Iowa Supreme Court decisions relating to the implementation of Iowa law in public school settings from 1971 to 1988 by Rasmussen, Elaine Linda
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1989
Iowa Supreme Court decisions relating to the
implementation of Iowa law in public school
settings from 1971 to 1988
Elaine Linda Rasmussen
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Educational Administration and Supervision Commons, and the Law Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rasmussen, Elaine Linda, "Iowa Supreme Court decisions relating to the implementation of Iowa law in public school settings from
1971 to 1988 " (1989). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 9234.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/9234
INFORMATION TO USERS 
. t 
The most advanced technology has been used to photo­
graph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm 
master. UMI films the text directly from the original or 
copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies 
are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type 
of computer printer. 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the 
quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, 
colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, 
print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a 
complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these 
will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material 
had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. 
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are re­
produced by sectioning the original, beginning at the 
upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in 
equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also 
photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced 
form at the back of the book. These are also available as 
one exposure on a standard 35mm slide or as a 17" x 23" 
black and white photographic print for an additional 
charge. 
Photographs included in the original manuscript have 
been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher 
quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are 
available for any photographs or illustrations appearing 
in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly 
to order. 
University Microfilms International 
A Bell & Howell Information Company 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, tVII 48106-1346 USA 
313/761-4700 800/521-0600 

Order Number 8920179 
Iowa Supreme Court decisions relating to the implementation of 
Iowa law in public school settings from 1971 to 1988 
Rasmussen, Elaine Linda, Ph.D. 
Iowa State University, 1989 
Copyright ©1989 by Rasmussen, Elaine Linda. All rights reserved. 
U M I  
SOON.ZeebRd. 
Ann Ait)or, MI 48106 

Iowa Supreme Court decisions relating to the 
A Dissertation Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Department: Professional Studies in Education 
Major; Education (Educational Administration) 
implementation of Iowa law in public school 
settings from 1971 to 1988 
by 
Elaine Linda Rasmussen 
Approved : 
o^Major Work 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
1989 
CopyrightElaine Linda Rasmussen, 1989. All rights reserved. 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
7 
9 
11 
12 
12 
14 
15 
21 
22 
25 
28 
29 
31 
33 
34 
38 
39 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Brief Review of Governmental Authority 
Statement of the Problem 
Need for the Study 
Delimitations of the Study 
CHAPTER II; REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Public Employment Relations 
Iowa Courts 
CHAPTER III: PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES USED IN THE STUDY 
Case Briefing 
Organization of the Study 
Definition of Terms 
CHAPTER IV: SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
School Districts as Quasi-Corporations of State 
Tuition 
Property Tax 
Tort Liability 
Religion 
Approval of Schools 
Significant Legislation Since 1970 
CHAPTER V: BOARDS OF EDUCATION 
Authority and Compliance 
Official Meetings 
Significant Legislation Since 1970 
iii 
CHAPTER VI: BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS 47 
Bids 47 
Reversion and Sale 52 
Significant Legislation Since 1970 55 
CHAPTER VII: PERSONNEL 57' 
Probationary Teachers 59 
Probationary Teachers Staff Reduction 59 
Probationary Teachers Contract Termination 61 
Nonprobationary Teachers Staff Reduction 65 
Nonprobationary Teachers Contract Termination 76 
Substitute Teachers 94 
Teacher Certification 96 
Discriminatory Practices 98 
Mandatory Retirement 101 
Extracurricular Contract 103 
Suspension Without Pay 104 
Benefits 106 
Administrators 109 
Unemployment Compensation 115 
Worker's Compensation 118 
Classified Employees Contract Termination 121 
Union Activities 124 
Military Service 125 
Significant Legislation Since 1970 126 
CHAPTER VIII: STUDENTS 130 
Eligibility 131 
iv 
Student Injury/Death 132 
Special Education 139 
Significant Legislation Since 1970 142 
CHAPTER IX; SCHOOL DISTRICT REORGANIZATION 144 
County Boards 145 
Area Education Agencies 148 
Significant Legislation Since 1970 149 
CHAPTER X: ELECTIONS 153 
Bond Issues 154 
CHAPTER XI; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 158 
t Working Agreement 162 
Elections 163 
Bargaining Unit 164 
Benefits 168 
Prohibited Practices 169 
Negotiability 172 
Impasse Arbitration 181 
CHAPTER XII: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 192 
Need for the Study 192 
Statement of the Problem 192 
Procedures and Techniques Used in the Study 192 
Delimitations of the Study 193 
School Districts 194 
Boards of Education 196 
Buildings and Grounds 197 
Personnel 198 
V 
Students 202 
School District Reorganization 203 
Elections 203 
Collective Bargaining 204 
Recommendations 206 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 209 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 217 
APPENDIX I: CASE LISTINGS BY CATEGORY CHART 218 
APPENDIX II: SCHOOLS IN COURT CHART 225 
APPENDIX III: COURT CASES 1971-1988 CHART 227 
APPENDIX IV: CASE FREQUENCY CHART 229 
APPENDIX V; CASE DISTRIBUTION CHART -- PERSONNEL 231 
APPENDIX VI: CASE DISTRIBUTION CHART -- COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 233 
1 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
For several decades, the public schools of Iowa have been in­
creasingly involved in litigation. Various sectors of the school com­
munity have looked with growing frequency to the courts as a means to 
rectify grievances. The emergence of public sector negotiations as 
practiced by the teacher organizations of the state has further served 
to bring school board members, administrators, and teachers into the 
courtrooms of Iowa. The demands upon the intellectual and fiscal 
resources of school districts to meet the needs created by an increasing 
number of courtroom appearances have risen in direct relationship to 
this trend. School authorities have developed a justifiable concern 
that such resources not be expended in litigation at the expense of 
the educational process. 
The laws under which schools in Iowa operate are established by 
the legislature. They are ultimately interpreted through court decisions 
when disputes arise as to legislative intent for their application 
to specific situations. Such interpretation fills in gaps that may 
exist in statutory law and creates a body of precedent which may be 
applied in future disputes. Prudent school authorities are able to 
utilize the body of court decisions to assist them in their interpreta­
tions of law and to help them apply these principles in such a manner 
as to avoid unnecessary litigation. 
The purpose of this study is to continue a survey of Iowa Supreme 
Court decisions which have been rendered throughout the history of 
the State, as began by Skarda in his dissertation completed in 1971 (1). 
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It is hoped that this study will provide insights to school authorities 
that will help them gain an understanding of the laws under which 
they must function, and thus allow them to more efficiently expend 
the resources for which they bear responsibility, and will update 
the research of Skarda. 
Brief Review of Governmental Authority 
In his study, Skarda provided an historical review of the govern­
mental structures which have a direct bearing on the operation of 
public schools in Iowa. That review is summarized here to provide 
immediate accessibility of that information to school authorities. 
Skarda's analysis of educational governance serves to reinforce 
an interesting insight into schools. Contrary to popular belief, 
the courts have firmly established the notion that the maintenance 
of schools is a state and not a local concern (2, p. 34). The school 
districts of Iowa are territorial divisions of the state and retain 
only those statutory powers expressly conferred by law, or reasonably 
implied as to the exercise of an expressly conferred power. The 
plenary power of state legislatures to enact statutes to govern the 
educational experiences of their citizens is exercised within the 
limitations of state constitutional paradigms (2, p. 35), 
There is no mention of education in the Constitution of the 
United States. The language of the tenth amendment of that document 
reserving the powers not delegated by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it, to the states leaves education primarily a responsibility of 
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each state individually. This is not to imply that the federal 
government has not had an impact upon education within the states. 
The Ordinance of 1787, known as the "Northwest Ordinance," affirmed 
the idea that a democracy cannot function adequately unless supported 
by an educated citizenry, and required each state to provide the re­
sources to encourage education (1, p. 3). 
Federal and state laws have influenced the development of educa­
tional institutions by providing the basis for civil court decisions 
and judicial opinions that interpret constitutional and statutory 
laws. In so doing, the courts rely upon general principles that have 
been traditional in the course of our nation's development. 
Working within the framework of state and federal statutes, and 
administrative rules developed pursuant to the laws, various state 
agencies may draft administrative policies and regulations. In the 
case of the Iowa public schools, the General Assembly has granted 
rule-making power to the State Board of Public Instruction. Rules 
promulgated by this agency have the force and effect of law, once 
adopted under the procedures outlined in Chapter 17A of the Code of 
Iowa. 
Statement of the Problem 
The laws which govern schools in Iowa are a product of the 
General Assembly, either by direct statute or by administrative rule 
having the force and effect of statutory law. These laws are 
continuously available to school authorities and interested individuals 
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in bound form, appropriately supplemented (3, p. 75). What is not 
immediately discernible from these publications are the compromises 
embodied in the development of amendments through the legislative 
process. Ambiguities may exist in the final document which are 
not readily apparent (1, p. 6). Some light may be shed upon unclear 
provisions of law by executive construction, either by appropriate 
department heads or by the attorney general. However, the Supreme 
Court of Iowa had indicated that even though such construction is 
entitled to consideration by the court, it is not binding upon it. 
The problem for school authorities then, is to obtain a complete 
picture of school law, not only as put into place by the General As­
sembly, but as interpreted by the Court in the process of resolving 
disputes. 
Need for the Study 
The public school system has become increasingly involved in 
terms of its relationship to the value system of the society that 
supports it. The amount of litigation focused upon educational 
practices has risen correspondingly. Many cases that would have gone 
unchallenged in the past now provide the setting for judicial 
definition or limitation of the action at issue. A catalytic factor 
in this march toward the courtroom is the changing face of education 
in terms of its social responsibility. Many view the classroom as 
the appropriate area for the delivery of remediation for such social 
challenges as substance abuse, .juvenile justice, vocational preparation, 
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and other troubling problems of a technologically changing society 
(2, p. xiv). 
Divisive litigation can have a paralytic effect upon the educa­
tional programs of a school system, and sap the human and financial 
resources which should be directed towards student instruction. The 
morale of the participants is often adversely affected and the mission 
of the educational process may become secondary. Additionally, the 
erosion of the resources of the schools through long and costly legal 
battles may raise questions about the wisdom of the actions that 
preceded such battles. The changing demographics of school districts 
prompts the courts to make long-term interpretations of the issues at 
hand, which may paralyze school personnel in terms of the immediate 
actions available to them (2, p. xiv). 
There is a need for risk management training in the area of 
legal precedent and decision making. School personnel must devote 
the majority of their educational training to the development and 
delivery of an appropriate educational program. They are not ex­
pected to become technologists in the area of legal procedures, but 
they can ill afford ignorance of the laws under which they must 
operate. It is hoped that this review, supplementing that of those 
cited, will assist those directly involved in the operation of public 
schools by providing a resource of court interpretations and judicial 
opinions of the school laws of the State of Iowa to date. 
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Delimitations of the Study 
Court decisions and reporting procedures vary from state to state 
in accordance with the legal requirements of the state. Consistent 
with the guidelines established by Skarda, this study is limited to 
the following; 
1. Iowa Supreme Court and reported Court of Appeals decisions 
from 1971 through 1988. 
2. Iowa Supreme Court and reported Court of Appeals decisions 
which only influence the operation of public schools. 
The history of these cases at the lower court level was 
not included in this study. 
3. Iowa Supreme Court and reported Court of Appeals decisions 
which currently influence the operation of public schools. 
Obsolete cases were excluded from the study except when 
used for historical reference. 
CHAPTER II; REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter consists of a review of related materials acquired 
from dissertations, theses, publications, and the Iowa Code. With 
the exception of the dissertation written by Paul Skarda of Iowa 
State University, no publication was primarily devoted to Supreme 
Court decisions in Iowa or any other state. 
The literature reviewed indicated the lack of any comprehensive 
study, or even a compilation of Iowa Supreme Court decisions which 
involve the public schools of this state since Skarda. A review of 
Comprehensive Dissertation Index, January 1971 to September 1988, 
indicated no record of a study which appears to research or catalogue 
decisions of the Iowa Supreme Court involving public educational 
agencies. A search of E.R.I.C., a computerized data bank of educational 
materials, also produced no titles or materials which deal directly 
with this subject. The Education Index, The Index to Legal Periodicals 
and Current Law Index list numerous articles that provide helpful 
background information, but none of them contain materials that cover 
the decisions of the Iowa Supreme Court with regard to school law. 
During the period of time covered by this study, several studies 
were completed in the form of dissertations which have contingent 
value in terms of procedure and background information. In 1976 
William Kritsonis of the University of Iowa wrote "A Study of Selected 
State Supreme and District Court Decisions on the Non-Renewal of 
Public School Professional Personnel Contracts for Reasons of De­
clining Enrollment or Economic Stress in Accordance with Due Process 
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of the Law." In the same year a study entitled "The Impact of 
Legal Decisions Rendered from 1970-76 Pertaining to State Athletic 
Association and Public School Board Eligibility Rules for Student 
Participation in Athletics" was written at Iowa State University by 
John Cox. 
Later studies include "An Analysis of the Contents and Develop­
ment of Open Meetings Laws in the United States with Emphasis upon 
Public Education and the Iowa Open Meetings Law" by Stephen Williams 
at The University of Iowa in 1980, and "An Examination of Supreme 
Court Case Law of Selected States Following Abrogation of Governmental 
Immunity of School Districts" by Judith Strickler at The University 
of Iowa in 1983. That same year a comprehensive study of "The 
Parameters of Student Legal Responsibility as Delineated In or Developed 
From Reported Federal Court Decisions Rendered Between February, 1969, 
and January, 1983" was completed by Larry Bartlett at Iowa State 
University. 
While these studies are pertinent in their content to the extent 
that they investigate legal regulations of school districts, they are 
either not specific to the state of Iowa, or comprehensive within 
the time frame under discussion here. 
In his study, Skarda reviewed three areas of literature from 
which many cases of record were drawn. Those areas are tort liability, 
students, and personnel. Significant in his discussion of tort 
liability was the evolution of legislation by the 62nd General 
Assembly in 1967 which abolished the doctrine of immunity from 
liability of Iowa public schools and subjected these school districts 
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to liability for the torts of their officers and employees while 
acting within the scope of their employment. 
Skarda's discussion of student rights centered upon the changes 
in judicial decisions in that regard based not upon new statutes, 
but upon a re-emphasis of constitutional rights (1, p. 13). In his 
study, Bartlett expanded the consideration of student rights in light 
of constitutional parameters, and investigated the parallel concept 
of student responsibilities under the law. 
The third area of review by Skarda, entitled "Personnel" dealt 
primarily with those rights enjoyed by certificated personnel, 
specifically teachers, within a school district. Certification, 
contracts, selection, dismissal, and retirement programs for teachers 
were among those issues discussed. This study will expand that dis­
cussion to include all employee groups within a school system, both 
certificated and classified. 
Public Employment Relations 
Since the inception of public sector negotiations for collectively 
bargained master contracts between public school employers and their 
certificated and classified employees, the Iowa Supreme Court has 
been asked to interpret Chapter 20, the Iowa Code a number of times. 
Chapter 20, known as the Public Employment Relations Act (PERA or 
PER Act) contains thirty sections specifying definitions and procedures 
for the accomplishment of public sector bargaining without the 
utilization of strike procedures. 
10 
To accomplish this goal, the Act authorizes the establishment 
of a Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) charged with the 
responsibility of administering the Act. The PERB consists of three 
members, appointed for staggered four-year terms by the governor, 
subject to confirmation by the senate. The duties of the PERB 
include; collecting data relating to wages, hours, benefits, and 
other conditions of public employment, and making that information 
available to interested persons or organizations; maintaining a list 
of qualified individuals to serve as fact-finders, mediators, and 
arbitrators, and establishing their compensation; holding hearings, 
examining witnesses, taking testimony and receiving evidence in cases 
brought before it; and adopting and enforcing rules to facilitate 
the administration of the Act. Each PERB member may serve as an 
individual hearing officer in cases before the Board. 
Having received a complaint, the PERB may dismiss it if a 
determination is made that the charge is without basis, or the hearing 
officer may conduct a hearing on the complaint and issue an order. 
The decisions of hearing officers may be appealed to the entire 
Board, and the decisions of the Board may be appealed to the District 
Court under the Administrative Procedure Act (4, p. 1). District 
Court decisions and rulings may be appealed to the State Supreme 
court for final disposition. 
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Iowa Courts 
In every county in the state there is at least one magistrate 
court. Magistrate courts have jurisdiction over limited types of 
civil and criminal matters. District Courts handle civil and criminal 
cases as well, including cases about domestic relations, adoptions, 
estates, and appeals of cases tried in magistrate court. The Iowa 
district court is a court of general jurisdiction. There are eight 
judicial districts in Iowa, each with one or more divisions. 
The Iowa Supreme Court is the highest appellate court in the 
state. Decisions made in district court may be appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which may elect to hear the case, or it may assign it 
to the Iowa Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court may also affirm or 
reverse decisions made by the Court of Appeals. 
The Iowa Court of Appeals was established in 1976 by the 66th 
General Assembly. It is a five-member appellate court. The Court of 
Appeals is authorized to review all civil and criminal actions, post­
conviction remedy proceedings, small claims actions, writs, orders, 
and other processes transferred to it by the Supreme Court (5, p. 15). 
The Iowa Court of Appeals hears only those cases transferred to it by 
the Supreme Court. Rulings issued by the Iowa Court of Appeals are 
reported in legal publications such as the North Western Reporter 
only if they may be cited as precedent for future litigation. 
12 
CHAPTER III: PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES 
USED IN THE STUDY 
The research referred to in this study has been historical and 
topical in nature and has been limited to primary source data. Those 
data consist of state Supreme Court decisions and Court of Appeals 
decisions contained in the Second Series of the North Western Reporter, 
the official reporter for Iowa since 1970. The Iowa Reports publication 
utilized by Skarda in his study ceased publication after 1970. The 
North Western Reporter, 2nd contains complete reported decisions from 
state supreme courts with jurisdiction in a specified geographical 
area of the United States, including Iowa. Appropriate court decisions 
published in this series were located using Shepard's Iowa Case Names 
Citator, 1925-1984. 
Secondary sources of information included commentaries and 
descriptions of court decisions contained in dissertations, publica­
tions of the Iowa Association of School Boards, and other publications 
pertinent to Iowa schools and related legal issues. Research fi jm 
these sources was conducted since 1970. 
Case Briefing 
To provide continuity between the Skarda study and this in­
vestigation, the system of briefing primary source cases utilized by 
Skarda has been adopted here. In his investigation Skarda obtained 
four major sources of information from each case: (1) facts, 
(2) issue or issues, (3) decision, and (4) reasons. From this 
13 
information, summaries were fashioned for each case which sought to 
capture the essence of the decision reached as well as the underlying 
reasoning which supported the decision. An example of a brief ob­
tained from the case of Aplington Community School District v. 
Iowa Public Employment Relations Board (6) is presented. 
Facts; 1. The Aplington Community School district and the 
Aplington Education Association, the exclusive collective 
bargaining agent for school teachers and other professional non-
supervisory employees in the district, were parties to a col­
lective bargaining agreement which was due to expire before the 
1985-86 school year. In December 1984, the parties began 
negotiating a successor contract to commence in July 1985. 
2. During negotiations, the association proposed that 
an article on evaluations be included in the contract. Language 
in this proposal established evaluation criteria to be utilized 
within the evaluation procedure, and additionally, constructed a 
grievance procedure to be used within the context of evaluation. 
3. The association argued that these proposals constituted 
mandatory subjects of bargaining under Iowa Code section 20.9 
of the Public Employment Relations Act. The district argued 
that they did not. 
4. Following a hearing on a request for an expedited 
resolution, PERB issued a ruling finding both proposals constituted 
matter for mandatory collective bargaining. 
5. The district filed a petition for judicial review 
in district court, which reversed the ruling of PERB and con­
cluded that neither of the disputed proposals was a mandatory 
subject of bargaining. 
6. From this ruling, both PERB and the association ap­
pealed. 
Issues: Must a public employer bargain about criteria by which 
its employees would be evaluated under 20.9 the Iowa Code? Does 
the right to grieve evaluations constitute a mandatory subject 
of bargaining? , 
Decision; The court decided for the appellants (PERB and the 
association). 
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Reasons: 1. In Saydel the court considered the statutory 
phrases "transfer procedures" and "procedures for staff reduction" 
within Iowa Code section 20.9. It stated that the term 
"procedures" in the PER Act had a broader meaning than it had been 
given in previous PERB decisions, and concluded that the term 
"procedures" necessarily included substantive criteria. The 
evaluation procedures criteria proposed by the association in 
this case had similarities to the impasse procedures criteria in 
that some comparisons of substantive factors were involved. They 
were also similar to the transfer procedures and procedures for 
staff reduction criteria found to be mandatory subjects for 
negotiation in Saydel. 
2. No principled difference existed between the facts 
existing in Saydel and those in the present case. It would have 
been inconsistent for the court to conclude that the term 
"procedures" had a different meaning within section 20.9 when it 
referred to transfer or staff reductions than when it followed 
the word "evaluation." 
3. Because the court determined that evaluation 
criteria are included in "evaluation procedures" as a mandatory 
subject for bargaining, it also ruled that the grievance procedures 
related to such a topic are also subject to mandatory negotia­
tion. 
In addition to the information supplied under the four major categories 
above, the date of the case, the name of the plaintiff and the 
defendant and the voting position of the judges is recorded. 
Organization of the Study 
In his study Skarda organized the Supreme Court cases into an 
approximation of the historical development of the practices and 
procedures of the school systems in Iowa. This study replicated 
that organization with some exceptions. The section of Skarda's 
study that dealt with teachers was expanded to include all employees 
that are part of a school system in Iowa. This group includes teachers, 
administrators, and classified or support employees. 
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An additional chapter was written to document the Supreme Court 
cases that have grown from the collective bargaining process since its 
inception. The study is organized into twelve chapters related 
to the following topics; 
Chapter I Introduction 
Chapter II Review of Literature 
Chapter III Procedures and Techniques Used in the Study 
Chapter IV School Districts 
Chapter V Boards of Education 
Chapter VI Buildings and Grounds 
Chapter VII Personnel 
Chapter VIII Students 
Chapter IX School District Reorganization 
Chapter X Elections 
Chapter XI Collective Bargaining 
Chapter XII Summary and Recommendations 
Each chapter is divided into subtopics with the appropriate 
case decisions included. Summaries of each case are presented with 
attendant citations and headnotes as reported in the North Western 
Reporter, 2nd. Where appropriate, at the conclusion of each chapter 
a brief discussion of the issues and trends evidenced in legislative 
activity since 1970 is presented. 
Definition of Terms 
A study of the reports of the cases heard by the Iowa Supreme 
Court necessarily involved terminology used primarily by those 
familiar with legal lexicon and required that some definition of 
terms be included. The following list of terminology was derived 
from the cases discussed in the study. The definition for the terms 
was taken from Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition (7), a West 
publication. 
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Addltur: The power of trial court to assess damages or increase 
amount of an inadequate award made by jury verdict, as 
condition of denial of motion for new trial, with consent of 
defendant whether or not plaintiff consents to such action. 
Adjudicate; To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. 
To determine finally. 
Affirm: In the practice of appellate courts, to affirm a judg­
ment, decree, or order, is to declare that it is valid and 
right and must stand as rendered. 
Allegation; The assertion, claim, declaration, or statement of 
a party to an action, made in a pleading setting out what he 
expects to prove. 
Amicus Curiae; Literally, friend of the court. A person or 
agency with strong interest in or views on the subject matter 
of an action may petition the court for permission to file a 
brief, ostensibly on behalf of a party but actually to 
suggest a rationale consistent with its own views. 
Appeal; Resort to a superior (i.e., appellate) court to review 
the decision of an inferior (i.e., trial) court or ad­
ministrative agency. 
Appellant; The party who takes an appeal from one court or 
jurisdiction to another. 
Appellee; The party in a cause against whom an appeal is taken; 
that is, the party who has an interest adverse to setting 
aside or reversing the judgment. Sometimes also called the 
"respondent." It should be noted that a party's status as 
appellant or appellee does not necessarily bear any relation 
to his status as plaintiff or defendant in the lower court. 
Arbitration; The reference of a dispute to an impartial 
(third) person chosen by the parties to the dispute who 
agree in advance to abide by the arbitrator's award issued 
after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity 
to be heard. 
Certiorari; To be informed of. A writ of common law origin 
issued by a superior to an inferior court requiring the latter 
to produce a certified record of a particular case tried 
therein. 
Citation of authorities; The reading, or production of, or 
reference to, legal authorities and precedents in arguments 
to courts, in legal textbooks, law review articles, briefs. 
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or the like to establish or fortify the propositions 
advanced. 
Collateral attack: With respect to a judicial proceeding, an 
attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny its force 
and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by 
law for the express purpose of attacking it. 
Concurring opinion; A separate opinion delivered by one or more 
judges which agrees with the decision of the majority of the 
court but offering own reasons for reaching that decision. 
Contract: An agreement between two or more persons which creates 
an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing. 
Declaratory Judgment: A binding adjudication of the rights and 
status of litigants even though no consequential relief is 
awarded. 
De Facto: In fact, in deed, actually. 
Defendant: The person defending or denying; the party against 
whom relief or recovery is sought in an action. 
De jure: Descriptive of a condition in which there has been total 
compliance with all requirements of law. Of right;, legitimate; 
lawful, by right and just title. 
De novo: Anew; afresh; a second time. 
Demurrer: An allegation of a defendant, which, admitting the 
matters of fact alleged by complaint or bill to be true, 
shows that as they are therein set forth they are insuffi­
cient for the plaintiff to proceed upon or to oblige the 
defendant to answer. 
Dissent: Contrariety of opinion. Most commonly used to denote 
the explicit disagreement of one or more judges of a court 
with the decision passed by the majority upon a case before 
them. In such event, the nonconcurring judge is reported 
as "dissenting." A dissent may or may not be accompanied 
by an opinion. 
Due process: Two such clauses are found in the U.S. Constitution, 
one in the 5th Amendment pertaining to the federal govern­
ment, the other in the 14th Amendment which protects persons 
from state actions. There are two aspects: procedural, 
in which a person is guaranteed fair procedures, and 
substantive, which protects a person's property from unfair 
governmental interference or taking. 
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Enjoin; To require; command; positively direct. To require a 
person by writ of injunction, to perform, or to abstain or 
desist from, some act. 
Estop; To stop, bar, or impede; to prevent; to preclude. 
Governmental Immunity; The federal, state and local governments 
are not amenable to actions in tort except in cases in 
which they have consented to be sued. The federal government 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act has waived its immunity 
in certain cases -"in the same manner and to the same extent 
as a private individual under like circumstances." Most 
states have also waived governmental immunity to various 
degrees at both the state and municipal government levels. 
Injunction; A prohibitive, equitable remedy issued or granted 
by a court at the suit of a party complainant, directed to 
a party defendant in the action, or to a party made a 
defendant, for that purpose, forbidding the latter to do 
some act which he is threatening or attempting to commit, 
or restraining him in the continuance thereof, such act being 
unjust and inequitable, injurious to the plaintiff, and not 
such as can be adequately redressed by an action at law. 
In loco parentis; In the place of a parent; instead of a parent; 
charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and 
responsibilities. 
In re; In the affair; in the matter of; concerning; regarding. 
Interlocutory; Provisional; interim; temporary; not final. 
Judgment; The official and authentic decision of a court of 
justice upon the respective rights and claims of the parties 
to an action or suit therein litigated and submitted to its 
determination. The final decision of the court resolving 
the dispute and determining the rights and obligations of the 
parties. 
Laches; "Doctrine of laches," is based upon the maxim that equity 
aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. 
It is defined as neglect to assert right or claim which, 
taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances 
causing prejudice to adverse party, operates as bar in court 
of equity. 
Liability; A broad legal term. It has been referred to as of 
the most comprehensive significance, including almost every 
character of hazard or responsibility, absolute, contingent, 
or likely. It has been defined to mean; all character of 
debts and obligations. 
19 
Liable; Bound or obliged in law or equity; responsible. 
Mandamus: We command. This is the name of a writ which issues 
from a court of superior jurisdiction, and is directed to a 
private or municipal corporation, or any of its officers, 
or to an executive, administrative or judicial officer, or 
to an inferior court, commanding the performance of a 
particular act, therein specified. 
Mediation: Intervention; interposition; the act of a third 
person in intermediating between two contending parties with 
a view to persuading them to adjust or settle their dispute. 
Parol: A word; speech; he^ice, oral or verbal. Expressed or 
evidenced by speech only; as opposed to by writing or by 
sealed instrument. 
Petition: A formal written request addressed to some governmental 
authority. 
Plaintiff; A person who brings an action; the party who complains 
or sues in a civil action and is so named on the record. 
Plenary; Full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified. 
Quasi: As if; almost as it were; analogous to. This term is 
used in legal phraseology to indicate that one subject re­
sembles another, with which it is compared, in certain 
characteristics, but that there are intrinsic and material 
differences between them. 
Quasi judicial: A term applied to the action, discretion, etc. 
of public administrative officers or bodies, who are 
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of 
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a 
basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion 
of a judicial nature. 
Ratification: In a broad sense, the confirmation of a previous 
act done either by the party himself or by another; as 
confirmation of a voidable act. 
Relief; Deliverance from oppression, wrong, or injustice. In 
this sense it is used as a general designation of the as­
sistance, redress, or benefit which a complainant seeks at 
the hands of a court, particularly in equity. 
Remand: To send back. The sending by the appellate court of 
the cause back to the same court out of which it came, for 
purpose of having some further action taken on it there. 
20 
Res ipsa loquitur; The thing speaks for itself; rule of evidence 
whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred 
from mere fact that accident happened provided character 
of accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably 
to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have 
occurred. 
Res judicata; A matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon 
or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. 
Statute: An act of the legislature declaring, commanding, or 
prohibiting something; a particular law enacted and 
established by the will of the legislative department of 
government. 
Tort; A private or civil wrong or injury, other than breach of 
contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in 
the form of an action for damages. Three elements of every 
tort action are; Existence of legal duty from defendant to 
plaintiff, breach of duty, and damage as proximate result. 
Vitiate; To impair; to make void or voidable; to cause to fail 
of force or effect. 
Writ: An order issued from a court requiring the performance 
of a specified act, or giving authority to have it done. 
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CHAPTER IV: SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
School districts are the basic units of school government in the 
State of Iowa. Statutory authority for their creation as corporations 
with limited powers is found in Chapter 274, School Districts in 
General, The Code of Iowa. Historically school districts have operated 
under one of three structures authorized by Iowa statute. 
An independent school district is one which bears the name of 
the city, township, or village in which it is operated. If there is 
more than one district in that geographic unit, an appropriate name 
or number must be included in its designation, such as Greeley Inde­
pendent School No. 8, or the Independent School District of East 
Greene Township. 
Consolidated school districts were created at a later date in an 
attempt to obtain a larger tax base. Consolidated schools were often 
marriages of smaller independent districts with centrally located 
buildings, frequently in rural areas. A consolidated school district 
must be so designated in its name: i.e., Starmont Consolidated 
School District. 
Community school districts were the last to be conceived, 
responding to a need for an even larger tax base. Community school 
districts may have more than one attendance center per district and 
are not limited to one centrally-located facility. 
While the number of instances that the Supreme Court of Iowa 
has been asked to assist in the resolution of problems relating to the 
nature, power, duties, and responsibilities of school districts are not 
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legion, they are nonetheless significant in the definition of their 
operation, and the limitations placed upon them by statute. 
School Districts as Quasi-Corporations of State 
Chapter 274.2, The Code, states that the provisions of law rela­
tive to common schools shall apply alike to all districts, except 
when otherwise clearly stated. The powers given to one form of 
corporation, or to a board in one kind of corporation, shall be 
exercised by the other in the same manner, as nearly practicable. 
The exception stipulated in this section is that school districts 
may not incur original indebtedness by issuing bonds until so 
authorized by the voters of the school corporation. 
The following cases fall generally into the category of litigation 
arising out of the operation of school districts as limited corporations 
under the statutes; 
Clinton Community School District v. Anderson (8) 
The Clinton District filed suit against Charles Anderson who 
was Clerk of District Court in and for Clinton County, Maurice 
Baringer, who was the Treasurer of the State of Iowa, and the Iowa 
Department of Environmental Quality to retrieve certain fines which 
had been levied by the state against a private corporation in Clinton 
County for the discharge of waste into the Mississippi River. The 
district pursued its claim under the wording of Chapter 666.3 of the 
Iowa Code which provided; "All fines and forfeitures, after deducting 
therefrom court costs, court expenses..., and fees of collection. 
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if any, and not otherwise disposed of, shall go into the treasury 
of the county where the same are collected for the benefit of the 
school fund." 
The state based its case upon a different chapter of the code. 
Chapter 4556.59(1), which made some differentiation between the terms 
"civil" penalty and "criminal" penalty, and provided for the collection 
of civil penalties by the state, not the county. The Supreme Court 
upheld the state's contention and the fines were duly accorded to 
the state. 
Civil penalty imposed upon private corporation for dis­
charging pollutants into river was not a criminal fine 
and thus was not required to go into treasury of county 
where the penalty was collected for benefit of school fund; 
rather, the proceeds should have been paid directly to 
state treasury (8, p. 73). 
Hubbard v. Pes Moines Independent Community School District (9) 
Hubbard, an employee of the district had his wages subjected to 
garnishment under Chapter 642.14, The Code. The district duly sur­
rendered the monies to the Sheriff for disposition, Hubbard brought 
action against the district because he had not been given advance 
notice that such action would be taken. The district alleged it had 
no responsibility to give notice of garnishment under the law. A 
subsidiary issue was, if the district had been so obligated, did its 
failure to do so create a wage-claim cause of action? 
The court ruled that section 624.4 imposes the responsibility of 
notification to the principal defendant upon the garnishment plaintiff, 
and not the garnishee, in this case, the school district. As a 
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consequence the issue of the wage-claim cause of action was rendered 
void. 
Statute proscribing entry of judgment against garnishee 
until principal defendant has had ten days' notice of 
garnishment proceeding imposes duty on garnishment plaintiff 
to give notice of garnishment proceeding to principal 
defendant, and neither statute nor common law placed such 
duty on garnishee; since garnishee therefore does not have 
duty to give notice, no action for alleged breach lies 
against garnishee (9, p. 239). 
Hoefer v. Sioux City Community School District (10) 
Robert and William Hoefer, representing a previous provider of 
health insurance to the Sioux City School District filed a petition 
asking that a writ of certiorari be granted to determine if the 
district had exceeded its authority in granting an insurance contract 
to the Wisconsin Education Association Insurance Trust. The district 
had advertised for bids and the agency represented by the Hoefers had 
submitted the lowest bid. The district, nonetheless, acting in open 
session, granted the contract to the WEAIT, alleging that it had 
absolute jurisdiction over the matter. The court held that certiorari 
was available in this case, because the district had made decisions 
that were quasi-judicial in nature in its process of adopting the bid 
of Wisconsin Education Association Insurance Trust. 
In determining whether action is judicial or quasi-judicial 
in nature for purpose of granting certiorari, factors to be 
considered are whether questioned act involves proceeding 
in which notice and opportunity to be heard are required, 
whether determination of rights of parties is made which 
requires exercise of discretion in finding facts and applying 
law, or whether challenged act goes to determination of some 
right protection of which is peculiar office of courts 
(10, p. 222). 
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Sioux City Community School District v. Board of Public Instruction (11) 
This case is subsequent to the decision in Hoefer (10). Hoefer 
pursued his appeal of the Sioux City School District's action in 
rejecting his bid and accepting that of the Wisconsin Education As­
sociation Insurance Trust, claiming that the district was not authorized 
to contract with the WEAIT for health insurance in view of Iowa Code 
section 509A.6. In that section, the legislature has listed specific 
types of entities with whom public bodies may contract for such in­
surance. The State Board of Public Instruction, upheld by the Court, 
ruled that in so doing, the legislature Implied the exclusion of pos­
sible insurers. In a related decision the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled the Wisconsin Education Association 
Insurance Trust did not qualify as an employee welfare benefit plan 
under the Employee Retirement Security Act. 
Purpose of statute governing contracts between insurance 
carriers or health maintenance organizations and governing 
bodies of school districts is to assure school employees 
that their fringe benefits, paid by employee contributions 
and tax funds, will be afforded the protection provided by 
insurance commissioner's regulation of insurance providers 
(11, p. 739). 
Tuition 
Tuition is defined as financial reimbursement for educational 
services. The statutory authority for school districts to provide 
free education to bona fide residents of the district and to establish 
and charge tuition to nonresidents is Chapter 282, The Code. Skarda 
identified two cases which resulted in Supreme Court decisions prior 
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to 1971. Since that study, two additional disagreements about the 
payment of tuition have been considered by that Court. 
Maquoketa Community School District v. George (12) 
Mary and William George were the parents of four minor children, 
all of whom attended school in the Maquoketa Community School District. 
The Maquoketa board determined that they were in fact, not residents 
of the district, and should either be attending school elsewhere or 
paying tuition to the district. George appealed to the State Board 
of Public Instruction which agreed with the position taken by the 
board and directed the family to begin payment of tuition for educa­
tional services. 
George challenged the State Board's decision and claimed that it 
was prohibited from entering a money decision in this appeal. The 
Court held that the Board's decision could not be attacked by appeal, 
and was in fact res judicata in this case. The decision alleged to 
be a money decision was in fact, a decision to charge tuition, not a 
judgment for a fee or penalty. The decision of the State Board was 
affirmed. 
Though determined by State Board of Public Instruction 
that children were not actual residents of districts in 
which they were attending school determined essential 
element of cause of action to collect tuition from the 
parents of such children, such determination did not 
violate statutory prohibition against Board entering a money 
judgment, since other essential elements of the cause of 
action remained to be determined as provided by law (12, 
p. 520). 
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Lakota Consolidated Independent School v. Buffalo Center (13) 
The Lakota School District alleged in a petition to the Court that 
the Buffalo Center-Rake Community School District had permitted students 
whose residence was in the Lakota District to attend school in Buffalo 
Center without payment of tuition, and that the Buffalo Center District 
had in fact, provided bus transportation to those students outside of 
its own district. The students in question were the wards of legal 
guardians who lived within the Buffalo Center District but they 
continued to live with their parents who were residents of the Lakota 
District. 
The Court ruled that the encouragements offered the students by 
Buffalo Center, i.e., attendance without tuition and transportation 
outside of the district, had the net effect of encouraging these 
students to continue attending school in Buffalo Center, and of de­
priving the Lakota District of revenues in the form of state aid. 
The balance lies between requiring the Buffalo Center-Rake District 
to comply with the law on one hand, and permitting financial loss 
to the Lakota District on the other. 
Plaintiff school district's claim that defendant school 
district allowed students residing in plaintiff district, 
who would have otherwise attended there, to attend school 
in defendant district without payment of tuition, thus 
causing loss of state foundation school aid to plaintiff 
with interest which was both ascertainable and worthy of 
protection, and sufficiently stated claim for money damages 
on which relief could be granted (13, p. 704). 
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Property Tax 
Property tax has been a source of support for the public schools 
of Iowa since the time of their inception. Statutory authority for 
school boards to establish budgets and levy property tax to support 
them is found in the Local Budget Law, Chapter 24, The Code. Al­
though school budget certification is often a source of controversy 
within local districts, it has not been the subject of Supreme Court 
consideration with any great frequency. Skarda discussed eight such 
cases occurring before 1970, and one additional case is cited here 
since that time. 
Langel v. Board of Supervisors of Carroll County (14) 
The Eden Township School District did not operate a public school 
within its district during the years 1964-1968, but sent its public 
school students to schools operating in nearby Manning and Templeton 
Independent School District. Tuition was paid by the Eden School 
District to the host districts. Electors in the Eden District 
participated in the election process for the Carroll County Board of 
Education, and education services were provided to Eden students by 
the county system. Nonetheless, a group of taxpayers of Eden School 
District filed suit for a refund of property taxes levied in their 
district, alleging that section 273.2 of the law stipulated that 
taxes be levied to support public schools, and that the Eden District, 
in fact, did not operate a public school. 
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The Court ruled the statute to be ambiguous, and invoked 
statutory construction to interpret the intent of the law. The 
Court reasoned the legislative intent would more accurately use the 
terminology "public school districts" in its application of taxation 
rules, thereby including school districts regardless of whether or 
not a public school was operated therein. 
Where school district and its residents had been furnished 
services by county school system, resident electors of 
district had voted for county school system officials and 
district had in fact operated as part of county school 
system, school district residents were subject to county 
school taxes in the same manner as any other school 
districts which were part of the county system (14, p. 608). 
Tort Liability 
Tort liability means every civil wrong which results in- wrongful 
death or injury to person or property rights and includes, but is not 
restricted to, actions based upon negligence, error or omission, 
nuisance, breach of duty, or denial or impairment of any right under 
any constitutional provision, statute or rule of law. For many years 
the Iowa public schools were immune to these liabilities because they 
were considered to be agencies of the state. Chapter 613A, the Code 
sets forth the laws now in effect regarding tort liability of 
governmental subdivisions. Section 613A.1 describes the meaning of 
"municipality" in tort proceedings to include city, county, township, 
school district, and any other unit of local government except a soil 
conservation district. With some exceptions noted in this chapter, 
every municipality in that definition is subject to liability for its 
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torts and those of its officers and employees, acting within the 
scope of their employment or duties. 
Since 1971 there have been many instances of tort liability claims 
as part of litigation against school districts. Most of them are con­
tained within actions found in other chapters of this study, particularly 
those cases involving personnel. One instance of a tort created 
through nuisance dealing specifically with a school district has also 
reached the Supreme Court and is cited here. 
Kriener v. Turkey Valley Community School District (15) 
Luke and Leona Kriener were owner-operators of a dairy farm 
located adjacent to the site where the Turkey Valley Community School 
District constructed a new high school in 1963. A small creek drained 
from the school property through the Kriener'farm. As part of the 
construction, the district established a sewage treatment lagoon or 
stabilization pond near the creek. The Krieners contended that after 
the district began using the lagoon, offensive and sickening odors 
emanated from the lagoon and effluent was noticeably present in the 
creek waters on the Kriener farm. In subsequent years the Krieners 
began having difficulty with calf mortality and herd mastitis, which 
they attributed to the herd's contact with the creek flowing from 
the lagoon area. 
Other witnesses for the district disputed the Kriener's claims 
of odors and unprocessed sewage being present, and testified as to 
the legality of the construction of the stabilization pond. The Court 
ruled that, even though the pond might be legally constructed, it 
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still could constitute a tort, and the district was not immune from 
an action for injunctive relief and damages. Section 657.1, The 
Code, provided: "Whatever is... offensive to the senses, or an 
obstruction to the free use of property, so as essentially to interfere 
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance, and 
civil action by ordinary proceedings may be brought to enjoin and 
abate the same and to recover damages sustained on account thereof." 
Accordingly, the Court assessed damages to the district and provided 
an injunction against further use of the lagoon. 
Generally, probable cause of damages to person or property 
by maintenance of a nuisance is determinable by the trier 
of the facts (15, p. 526). 
Religion 
The separation of church and state is a doctrine established by 
the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Iowa. Al­
though prior to 1971 there were cases before the Supreme Court that 
dealt directly with challenges to that doctrine. A different issue 
has evolved since that time from the concepts of religion and education 
This issue falls more into the realm of compulsory attendance of school 
age children and their attendance at nonapproved religious schools. 
Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education (16) 
The issues litigated in this case were twofold. The first issue 
involved a determination of whether the state has a fundamental 
authority to set education standards for private religious schools; 
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the second dealt with Section 299.24, The Code, popularly called the 
Amish exemption. 
In the fall of 1980 the Cavalry Baptist Church of Charles City 
organized a parochial school to serve the children of its members. 
The curriculum chosen was the Accelerated Christian Education Program. 
Parents are given the responsibility for reporting information to the 
state regarding the provision of education to their children. Parents 
of children attending this school failed to do so, and the state 
charged them with violating Iowa's compulsory attendance law, Iowa 
Code 299. They in turn, sought relief by asking that the Amish 
exemption be applied equally to their situation. 
Citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510 S. Ct. 571 
(1925) as authority, the Court refused to limit or curtail the power 
of the state to reasonably regulate all schools, to Inspect, super­
vise, and examine them, their teachers, and their pupils, to require 
attendance, and to mandate that certain studies plainly essential to 
good citizenship be required. One way the state has done this is to 
enact compulsory education statutes. A citizen must submit to such 
statutes, persuade society to change them, or join a society without 
them. 
To obtain an exemption under Section 299.24, the court ruled the 
congregation had to prove that tenets of their church were in conflict 
with teaching the subjects listed in the statute. The requirement of 
reporting students' attendance and hiring a certificated teacher did 
not deny the church of its ability to teach those subjects in its own 
way with books and teachers of its own exclusive choice. The church 
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did not demonstrate that their children's educational needs were sig­
nificantly different from those of other children, as in the case of 
the Amish community. 
State has clear right to set minimum educational standards 
for all its children and corresponding responsibility to see 
to it that those standards are honored; when such standards 
are set in place, compliance with them falls within ambit of 
fundamental contract between citizen and society (16, p. 
74). 
Legislature did not intend "Amish exception" to compulsory 
attendance law to be available to any and all church groups 
who seek to provide for religiously oriented education (16, 
p. 75). 
Approval of Schools 
Statutory authority for the approval of schools for state aid . 
payments is found in Chapter 257, The Code of Iowa. Section 257.25 
provides that the State Board of Public Instruction establish 
standards for approving all public and nonpublic schools in Iowa 
offering instruction at any or all levels from the prekindergarten 
level through grade twelve. It further stipulates that the State Board 
maintain a list of all so authorized schools in the state, and that it 
promulgate rules to require that a multicultural, nonsexist approach 
is used to implement the educational program by all school districts. 
The standards that constitute an approved educational program 
have been under constant scrutiny and review by the legislature, 
particularly in the last few years, and are subject to addition or 
augmentation by that body, as well as by the State Board of Public 
Instruction. 
34 
Skarda discussed one incident whereby the constitutionality of 
mandated rules for the operation of schools was challenged. There 
has not been a similar challenge since Skarda completed his study, 
and no other cases involving educational standards per se have reached 
the Supreme Court. The only reference to standards as an issue was 
discussed in the section above, dealing with a nonapproved religious 
school. 
Significant Legislation Since 1970 
In 1976, the Sixty-sixth General Assembly enacted legislation 
establishing the maximum tuition fee that a district may require for 
students attending a school in a district other than their district 
of residence. That amount is established as either the state cost per 
pupil or the district cost per pupil of the receiving district, as 
computed under the school foundation aid formula. The tuition fee 
is the lesser of the two figures. 
House File 2361, enacted in 1978 makes changes in the operation 
and financing of school districts. It defines and provides for com­
munity education programs and allows school districts to utilize 
their recreation levy for such programs. The date of certification 
for the Schoolhouse Fund Levy is changed from February 1 to March 15. 
Legislation in 1981 allows school districts located near Iowa's 
borders to send students to a public school across the state line if 
the school in the other state is closer than the resident attendance 
center. It authorizes the district to pay tuition at a rate acceptable 
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to both boards, but not less than the lower average cost per pupil 
of the two affected school districts for the previous year. 
Major attention was paid to the school districts of Iowa during 
the 1985 session of the Seventy-first General Assembly. House File 
686 enacted many of the recommendations of the Excellence in Education 
Task Force. In the area of approval of schools and standards, the 
Act requires the State Board of Public Instruction to review standards 
for approved schools and to develop new standards after consultation 
with affected education groups and associations. The new standards 
are required to reflect more than the educational program of the school 
or school district and must relate to the entire school planning, 
teaching, and assessment environment. 
The Act also revises the section of the Code that requires school 
districts to develop goals and assess progress toward meeting such 
goals, requiring the use of advisory committees in the development 
process and the evaluation of progress. The Act requires the State 
Board of Public Instruction to develop model policies and curricula 
in a number of different areas and to perform a number of functions 
relating to competency testing procedures for students, surveying the 
educational needs of business and industry, encouraging the sharing of 
nonathletic programs, developing expectations for academic preparation 
of high school students, and developing and utilizing different kinds 
of information from school districts. It directs the State Board 
to develop recommendations relating to evaluation processes of school 
employees, for conducting research and development, and for preschool 
activities. 
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The Act specifies that the parent or guardian of a student may 
obtain from the State Board of Instruction a review of an action or 
omission of the board of a school district if the parent or guardian 
believes that the student is not receiving an appropriate instructional 
program. 
A portion of H.F. 499 passed by the 1987 Iowa General Assembly 
has significant effect on approval standards for Iowa schools, providing 
for modifications to the accreditation process adopted previously and 
the role of the State Board of Public Instruction in that process. 
This statute requires that each school district and nonpublic 
school desiring approval must meet the accreditation standards prescribed 
by July 1, 1989. The Department of Education must monitor school 
districts and nonpublic schools by means of a review of compliance 
form to be completed by the schools and an annual onsite visit by 
Department employees. Under certain conditions, the Director of 
Education may appoint an accreditation committee to visit the school 
district or nonpublic school to determine whether the standards have 
been met and to report its findings to the Director. An appeal process 
is available if the committee's findings are negative, a correction 
plan may be developed, and further review carried out. If the de­
ficiencies are not corrected, the State Board must merge the school 
district with one or more contiguous school districts. 
The 1988 General Assembly produced S.F. 2094 which requires 
that minimum curriculum standards for grades one through six supplement 
courses already taught in the areas of health, physical education, 
and communicable diseases with instruction about human sexuality. 
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self-esteem, stress management. Interpersonal relationships, and ac­
quired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). Additionally, each school 
board must provide an outline of the human growth and development 
curriculum requirements to parents annually. 
S.F. 2278 supplants the school standards previously contained in 
section 256.11 with an educational program based upon the rules 
adopted by the State Board of Education under section 256.17. The 
new program is to be taught from a global perspective at all grade 
levels. The major impact of this legislation is to increase require­
ments in all subject areas in grades nine through twelve, increase 
vocational education standards, provide for qualified media specialists 
in each school, and to require programs for special education, gifted 
and talented, and at-risk students. 
Such changes in requirements constitute potential challenges to 
not only the requirements themselves, but the discretionary authority 
to measure their attainment and the actions taken by the State Board 
of Public Instruction as a consequence of their determinations on re­
view. 
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CHAPTER V: BOARDS OF EDUCATION 
Since education has been defined by the courts, the State Constitu­
tion, and the State Legislature as a state function, and since the 
Federal Constitution passed this responsibility along to the states 
in an indirect manner, members of the board of directors of a school 
district are officials of the state. Although they are elected in 
local elections to represent a finite jurisdiction, they are ulti­
mately responsible to the State Department of Education and the State 
Legislature and are governed by the statutes of the State of Iowa. 
Historically, school boards drew their genesis from committees 
that were established by New England town meetings to regulate the 
schools and to deal with problems that may have accrued to the schools. 
With the increasing complexity of the educational process, these com­
mittees soon were replaced by boards of directors, elected by the 
public, and guided by statutory direction. 
Chapter 277 of the Code of Iowa sets forth the procedures to be 
followed in the election of school board members in this state, and 
Chapter 279 provides the powers and duties thereof. In Iowa, the 
requirements to be eligible to be elected to the board of directors 
of a school district are the same as those qualifications which bestow 
eligibility to vote. These qualifications are: (1) to be a citizen 
of the United States, (2) to be at least twenty-one years of age, 
and (3) to be a resident of the state at least six months, of the county 
sixty days, and of the local district ten days. 
School districts including all or part of a city of fifteen 
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thousand or more population must have seven members on the board of 
directors. All other districts must have five. Any district 
may authorize seven members if it so chooses, but none may have less 
than five (17, p. 298). The terms of board members rotate and are so 
arranged that an entire board is not elected at the same time. Most 
terms are for three years. 
Decisions of boards of directors are subject to appeal, either 
administratively or judicially, depending upon the nature of the 
dispute. In his study Skarda identified sixteen cases in which the 
authority of school boards to act in a given manner was disputed in 
the Supreme Court. In the area of authority and compliance, only 
one case has reached that level of adjudication since 1970. 
Authority and Compliance 
Bishop V. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction and Valley Community 
School District (18) 
The Valley Education Association filed a complaint with the 
Iowa Professional Teaching Practices Commission charging Superintendent 
of Schools Richard Burmeister with unprofessional practices. The 
complaint emanated from the temporary suspension by Burmeister of 
five teachers of the school district, resulting from a drinking 
incident. Burmeister acted with the apparent knowledge and implied 
approval of the school board. The Valley Community School Board 
approved payment of Burmeister's legal fees incurred as a result of the 
proceeding. Two teachers then filed an appeal with the State Board of 
Public Instruction, challenging the school board's authority to pay 
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Burmeister's legal expenses in such a hearing. A panel of the Board 
of Public Instruction found that the school board had such authority, 
and the teachers appealed for judicial review. 
The Court ruled the phrase "as necessary" in section 279.37 
created a strong inference of board discretion on the. part of local 
boards in making decisions to employ counsel. The only powers of a 
school board are those expressly granted or necessarily implied 
in the governing statutes. The language of the section allows payment 
of legal expenses of the school corporation, making no specific 
mention of school administrators. The actions of Burmeister were 
official actions taken by him on behalf of the district. The board 
had authority to act in the manner it did. 
School board had discretionary power to pay school super­
intendent's legal expenses incurred in defending complaint 
filed against him with professional teaching practices 
commission which arose out of superintendent's suspension 
of five teachers, which constituted official school 
action on behalf of school district (18, p. 889). 
Official Meetings 
The intent of Chapter 21, The Code, is to assure, through a 
requirement of open meetings of governmental bodies, that the basis 
and rationale of governmental decision, as well as those decisions 
themselves, are easily accessible to the people. If there is any 
ambiguity in the construction or application of this law, the statute 
itself dictates resolution in favor of openness (19). The remaining 
three cases discussed here and which have been considered by the 
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Supreme Court since 1971 deal with the issue of open meetings and 
public disclosure of the basis and rationale for a decision made by 
a school board. 
Anti-Administration Association v. North Fayette Community School 
District (20) 
There was considerable public interest in the activities of the 
North Fayette Community School Board during the spring of 1971. A 
group who called themselves the Anti-Administration Association 
desired to participate in conducting the administrative affairs of 
the district. At the regular meeting on March 15, 1971, the board's 
agenda included a consideration of the contracts to be offered 
teachers for the coming school year, as well as a separate discussion of 
contracts for the four principals and the superintendent. After a 
brief public session the board adjourned to a closed session for the 
purpose of discussing certain personalities of teachers on the staff, 
and to discuss administrative salaries. Following the closed session 
the board reconvened in open session and authorized the offer of all 
contracts. Counsel for the taxpayer's group filed an action against 
the board, seeking to void the contracts and to issue an injunction 
against the board preventing future closed meetings. 
The court ruled that there was no actual violation of the 
open meetings law, but the board had been careless in its adherence 
to it. It further ruled that Chapter 28A could not be interpreted 
to state that a violation thereof would void the action of the public 
body. There was no evidence that the board would violate the open 
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meetings law in the future so the injunction would not be an appropriate 
remedy. 
Even if "open meetings" law was violated when contracts 
for school teachers and administrators were approved by 
board, such contracts were neither void nor voidable (20, 
p. 724). 
Keeler v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction and the Marshalltown 
Community School District (21) 
The board of directors of the Marshalltown Community School 
District decided in March 1981 to close the elementary school in 
Albion at the end of the 1980-81 school year. The decision was made 
after several months of discussion regarding budgetary constraints and 
various methods of addressing them. The agenda- for the meeting at 
which the decision was finally reached did not specifically list "school 
closing" as an item, but included it under the general category of 
"budget cuts," Keeler and sixty other persons residing in or near 
Albion appealed to the State Board of Public Instruction to void the 
decision made by the board due to alleged violations of the open 
meetings law. The State Board declined to do so and affirmed the 
district's action. 
The Court determined that a petition for judicial review of 
a State Board decision was not the proper vehicle for determination of 
the open meetings law. The plaintiffs should have pursued an original 
action in district court in the county in which the school had its 
principal place of business. Having disposed of that issue, the court 
further found that the history of the board consideration of the closing, 
the full opportunity for public input at various stages of the 
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consideration, the notice of the March meetings, and the participation 
of many individuals from Albion in that meeting, denied the contention 
that the public's knowledge and opportunity to be heard were adversely 
affected by the style of the meeting notice. 
Exclusive mechanism for enforcement of open meetings law 
is an original action in district court for county in which 
governmental body has its principal place of business; 
evidentiary proceeding is necessary and special remedies 
are available (21, p. 110). 
The Board of Directors of the Davenport Community School District v. 
The Quad City Times (22) 
The Davenport Community School district board of directors gave 
written notice to a nonprobationary administrator that it had voted 
to consider termination of his contract. The notice stated specific 
reasons for the consideration. After a hearing was held at the request 
of the administrator, the hearing officer submitted to the board and 
the administrator his findings of fact and his proposed decision. 
The administrator appealed and requested a private hearing before the 
board. The board presided at the private hearing and heard the case 
de novo. It then convened in open session and by roll call vote de­
cided to continue the administrator's contract. 
The Quad City Times sought to examine the transcript of evidence 
generated at the first hearing in which the board undertook to decide 
whether to terminate the contract. The board resisted this request, 
being unsure whether the transcript was exempted from public access. 
On appeal, the Court found within the statutes a clear legislative 
intent to provide the public access to the information upon which 
the board would base its decision. It made an analogy between hearings 
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before the board and trials by jury, in which trials are for the most 
part, open. Only the deliberations of the jury are confidential in 
nature. 
Transcript of proceedings before hearing officer which 
concerned proposed termination of nonprobationary school 
administrator was public record accessible to newspaper 
under statute which requires public disclosure and not 
exempted by statute which makes deliberations of appeal 
to school board private (22, p. 80). 
Significant Legislation Since 1970 
Legislation remaining operative since 1970 involving the operation 
of school boards includes House File 418, enacted in 1979 which adds 
to the list of methods of electing members of local school boards a 
fifth optional method. This method creates a seven-member board 
with three members elected at large and four elected as residents 
of and by the voters of individual subdistricts. It also provides 
that a referendum on changing from one authorized method of electing 
a school board to another may be called by a petition signed by thirty 
percent of the number of persons voting in the most recent election 
in the district. 
In 1981, the Sixty-ninth General Assembly authorized governmental 
bodies to meet in a closed session to discuss employment conditions 
of employees not covered by a collective bargaining agreement. One 
year later, boards of directors of a school corporation were authorized 
to appoint one person to serve as both the secretary and treasurer 
of the board. 
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Senate File 540, enacted in 1986 makes several changes to the 
Campaign Finance Disclosure Law. Notably, candidates are required to 
despoit all contributions within seven days of receipt in an account 
maintained by the candidate's committee in a financial institution. 
If school board candidates receive contributions, expend funds, or 
incur indebtedness in excess of two hundred fifty dollars, the 
candidate must establish a committee and file the required reports 
with the county election commissioner, and a separate bank account 
must be established for the candidate's committee. 
The 1987 Session of the General Assembly made some changes 
in the rules under which boards must operate that will have some impact 
in the future. As a result of legislation enacted during that session 
members of the board of directors may now be individuals whose spouses 
receive compensation directly from the school board. Spouses of 
employees have been prohibited from serving as school board members 
in the past. 
School boards may now meet and organize at the first regular 
board meeting after a regular school election rather than at a specific 
time on a specific date. Boards must now publish the proceedings of 
each regular and special meeting in a newspaper published in the 
district or having general circulation within the district. The fee 
for such publication will be allowed to increase until July 1, 1989, 
when it will be the legal publication fee provided by statute. 
Another piece of legislation from the 1987 session will also have 
a financial impact upon local school districts. This statute provides 
that a local board may levy a property tax to pay the costs of providing 
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incentives for early retirement for teachers if the total estimated 
accumulated cost does not exceed the total estimated accumulated 
savings. 
Still from the 1987 session, S.F. 106 requires boards of directors 
of school districts to establish written evaluation criteria and to 
establish and annually implement evaluation procedures for school 
district administrators. The Act also requires boards to establish 
written job descriptions for supervisory positions in school districts. 
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CHAPTER VI: BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS 
As quasi-corporations of the state, school districts may acquire 
and hold property in the name of the state. The control of such 
property is actually under the jurisdiction of the legislature. 
There are no contractual relations between the state and the local 
school districts with regard to property and buildings. Rather, the 
districts act as trustees for the public at large. The authority 
granted school districts to build facilities includes the right to 
purchase land for playgrounds, transportation facilities, and other 
educational needs. 
School boards are required to insure their property against 
hazard. In most instances, the sale and purchase of property is 
regulated by statute and requires approval of the voters. Exception 
is made when the property is of insignificant value, or when land is 
acquired through the use of the levy authorized in section 297.5, 
often referred to as the "Twenty-Seven Cent Levy." A recent change 
in that section requires voter approval for the construction of school 
buildings or administration buildings (23, p. 371). The levy itself 
can be implemented through official approval of the board. 
Bids 
When construction, demolition, erection, alteration or repair of 
a school facility exceeds twenty-five thousand dollars, the district 
is required by Chapter 23, The Code, to let bids for its completion. 
The statute requires in part "The municipality shall let the work to 
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the lowest responsible bidder submitting a sealed proposal" (24, 
p. 65). It provides a procedure as well wherein a district may reject 
all bids if it should deem them unacceptable, and then request new bids 
for the same project. 
Since 1971, three different challenges to a district's action in 
regard to the bidding procedure have been considered by the Supreme 
Court. Seven other instances were investigated by Skarda in his 
research prior to that date. 
Menke v. Board of Education, Independent School District of West 
Burlington (25) 
In response to an invitation to bid on work to be done on an 
addition to the West Burlington Senior High School, Richard Menke 
submitted a bid, and accompanied his bid with a check drawn on the 
State Central Savings Bank, The check had been submitted to an 
officer of the bank for certification prior to Menke's sending it to 
the district, and had been duly stamped. For reasons unknown, no 
signature of a bank officer had been placed on the line provided for 
it, an omission not noticed by either Menke or the bank. When the 
bids were opened by the board, it was found that Menke's bid was the 
lowest submitted. However, the check was returned to Menke advising 
him that his bid had been rejected due to the lack of authenticating 
signature from the bank. When the contract was awarded to another 
bidder, Menke filed suit, claiming damages in the amount of the net 
profits he would have realized from the performance of the 
contract. 
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The court ruled that the principal issue was whether a check 
stamped as was Menke's check, was properly certified as a matter 
of law. It ruled that although it is consistent with customary 
certification practice to conclude that the affixing of the stamp 
certifies a warrant, the bank in this case had an intention to also 
require the script signature of a bank official to verify certification. 
With regard to any cause of action against the board, the court held 
that the lowest pecuniary bid was but a single factor in the determina­
tion of who was the lowest responsible bidder and the board was 
justified in rejecting the lowest bid, absent a certified check and 
proceeding to the next qualified bidder. 
Board of education was justified in rejecting low bid by 
contractor when bid was accompanied by security in form 
of check which was not properly certified (25, p. 692). 
West Harrison Community School v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction 
and William Clegg (26) 
In December of 1981, the West Harrison Community School issued 
an invitation to a number of firms to bid on a project to control the 
threat posed by asbestos in the insulation used in two of the district's 
attendance centers. The lowest bids were submitted by William Clegg. 
On February 10, 1982, the school board met and received bids from 
Clegg as well as those from Advanced Insulation Services, the Judy 
Company, and Hamilton Insulation and Roofing. Subsequent to that 
meeting, the superintendent was authorized to negotiate further with 
Advanced and the Judy Company regarding the possibility of accom­
plishing the work with a spray-on cellulose encapsulation procedure. 
Although Clegg had initially recommended such a procedure, it was 
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not included as a specification in the formal bid request. One month 
later the board awarded the bid to Advanced. Clegg's attorney con­
tacted the board advising them they had not fully complied with the 
statutory requirements by not awarding the contract to Clegg, the lower 
bidder, without determining that he was not a responsible bidder. 
Consequently, the board rescinded its contract with Advanced 
and rejected all other bids previously submitted. At the same time 
the board decided to split the project and call for two separate 
proposals, one for each attendance center, and so advised Clegg. 
The district, however, did not solicit a bid from Clegg, but received 
bids for the two new projects only from Advanced and two other firms. 
All bids were under $25,000 for each project. The bids from Advanced 
were accepted on May 28, 1982, and the work was completed by that 
company. Clegg made an appeal to the Iowa State Board of Public 
Instruction which held a hearing and issued its decision in Clegg's 
favor. On appeal to the district court, the decision was reversed. 
The issue considered by the Supreme Court was whether the district 
had improperly split the bid into two projects to avoid the ap­
plicability of the public bidding statute, Iowa Code section 23.18. 
The court ruled that the district officials had clearly divided a 
construction project for the purpose of precluding Clegg from 
participating in any phase of the project. 
Generally, court is reluctant to interfere with local 
school board's determination of who is lowest responsible 
bidder, absent proof that determination is fraudulent, 
arbitrary, in bad faith, or an abuse of discretion (26, 
p. 685). 
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State Board of Public Instruction was authorized to conclude 
that school district abused its discretion in splitting 
construction project into two separate contracts after 
previously treating it as one (26, p. 686). 
Elview Construction Company, Inc. v. North Scott Community School 
District (27) 
In April 1983 the North Scott Community School Board decided to 
build an addition to an existing school. The board properly adopted 
proposed plans and contract forms and set a time for a public hearing 
on the matter. No objections to the project were raised at the hearing. 
The board decided to split the project into individual contracts 
according to the types of work to be done. This resulted in twenty-six 
contracts making up the general project. Bids were solicited for a 
general contract for the entire project and in the alternative for 
each of twenty-six individual contracts. When the bids were opened, 
it was determined that the individual contracts would be the most 
efficient way for the district to proceed, and a general construction 
manager was hired. 
The bidding process failed to produce bids on seven of the twenty-six 
contracts so the board informally solicited price quotations for them 
and awarded purchase orders on them after the normal bidding process 
had been completed. One such contract, for metal windows and doors, 
had been bid on by the Elview Company, but was rejected because the 
board considered it too high. Elview brought suit against the 
district alleging that the contracts were made in violation of Iowa 
Code Chapter 573, and that the board had acted wrongly in not obtaining 
performance bonds from all of the contractors. 
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The court ruled that Elview, as an unsuccessful bidder, had no 
standing to challenge the district's actions. It also held the board 
had taken an unnecessary risk in not obtaining performance bonds from 
all of the contractors. If one of the contractors had defaulted, 
the school board, as representatives of the taxpayers would be in a 
precarious position. The court held that all twenty-six of the con­
tracts for the school addition were subject to the guidelines of 
section 23.18 because each was a part of one public improvement 
costing in excess of the twenty-five thousand dollar limit. This 
did not mean that the contract splitting done by the board was il­
legal, but it did mean that the board should have followed bidding 
procedure for all of the contracts in the project. In certain instances, 
such deviation from procedure could render the contracts void, but 
in this instance, the court did not render judgment on the issue of 
voidability since there was no remedy. The work had already been 
completed and the fees paid. Additionally, there were no complaints 
about the quality of the work as it had been accomplished. 
If deviations from prescribed competitive bidding system 
were severe enough to deprive school board issuing con­
struction contracts of its jurisdiction to act, the re­
sulting contracts were void; however, if board's actions 
were mere irregularities, the contracts were merely voidable 
(27, p. 139). 
Reversion and Sale 
Statutory authority for a school district to allow reversion of a 
schoolhouse site of less than two acres is found in Chapter 297, The 
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Code, section 297.15. It provides a procedure whereby such property 
may revert to the owner of the tract from which it was taken, pro­
vided that the owner of the tract pay the value of the site to the 
school district. Section 297.22 bestows upon boards the authority to 
sell property which is appraised at $25,000 or less by board action. 
Property appraised above that figure must be submitted to the voters 
for authority to sell under section 278.1. 
Skarda located four cases prior to 1971 dealing with sale or 
reversion of school property. Since 1971, two more such cases have 
reached the attention of the Supreme Court. 
Unification Church v. The Clay Central School District (28) 
In February of 1972 the Clay Central Board of Directors decided 
to sell a vacant school building in the town of Greenville,- Iowa. 
Pursuant to the requirements of then section 279.22, three disinterested 
freeholders were appointed to appraise the property and did so in the 
amount of $7,420. After bids were received the board accepted the 
highest bid from Billie K. Schomaker in the amount of $5,005. At that 
time section 279.22 provided for limitations on the amount a board 
may realize from sale according to the size of the school district. 
The average daily attendance of Clay Central was such that the maximum 
amount the district could realize from the sale was $5,000. The 
board was unaware of this limitation at the time of the sale. 
Schomaker subsequently sold the building to the Unification Church 
which instituted quiet title action seeking to void the sale by the 
district due to violations of section 279.22, The Code. 
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The Court ruled that the district's failure to follow mandated 
statutory procedures voided the sale. The failure of the Clay County 
School District to follow those procedures invalidated the conveyance 
of title to Schomaker. 
School sale statutes are mandatory, not merely directory, 
because school property occupies status of public property 
subject to public interest (28, p. 579). 
Calamus Community School District v. Glenn Rusch and Jean Rusch (29) 
The Calamus School District abandoned a half-acre schoolhouse 
site in 1966. The Rusch's negotiated for the property and in 1967 
paid $200 down on its purchase. A dispute then arose over the total 
purchase price, the Rusch's claiming it to be $1,500 while the 
district insisted it was $1,700. Without resolving the dispute, 
the Rusch's entered the property August 15,*1967, and remained in 
possession. When they learned the school had acquired the property 
through a lease in 1860 from the owner at that time, the Rusch's 
claimed possession of the site by virtue of the lease and their owner­
ship of the surrounding land from which the site was leased. The 
district brought action to determine the ownership of the land. 
The court ruled the district to be the owner, citing section 614.24, 
The Code, which barred action on any claim rooted in a contract for a 
version against the holder of the title in which the instrument was 
recorded more than twenty years before July 4, 1965. The only ex­
ception being claims filed on or before one year after July 4, 1965. 
The reversion restricting the title of the school became ineffective 
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when those claiming under it failed to file their claim within one 
year of that date. 
Failure of defendants, who owned the land abutting site of 
abandoned schoolhouse, to comply with requirements of statute 
pertaining to reversionary interests in school property re­
sulted in their forfeiture of any statutory reversionary 
right (29, p. 489). 
Significant Legislation Since 1970 
Although legislative activity in the area of buildings and grounds 
has been less than that devoted to other areas of school district 
management, some changes have been made since 1970. Senate File 59, 
a product of the 1974 General Assembly, allows local school districts 
to expend the 2.5 mill voted schoolhouse levy (now the twenty-seven 
cent site improvement levy) for buildings as well as schoolhouses and 
for equipment, landscaping, paving, or improving the schoolhouse 
building grounds and for the rental of facilities under joint agreement. 
It also allows school districts to enter into rental or lease agree­
ments for up to ten years. 
An area that has been receiving increasing attention was addressed 
by the General Assembly in 1984. House File 2516 authorizes the board 
of directors of a district to pay the actual cost of removal or 
encapsulation of asbestos from the general fund of the district, from 
funds received from the schoolhouse tax under section 278.1(7), The 
Code, or from the tax levy certified under 297.5. If an additional tax 
levy is needed, the board of directors may submit a proposal to the 
electorate for approval. If the voters approve an additional levy. 
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they must choose between the levy of an additional property tax or 
the levy of a combination of an enrichment property tax and a school 
district income surtax. These tax levies may be certified for not more 
than three years. 
House File 2407, a product of the 1986 General Assembly, permits 
a board of directors of a school district to sell, lease, or dispose 
of property belonging to the school district without an election. 
The board must hold a public hearing before taking final action on the 
property if the appraised value exceeds twenty-five thousand dollars. 
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CHAPTER VII: PERSONNEL 
School districts in Iowa are employers for a variety of job cate­
gories, which can be generally grouped into two areas of preparation. 
Certificated employees are those who must be licensed or certified 
by the state to perform the responsibilities required by their position. 
Teachers and school district administrators constitute the largest 
portion of this job category. These personnel are required by law to 
be contracted for their services by a school district. Statutory 
authority for contracts with certificated instructional personnel is 
found in Chapter 279, The Code of Iowa. For purposes of this study, 
the use of the terminology "certificated employees" will refer to 
teachers and administrators exclusively. 
Bus drivers must also be licensed by the state and must possess 
certain job-related skills and abilities in order to be contracted to 
drive a bus for a school district. The same authority for contracting 
with bus drivers is found in Chapter 285, The Code. Although bus 
drivers must be licensed by the state, they are most often categorized 
as classified employees of a school district, due to the widely 
discrepant level of training and preparation between their job require­
ments and that of teachers and administrators. 
Other classified employees of a school district include secre­
tarial, maintenance, custodial, and food service personnel. Districts 
are not required by law to issue contracts to these employees, although 
many do as a matter of course. 
The Code of Iowa is quite specific in its determination of the 
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procedures to be followed when disciplinary measures or termination of 
a contract between a school district and a certificated employee is 
contemplated. Additionally, recent decisions by the Federal Supreme 
Court in the area of interpretation of the meaning of the terms "due 
process" in the Fourteenth Amendment have significance to personnel 
actions in every state. The Federal Court has ruled that the Due 
Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights — life, liberty, 
and property — cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally 
adequate procedures (30, p. 4308). When state law creates job rules 
and dimensions, it creates a property interest in the job by those 
employed to fulfill it. Such property interest is implicit and is 
not conferred by legislative action, but by constitutional guarantee. 
An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation, in this 
instance of a means of livelihood, must be preceded by notice and 
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (30, 
p. 4307). 
The Iowa Department of Education has been given the responsibility 
of teacher and administrator certification. This agency may not re­
fuse to issue a certificate to a qualified candidate without good 
cause. Certification is a licensing procedure, and does not constitute 
nor guarantee a contract between the teacher and the State. Such 
certificates may be revoked for just cause and the legislature may 
implement added qualifying standards upon prospective teachers and 
administrators. 
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Probationary Teachers 
The first two consecutive years of employment of a teacher in 
the same school district are considered a probationary period, A 
board of directors may either waive the probationary standing of any 
teacher who has served such a period in another district, or it may 
extend the probationary period for a third year with the consent of 
the teacher. Teachers who have gained nonprobationary status, but who 
are experiencing difficulties are sometimes placed on probation pending 
performance improvement, by mutual agreement of a school district and 
the affected teacher. Termination procedures for probationary teachers 
include proper notification of the board's intent, and an opportunity 
for the teacher to request a private hearing before the board, as 
detailed in section 279.16, The Codé. The decision of the board after 
the hearing will be final and binding, absent any violation of a 
constitutionally guaranteed right or a violation of public employee 
rights of the teacher under section 20.10 (31, p. 305). 
Probationary Teachers Staff Reduction 
Ferree v. Board of Education of the Benton Community School District (32) 
Loretta Ferree was a teacher with the Benton Community School 
District with fifteen years of service to the district. She had been 
placed on probation in November of 1980 as a result of several negative 
evaluations. She was subsequently notified in writing that her per­
formance remained unsatisfactory and she would continue in a probationary 
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status. She was also advised that this status could subject her to 
termination. 
In 1981 it became clear that staff reduction would be necessary 
due to declining enrollment and budgetary constraints. The master 
contract provided the following procedure for consideration of teachers 
to be reduced in the event of staff reduction: (1) natural attrition, 
(2) staff members with emergency and/or temporary certification, and 
(3) staff members currently on probation or who were held on the same 
salary step from the previous year. There was no attrition, nor were 
there any staff members on emergency or temporary certification. 
Ferree was selected for termination on the basis of her probationary 
status. Ferree brought suit claiming the termination was invalid 
because the probationary status was improperly assigned. The Court 
ruled that Ferree's action was not timely in that she should have 
objected to the propriety of the probationary assignment within 
five days of being notified by the district that she was on probation, 
and why. She was notified in November 1980 that she was on probation, 
but did not challenge that action until 1981 when termination proceedings 
were begun. Under the grievance procedure outlined in the master 
contract, she could have protested the probation within the time so 
provided. 
Teacher's obligation to file timely grievance arose when she 
was placed on probation, not when she was selected for 
termination in a staff reduction because she was on probation, 
where teacher knew, or should have known, because she was 
a party to master contract between teachers and school 
district, that being on probation made her employment 
position significantly less secure, and potential consequences 
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of her probation on her employment had been explicitly 
stated in two evaluations (32, p. 870). 
Probationary Teachers Contract Termination 
Bonnie Kruse v. Board of Directors of Lamoni Community School District 
(33) 
Kruse had been hired as a social studies teacher in 1968. Ap­
parently satisfied with her first year of service, the board renewed 
her contract for the school year 1969-70 in March of 1969. In February 
of 1970 she received by certified mail a letter in which she was 
notified that her continuing contract had been terminated effective 
at the end of the current year pursuant to a majority vote of the 
board. She responded, protesting the termination and requesting a 
private hearing, as well as a list of incidents and reasons leading 
to the board's actions. She was promised and received a hearing 
before the board, but no list of reasons was supplied until after 
the hearing. She then received notice that her performance had not 
been of sufficient quality to warrant continued employment, whereupon 
she requested and was given a public hearing. In May the board voted 
again to terminate her contract. Kruse filed suit, alleging that the 
Code had not been sufficiently adhered to by the board in its action, 
thereby denying her of due process and equal protection under the law. 
The Court held that strict adherence to section 279.13 had not 
been observed by the board in that Kruse did not have an opportunity 
to seek a hearing before she received notification of termination, 
and that the list of reasons was not provided her prior to the hearing. 
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Consequently, the contract was not terminated, and the issue was 
returned to the district court to determine damages. 
A school district's attempted termination of a teaching 
contract was null and void where district failed to meet 
statutory requirements as to notice (33, p. 627). 
Moravek v. Davenport Community School District (34) 
Edward Moravek was hired as a teacher by the Davenport School 
District for the 1974-75 school year. He had been hired in September 
of 1974, one month after the District and the Davenport Education As­
sociation had entered into an agreement. This agreement contained a 
grievance procedure which included the definition of a grievance as a 
claim by an employee, or the association, based upon the interpretation, 
application, or violation of the agreement. In March of 1975, the 
district sent Moravek notice, pursuant to 279.13, The Code, that it was 
considering the termination of his contract. Upon his request, he 
was given a private conference and a list of specific reasons for the 
consideration. He was also notified that he could request a private 
hearing before the board within twenty days of his receipt of the 
list of reasons. He never exercised that right. Later he filed a 
grievance in which he alleged that an article of the agreement, 
stating that an employee shall not be dismissed without just cause 
and without procedural due process, had been violated by the board. 
Pursuant to advice by counsel, the board refused to submit the 
matter to arbitration since, in its view, the arbitrator would not 
have jurisdiction over such matters. Moravek did nothing more to regain 
his position until he filed suit in district court. District court 
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dismissed his petition. The Supreme Court ruled that nothing in 
section 279.13 authorized contracting parties the right to mutually 
agree to abolish the board's exclusive power to renew, or not to 
renew, teachers' contracts. In this light, the board was within its 
rights and had properly terminated Moravek's contract. 
Master contract between school district and teachers' 
representative, which provided for four-step grievance 
procedure, violated statute governing contracts with 
teachers and termination of such contracts insofar as 
grievance procedure purported to govern teacher contract 
termination (34, p. 798). 
Stafford v. Valley Community School District (35) 
Judy Stafford was employed by the Valley School District as a 
part-time tutor, at an hourly rate, for one student from November 1976 
to May 1977. During the 1977-78 school year, she was employed by 
contract on a three-fourths time basis as a remedial reading teacher. 
In the 1978-79 school year she was employed by contract for the same 
duties on a one-half time basis. In February 1979, the superintendent 
initiated proceedings under section 279.15 to terminate her contract 
at the end of the 1978-79 school year as part of a staff reduction. 
Following a private hearing, the board filed a decision, including 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, terminating her contract. 
Stafford then filed notice of appeal to an adjudicator. The superintendent 
filed a special appearance with the board, claiming that Stafford was 
not entitled to an adjudicator's opinion in that she was a probationary 
teacher. Stafford appealed to district court claiming the designation 
of probationary teacher had been incorrectly applied by the district 
in light of her years of experience working for the district. 
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The Court held that the district had the right to make a determina­
tion of her status. It further held that during the 1976-77 school 
year she had no written contract for the services she performed, she 
enjoyed no benefits, and was not paid on a salary schedule established 
in the master contract. It was apparent that the district and Stafford 
herself mutually considered her services to be that of a part-time 
tutor for a single student, not a teacher. 
Where teacher was hired to be part-time tutor for single 
student, teacher was paid hourly rate rather than in 
accordance with master contract salary schedule, did not 
receive sick leave or other benefits, received no holiday 
pay, was not hired for full school year,"was not required 
to participate in parent-teacher conferences or staff 
meetings, and was officially classified as a "tutor," 
teacher's activity for school district in that school year 
did not qualify as employment as a teacher for purposes of 
statute providing that the first two consecutive years of 
employment in the same school district are a probationary 
period (35, p. 323). 
Larsen v. Oakland Community School District (36) 
Larsen was an art teacher and coach with the Oakland Community 
School District. His employment had begun in the fall of 1983. On 
March 12, 1985, the superintendent of the district served upon Larsen 
a notice of recommendation to terminate his teaching contract at the 
end of the 1984-85 school year. Larsen requested and was provided a 
private hearing before the board on April 1, 1985. On April 3, 1985, 
the board held a special meeting, went into closed session to discuss 
his contract, returned to open session and set a special meeting for 
April 8 to make the decision. On that date, the board voted to terminate 
his contract. On April 9, 1985, a notice was mailed to Larsen along 
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with the board's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision. 
Larsen filed suit, claiming the board had not acted within the 
statutorily mandated time. 
The Court of Appeals decided for the district, ruling that while 
section 279.16, The Code, clearly provided a time for the determination 
if there was no hearing, there was no mandated determination time if a 
hearing had been held, only a time within which the board must meet. 
It reasoned that although the general intent of the law would demand a 
relatively short time frame, a board may need to meet in more than 
one session to consider the evidence and make a decision. 
School board did not have to make final decision whether 
to renew teacher's contract within five days of private 
hearing requested by teacher; it was enough that school 
board met within five days of hearing in order to further 
discuss issue (36, p. 90). 
Nonprobationary Teachers Staff Reduction 
Hagarty v. Dysart-Geneseo Community School District (37) 
Marilyn Hagarty was employed by the Dysart-Geneseo District as a 
vocal music teacher for grades kindergarten through eighth grade from 
1970 through the 1976-77 school year. The superintendent, in the 
spring of 1977, determined that staff reduction would be necessary 
due to declining enrollment, and advised the board of his recommenda­
tion. Hagarty was notified that her position was recommended for 
reduction, and she requested a private hearing before the board. Fol­
lowing the hearing the board adopted the recommendation to terminate. 
Hagarty did not appeal the decision. Independent of these events, a 
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high school social studies teacher resigned, and was replaced with the 
middle school social studies teacher. Since Hagarty was endorsed in 
social studies, the district offered her the middle school position, 
pursuant to the recall provisions of the master contract. She declined 
the position. Later an elementary teacher resigned and the superintendent 
recommended that the position not be filled, but that the district 
instead reinstate elementary music and hire a part-time librarian. 
The board agreed with the recommendation and advertised for the posi­
tions. Hagarty applied for the music position, but the board instead 
hired an applicant who would begin employment lower on the salary 
schedule, permitting the district to fill both positions for what it 
would have cost to employ Hagarty alone. She filed suit, claiming 
fraud and asking for an equitable estoppel of the district's actions. 
The Court, in ruling for the district, held the central issue to 
be whether the district had offered Hagarty a position subsequent to 
her termination for which she was qualified within the requirements 
of the agreement. In order to prove the falsity element of a fraud 
action, it would be necessary to establish that the district's representa­
tion was false at the time it was relied upon. The fact that the vocal 
music position was reinstated was not alone sufficient to show that 
the earlier representation was false. 
Where vocal music instructor, whose contract was terminated 
when her position was eliminated, was qualified to teach 
social studies but declined offer of such position and 
staff reduction policy provided a terminated teacher with 
only right of recall to a position for which the teacher 
was qualified, the school board was not equitably estopped 
from relying on the staff policy in refusing to reinstate 
plaintiff when the position of vocal music instructor was 
subsequently reinstated (37, p. 93). 
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Ar-We-Va Community School District v. Long, Ar-We-Va Community School 
District v. Henkenius (38) 
On March 14, 1978, the superintendent of the Ar-We-Va School 
District served a written notice of recommendation of termination upon 
Elizabeth Long and Leah Henkenius pursuant to section 279.15, The 
Code, citing declining enrollment and a decline in the financial assets 
of the district as reasons necessitating staff reduction. Meeting in 
closed session the board determined that the relative skill, ability, 
competence and qualifications of Long and Henkenius were less than the 
other teachers in the elementary system, and that sufficient cause 
existed to terminate their contracts. On appeal, an adjudicator ruled 
that the terminations were in violation of the master contract in the 
areas of evaluations by the principal and the district's determination 
of seniority. The board subsequently rejected the adjudicator's 
decision and appealed to district court for reversal. 
The master contract required that consideration be given to the 
qualifications of the available teachers in making staff reductions. 
Citing Hagarty (37) the Supreme Court ruled that qualifications meant 
evidence of certification. Accordingly, before a teacher's contract 
could be reduced, he or she must be evaluated in relation to all 
teachers in positions which those under consideration were certified 
to teach. Long and Henkenius were compared only to elementary teachers 
in the district, and should have been compared to teachers through 
grade nine for the school board to have complied with the terms of the 
master contract. The school district violated the relevant provision 
of the contract in failing to do so. 
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Von Krog v. Board of Education of the Beaman-Conrad-Llscomb Community 
School District (39) 
Karlyne Von Krog was a physical education teacher in the BCL 
District since August 1969. On February 13, 1978, she was notified 
by the superintendent that her contract was being considered for 
termination because of contemplated staff reduction. The board subse­
quently decided to reduce staff in the area of physical education, and 
Von Krog was formally notified that the superintendent would recommend 
that her contract be terminated at the end of the current school year. 
Independent of these events, two other teachers at BCL submitted their 
resignations, one in the area of social studies, the other at the 
elementary level. There was no indication that the district intended 
to reduce the number of physical education classes offered in the 
district. Von Krog requested a private hearing before the board, 
after which the board voted to terminate her contract. Upon appeal 
to an adjudicator, the board's decision was reversed. The board re­
jected the adjudicator's opinion and appealed to district court. 
The Iowa Court of Appeals upheld the school board's decision, 
ruling that there was evidence from which the board could reasonably 
conclude, as it did, that the same number of classes could be taught 
by one full-time teacher with help from presently-employed teachers. 
The areas of teaching that became vacant were of no assistance since 
Von Krog was not certified to teach either of them. 
Termination of physical education teacher's contract did not 
violate staff reduction provision, which required school 
district to attempt to accomplish necessary staff reduction 
first by attrition, of collective bargaining agreement 
between school district and teachers' association, in that 
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teacher was not certified to fill either of district's two 
vacancies, and section on recall rights in agreement did 
not place affirmative duty on board of education to perform 
a wholesale rearrangement of teaching assignments every 
time a vacancy occurred (39, p. 339). 
Wollenzien v. The Board of Education of the Manson Community School 
District (40) 
Norene Wollenzien was employed by the Manson School District 
as a high school English teacher beginning with the fall of 1974. 
In 1976 the superintendent became concerned with declining enrollment 
and prepared a study of anticipated staff requirements for the 1977-78 
school year. The school board formally adopted a staff reduction 
policy which set forth the procedures and considerations necessary 
to accomplish this reduction. Wollenzien was evaluated on three 
occasions under standard criteria, along with ten others with whom 
she was competing for the remaining jobs. All eleven were found 
to be doing satisfactory work and all were competent and possessed 
relative skill and ability. Wollenzien was singled out at this point 
because she was certified to teach only English, whereas the other 
candidates for termination were either certified in more than one 
area or possessed some additional training or degree. In January 1977 
she was informed by the superintendent that she would be recommended 
for termination after the current year. A hearing was held before 
the board which then voted to terminate her contract. Upon appeal, 
an adjudicator upheld the board's decision. This decision was filed 
on June 9, 1977. Wollenzien took no action on this decision until 
July 5, 1977, when she filed a notice of appeal. 
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The Supreme Court of Iowa dismissed Wollenzien's appeal. The 
wording of section 279.17 states clearly that the adjudicator's 
opinion becomes final and binding when it is not rejected in writing 
within ten days of its issuance. There was no basis in this case to 
undertake statutory construction that says otherwise. 
Under statute providing that dismissed school teacher may 
reject adjudicator's decision by notifying school board's 
secretary in writing within ten days of filing of decision, 
adjudicator's decision became final and binding when it was 
not rejected by teacher within ten days and decision was 
not subject to later appeal (40, p. 216), 
Olds V. Board of Education of Nashua Community School District (41) 
On March 7, 1979, Robert Olds, a high school science teacher with 
the Nashua Community School District, received a notice and recom­
mendation to terminate his contract. He requested a private hearing 
before the board, at which time the board voted to terminate his 
contract. That decision was affirmed by an adjudicator on August 16, 
1979. Olds filed a petition for judicial review, and the district 
court issued its decree finding that Olds' constitutional rights to 
due process were violated by what the court considered excessive 
questioning of Olds by the board members. 
On February 25, 1980, the superintendent sent Olds a new notice 
of his recommendation to terminate his contract for the same reasons 
as stated in 1979. Olds again requested a private hearing before 
the board. Three of the members of the 1979 board were on the board 
again in 1980 along with two new members. The board again accepted 
the superintendent's recommendation and terminated Olds' contract. 
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Olds again appealed to an adjudicator who again affirmed the board's 
decision. Upon appeal to district court, the court again reversed 
the decision, expressing doubt that Olds had yet been heard before an 
impartial tribunal in that three of the five board members had 
previously voted to terminate his contract and were overturned by 
district court. Additionally, the court questioned the district's 
decision in light of recommendations for increasing the size of the 
high school science program at Nashua by a State Department of Public 
Instruction survey, and questioned the district's interpretation of 
seniority in the staff reduction procedures of the master contract. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that it did not necessarily contravene 
due process to permit judges and administrators who have had their 
initial rulings reversed on appeal to hear and decide the same issues 
on remand. It agreed with the board that the seniority provisions had 
been correctly applied by it, and that the board had rightly considered 
the individuals who were eligible for staff reduction. The court has 
a limited scope of review. It should not judge the wisdom of a board's 
actions, nor can it force a board to adopt a policy which it may think 
is preferable. The Nashua board could not be forced to retain an 
employee absent a violation of the procedures utilized. 
Smith V. Board of Education of the Mediapolis School District (42) 
Joan Smith was a junior high school English teacher with the 
Mediapolis Schools. The superintendent of the district sought to 
terminate the teaching contract of Smith as part of the district's 
staff reduction program. Under the master agreement, if necessary 
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staff reduction was not accomplished by attrition or reassignment, 
the employer had to consider the needs of the district and the skill, 
ability, competence, certification, qualifications, and experience of 
the professional employees relative to the available work for them. 
Following Smith's request a private hearing was held by the board, 
which subsequently followed the superintendent's recommendation and 
terminated her employment. An adjudicator affirmed the board's 
decision. Upon appeal by Smith, the district court overturned the 
adjudicator and ordered Smith reinstated. 
Ruling in favor of the board, the Supreme Court drew a distinction 
between termination of a contract for just cause and termination of a 
contract for staff reduction purposes. The latter case does not 
necessarily require evidence of a teacher's faults. The court's 
primary responsibility is to assure that the decision to terminate 
was not the result of arbitrariness or capriciousness on the part of 
the superintendent or the school board. Courts should be reluctant 
to act as a super school board by viewing each facet of a teacher's 
skill and comparing it to that of other teachers. The superintendent's 
recommendation for termination, while in part the result of subjective 
evaluation, was not unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Just cause for nonrenewal of teacher's contract may be 
based upon district's personnel and budgetary requirements 
and does not necessarily require evidence of a teacher's 
faults (42, p. 150). 
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Rankin v. Board of Education of the Marshalltown Community School 
District (43) 
Edith Rankin was employed by the Marshalltown Community School 
District for six years as a high school social studies teacher. 
In February 1981, as part of a district staff reduction, she was 
served with the superintendent's notice and recommendation to terminate 
her contract. She requested and was given a private hearing before 
the board. . As Rankin was the most senior social studies teacher in 
the district, she argued that there was justification for retaining 
her position despite financial restrictions. An administrative as­
sistant testified to the board that the district planned to utilize 
some administrative curriculum coordinators to fill some of the 
terminated positions, at least on a part-time basis. Following the 
hearing the board terminated Rankin's contract. Upon appeal, an 
adjudicator found the district's reductions to be essentially legitimate 
on grounds of declining enrollment, but that the plan to fill 
terminated teaching positions to some degree with administrative personnel 
violated the staff reduction provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement. District court reinstated the board's termination. 
The Court of Appeals held that the net effect of the board's 
proposal was to avoid the requirements of the bargaining contract with 
regard to retention of tenured teachers. Plans to increase the teaching 
responsibilities of nonunion members in a union position would result 
in the reinstatement of approximately two-fifths of the teaching 
position. Such assignment coupled with the termination of a tenured 
teacher violated the master contract of employment. 
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Shenandoah Education Association and Janice Gardner v. Shenandoah 
Community School District (44) 
On March 2, 1981, the school district superintendent caused to be 
served upon Janice Gardner, a teacher, a written notice of recommenda­
tion of termination citing fiscal problems and program realignment. 
On March 3, Gardner requested a private hearing, and on March 6, 
Gardner and the Shenandoah Education Association filed a grievance 
under the negotiated collective bargaining agreement, alleging a 
violation of the master contract by incorrectly terminating Gardner's 
contract. Thus, two concurrent dispute-resolution procedures were 
initiated, the request for hearing triggering statutory appeal 
procedures, and the grievance leading toward arbitration under the 
negotiated agreement. A hearing was held before the board on March 19, 
at which time the board overruled Gardner's request that the private 
hearing be continued until the grievance resolution had been ac­
complished. The board then heard the evidence and upheld the superin­
tendent's recommendation that she be terminated. Gardner filed a 
statutory appeal from that decision and an adjudicator was selected. 
In the meantime, the grievance was not resolved in steps provided by 
the master contract, and the parties selected an arbitrator to render 
a decision. 
On May 15, 1981, the arbitrator issued his decision finding that 
the district had violated the master contract in terminating Gardner 
and dictating that she be reinstated. When the date for the hearing 
before the adjudicator arrived, Gardner requested that the proceedings 
be stayed on the grounds that the arbitrator's decision was binding upon 
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the district. The district resisted, the hearing was held, and the 
adjudicator affirmed the board's decision. The two conflicting opinions 
were challenged in district court, which vacated the arbitrator's 
decision and affirmed that of the adjudicator, thereby upholding the 
action of the district. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the arbitration decision was final 
and binding upon the district. The arbitrator had not exceeded his 
authority in ruling that the district had incorrectly selected Gardner, 
and therefore Gardner could not lawfully be terminated through Chapter 
279 proceedings. Once it was decided by arbitration that she was 
improperly selected for lay off, the entire basis for terminating her 
failed. 
Under statutes as revised, it is no longer against public 
policy reflected in statutes for school board's termination 
decision to be overturned by outside decision maker (44, 
p. 477). 
Pocahontas Community School District v. Levene (45) 
Pursuant to notice and recommendation by the superintendent, the 
Pocahontas School Board voted to terminate the continuing contract 
of Alice Levene, a sixth grade teacher of seventeen years in that 
district. Language in the negotiated contract required the considera­
tion of teachers teaching In more than one department or teachers ac­
cepting extra-duty assignments as services to be considered as part of 
that teacher's skill, ability, competence, and qualifications. 
Levene appealed to an adjudicator who reversed the board's decision. 
Upon appeal, the district court reversed the adjudicator. 
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The Court of Appeals, citing Olds v. Board of Education (41), 
ruled that the school district had established that due to small 
class sizes in the elementary school maintenance of the current staff 
would result in reduced efficiency. The school board had met its 
burden of proof of showing just cause for the termination. It did 
not err by segregating five teachers from the staff reduction process, 
all of whom had less seniority than Levene, but each of whom had special 
qualifications and special skills in other areas not possessed by 
the dismissed teacher. 
Just cause for terminating a teacher's contract includes 
budgetary and personnel requirements of school district; 
lack of need for services alone is just cause for terminating 
a teacher's contract (45, p. 699). 
Nonprobationary Teachers Contract Termination 
Keith V. Community School District of Wilton (46) 
Derwood Keith had taught vocational agriculture in the Wilton 
district for twenty-one years. There was nothing of record to indicate 
any problems with his performance as a teacher until after the 1967-68 
school year. In that year he served as president of the Wilton Educa­
tion Association and was involved in heated and argumentative contract 
negotiations with the school board. Between that year and 1974, two 
other proceedings had been commenced by Wilton school boards of dif­
ferent membership to consider termination of Keith's teaching contract. 
Both efforts had ended in compromise settlements. 
In March of 1974, Keith's teaching was evaluated for the first 
time by the principal, and the result was favorable. On March 20, a 
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meeting was held between Keith and four of the five board members, who 
expressed criticisms of Keith's program. No mention was made of 
contract termination. A special meeting was held on March 25, at 
which two patrons of the school board voiced dissatisfaction with the 
vocational agriculture program as it had been conducted. Immediately 
thereafter and without any discussion the board voted to notify Keith 
of its intention to terminate his teaching contract at the end of the 
school year. Keith was notified by letter and requested a private 
conference with the board, which was held on April 5. A list was 
also provided Keith of the reasons for the board's consideration of 
his termination. The board subsequently voted to terminate his contract, 
and a public hearing was requested. At this hearing testimony was 
taken from forty people, most of whom were favorable toward Keith's 
program, and the board voted again to terminate his contract. 
The Supreme Court overturned the board's decision, ruling that 
Keith had not been afforded an impartial decisionmaker, nor had he 
been given opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 
The critical determination here in assessing the charge of partiality 
of the decisionmaker is whether in weighing the evidence the board 
was required to call on its own personal knowledge and impression of 
what occurred. Such was the case here, as there were no other wit­
nesses. The board had determined here from the very start Keith's 
performance as a teacher was not up to highest caliber. It then called 
upon itself to judge the credibility of its own determination as to 
Keith's performance. 
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Where school board initiated proceedings to terminate 
teacher, it could not act as impartial decision maker to 
• which teacher was entitled by due process (46, p. 249). 
Board of Education of Fort Madison Community School District v. 
Youel (47) 
This was the first case arising under section 279.13, The Code, 
1977, which completely revised the procedure for terminating school 
teachers' contracts. During his tenure with the Fort Madison 
School District, James Youel served as football coach, athletic 
I director, and mathematics teacher. At the time of his termination, 
he was no longer athletic director but was still acting as football 
, coach and mathematics teacher. All of the procedural steps pertinent 
to the termination of Youel's contract were met by the district. 
The recommendation to terminate listed four reasons including; 
(1) inattention to duty, (2) negative attitude toward and poor working 
relations with activities director, (3) lack of cooperation with 
activities director, and (4) improper handling of the football 
program resulting in deterioration of the program. 
Following Youel's private hearing with the board, the board 
filed its decision terminating his contract. Youel appealed to an 
adjudicator who reversed the board and ordered his reinstatement. 
Upon appeal by the board, the district court overturned the adjudicator 
and reinstated the original decision of the board. 
The Supreme Court found that the only issue the board had acted 
upon was reason number four, and that the termination must either stand 
or fall on the basis on the evidence considered by the board on that 
issue. The quantum of proof required under section 279.13 is a 
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preponderance of the competent evidence, a de novo issue in this case, 
as the standard had previously been "substantial" evidence. The 
Court ruled that the reasons for termination were supported by a pre­
ponderance of the evidence and ruled in support of the board's decision. 
Term "just cause" as used in statutory section providing 
that notification of intent to recommend termination of 
nonprobationary teacher's contract shall contain statement 
of reasons which shall be for just cause why recommendation 
is given to board of education encompasses in addition to 
"good cause," other legitimate reasons relating to school 
district's personnel and budgetary requirements (47, 
p. 677). 
Bruton v. Ames Community School District and Board of Education of Ames 
Community School (48) 
This appeal challenged the validity of the "one-year-only" 
clause in a contract of a nonprobationary public school teacher. 
The Ames Community School District employed Karen Bruton as a teacher 
for four consecutive years. No question existed as to her competency 
or performance. At the end of the 1976-77 school year (her third 
year) the district had terminated her contract in accordance with 
Chapter 279, The Code. The district then employed her to teach on a 
part-time basis for the next school year, and in order to be able to 
plan for staff reduction, staff alignment, and changing program needs, 
placed the one-year-only clause in her contract. On March 13, 1978 
the district superintendent notified Bruton that he would recommend 
to the board that her contract be terminated at the end of the current 
year due to the fact that it was a one-year-only contract. 
The board held a private meeting with Bruton as a matter of 
courtesy and issued its findings that her contract was not a continuing 
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contract and would therefore expire at the end of the current year. 
Bruton appealed to an adjudicator, who affirmed the board. 
In its review, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Bruton, citing 
the 1976 overhaul of the teachers' contract statutes in section 
279.13 to 279.19 by the General Assembly. In its action, the legis­
lature established a new system consisting of two categories of 
teachers: probationary teachers, whose contracts are given procedural 
protection but are subject to nonrenewal in the final judgment of the 
board, and nonprobationary teachers, whose contracts are given pro­
cedural protection and are terminable on establishment of just cause. 
The Court held that the General Assembly did not intend to permit 
teachers and boards to have the ability to waive their respective 
protections and rights under the statute. The law now writes 
section 279.13 to 279.19 of the Code into teachers' contracts in Iowa 
and the one-year-only clause is of no effect. 
Clause in contract of nonprobationary public school teacher 
providing that contracts shall terminate in one year without 
notice, hearing, or any other action by school board was of 
no effect, and thus where school board failed to attempt to 
prove just cause for nonrenewal, board and teacher did not 
mutually agree to terminate contract, and teacher did not 
resign, contract automatically renewed (48, p. 351). 
Smith V. The Board of Education of the Fort Madison Community School 
District (49) 
Frank Smith was a counselor employed by the Fort Madison School 
District prior to and including the 1976-77 school year. During the 
course of that and the preceding school year, it became apparent that 
he was having difficulties fulfilling his duties, being preoccupied 
with personal problems, marital separation, and child custody disputes. 
81 
On March 15, 1977, pursuant to an agreement with the district superin­
tendent and as an alternative to immediate termination proceedings. 
Smith went on extended sick leave and sought professional psychiatric 
help. Under the agreement he would remain on sick leave until such 
time as the psychiatrist certified to the school district that he was 
fully capable of returning to his duties to work for a thirty-day 
probationary period. 
When asked on May 3, 1977, the psychiatrist informed the district 
superintendent that he could not determine when Smith would be fully 
capable of returning to work but said Smith could try returning to his 
duties. As that response did not meet the standard set in the agree­
ment, Smith was not given a thirty-day trial period. In August, the 
superintendent notified Smith that he was recommending the immediate 
termination of his employment and was suspending Smith without pay 
pending the hearing on his termination. Grounds for dismissal were 
listed as inattention to duty, failure to maintain an effective working 
relationship with peers, and incompetence. A hearing was held before 
the board who found just cause existed for Smith's dismissal. An 
adjudicator upheld the board's decision. Upon appeal by Smith, the 
district court held that the superintendent lacked authority to suspend 
Smith without pay, that the board did not breach its agreement with 
Smith when it failed to give a thirty-day trial period, and that a 
preponderance of the competent evidence supported the termination 
decision. 
The Supreme Court upheld the district court in the matter of the 
agreement between the board and Smith, but ruled that the grounds for 
82 
dismissal were incorrectly stated by the superintendent, and that the 
district court erred when it held that Smith could not have been sus­
pended without pay in this instance. 
Where record disclosed that parties were aware that guidance 
counselor's teaching difficulties were the result of mental 
illness, as indicated by their initial agreement and 
confirmed by an agreed upon psychiatrist, and temporary 
nature of disability was further evidence by psychiatrist's 
statement at termination hearing that counselor was no longer 
suffering from a paranoid condition, termination of 
counselor's contract should not have proceeded on grounds 
of inattention to duty, failure to maintain an effective 
working relationship and incompetence, but should have 
proceeded on ground of mental disability and involved, at 
minimum, evaluation of certain specific factors (49, 
p. 221). 
Smith V. Fort Madison Community School District (50) 
This is a sequal to Smith v. Board of Education (49). Smith 
argued here that under the prior opinion, the district must either 
reinstate him, or initiate new proceedings to terminate his contract, 
and that it had done neither. The district argued that, under the 
modification agreement, the next move was up to Smith; he was required 
to furnish a certificate by a psychiatrist that he would be fully 
capable of returning to work. The district further argued that Smith 
was barred from seeking reinstatement or back pay because of doctrine 
of laches. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the agreement between Smith and the 
superintendent had not been repudiated by the board when it sought to 
terminate Smith's contract, but that Smith was not barred by the doctrine 
of laches from seeking reinstatement. The matter had not been lying 
dormant, but had, in fact, been in a state of fairly constant agitation 
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in administrative and judicial proceedings since its inception. How­
ever, the matter may not be permitted to remain in limbo indefinitely. 
When the time of performance is indefinite in a contract, it generally 
must be rendered within a reasonable time. 
Fay V. Board of Directors of the North-Linn Community School District (51) 
John Fay was a sixth grade teacher employed by the North-Linn 
Community School District. On March 14, 1979, the district superintendent 
notified Fay that he would recommend his termination to the Board of 
Directors for cause. The notice listed the following reasons for the 
superintendent's action; (1) unacceptable rapport with students, 
(2) unacceptable ability to motivate students, (3) unacceptable parent/ 
student relations, (4) unsuitable teaching methods, and (5) unacceptable 
self-control. Fay requested a hearing with the board which was held 
on March 28-29, 1979. The board subsequently found just cause to 
terminate his contract. An adjudicator reversed the board and 
ordered Fay's reinstatement. District court overturned the adjudicator 
and reinstated the board's decision. 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the board, finding a 
preponderance of the entire evidence to indicate Fay's continuing 
problems in dealing with his students, their parents and the school 
administration, as well as his teaching methods and lack of self-
control. The judicial review statute (section 279.18) did not 
require the district court to give any particular weight to the decision 
of the adjudicator. Rather the statute stated that the court shall 
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reverse the decision of the board or adjudicator when such decision 
is unsupported by the necessary preponderance. 
Board of Directors of the Sioux City Community School District v. 
Ames Mroz (52) 
Mroz was a teacher of junior high science with the Sioux City 
Community School District until the end of the 1977-78 school year. 
On March 4, 1978, the superintendent of the district notified Mroz 
that he would recommend that the board terminate Mroz's contract at 
the end of the school year because he was an incompetent teacher. 
The notice specified fourteen reasons why the termination was being 
recommended, which may be categorized into the following broad cate­
gories; (1) inadequate maintenance of discipline during class, (2) ex­
cessive and ineffective use of films, (3) ineffective classroom teaching, 
and (4) failure to improve and cooperate with administrators who tried 
to assist in correcting his difficulties. Mroz requested and was given 
a private hearing before the board. After fourteen hours of testimony 
the board confirmed that just cause existed to terminate the contract. 
Mroz appealed to an adjudicator who reversed the board and ordered 
him reinstated. The board rejected the arbitrator's opinion and 
appealed to district court. In August 1979, the district court af­
firmed the adjudicator's decision. 
The Supreme Court reversed the district court and reinstated 
the board's decision. It held that a school district is not married 
to mediocrity but may dismiss personnel who are neither performing 
high quality work nor improving in performance. There was a preponderance 
of evidence to support the board's decision. Mroz contended that he 
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was ill with high blood pressure at the time of his poor evaluations, 
but failed to establish a relationship between his teaching defi­
ciencies and his high blood pressure. 
Where there is uncontroverted expert testimony that a 
teacher's incompetence is due to a physical or mental 
disability, school board must consider the duties required 
by contract, character and possible duration of the illness, 
and needs of the employer and extent to which the duties 
can be performed by another; in contrast, where a teacher's 
incompetence is not due to a mental or physical disability, 
board does not have to consider these criteria (52, p. 447). 
Hunger v. The Jesup Community School District (53) 
Larry Hunger was a social studies teacher and wrestling coach in 
the Jesup Community School District. After being notified of the 
superintendent's intention to recommend termination of his contract. 
Hunger requested a private hearing before the board. The reasons 
listed for his termination included failure to maintain a competitive 
wrestling program and failure to maintain rapport with athletes. 
Subsequent to the hearing, the board voted to terminate Hunger's 
contract, and he appealed to an adjudicator. The adjudicator reversed 
the board's findings. In the meantime, Hunger offered to tender his 
resignation as wrestling coach but not that of social studies teacher, 
arguing that he thus was relinquishing those duties which were un­
satisfactory. The adjudicator concurred with this argument and ordered 
Hunger reinstated to his duties in the classroom only. The board ap­
pealed to district court, which reversed the adjudicator and reinstated 
the board's decision. 
The Supreme Court ruled that Hunger's contract was not severable, 
but that he had tried hard to cooperate and solve the problem, unlike 
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Youel (47) who tried instead to sabotage the program. Hunger was 
given no reason to believe his job was in jeopardy until he received 
notice that the superintendent intended to recommend termination, 
therefore he was given no opportunity to remedy the complaints against 
him. The decision of the district court was reversed. 
Evidence was insufficient to support termination of contract 
to teach social studies and coach wrestling for failure to 
maintain competitive wrestling program and to maintain 
rapport with athletes (53, p. 378). 
Board of Directors of the South Winneshiek Community School District v. 
Sexton (54) 
Betty Sexton was a veteran teacher of twenty-nine years, nineteen 
of which were in the employ of the South Winneshiek Community School 
District. On March 9, 1981, the superintendent of schools served 
upon Sexton a notice and recommendation to terminate her teaching 
contract. Four reasons for the recommendation were given; (1) un­
suitable teaching methods, (2) insubordination, (3) inappropriate 
discipline, and (4) inability to communicate and relate with students. 
A private hearing was held before the board, after which the board 
voted to accept the superintendent's recommendation and terminate her 
contract. Sexton appealed the decision to an adjudicator who reversed 
the board's decision on the grounds that it was not supported by a 
preponderance of the competent evidence in the record. The adjudicator 
did suggest that a disciplinary sanction other than termination might 
be appropriate. The board rejected the adjudicator's findings and ap­
pealed to the district court, which affirmed. 
The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the adjudicator's decision. 
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ruling that the examples cited by the board as indicia of its allega­
tions were evidence of professional faults which should be corrected 
by improvement of performance. The Court also noted a record of sup­
port for Sexton and her teaching ability by numerous foirmer students 
and parents, and the fact that Sexton was selected as one of thirty 
teachers from a field of thirty-three thousand teachers in the 
state to participate in Project Teach, a project to teach other 
teachers. The adjudicator's statement of alternative sanction was 
merely a recommendation and thus did not constitute action in violation 
of the law or in excess of his authority. 
Everett v. Board of Education of the Hampton Community School District 
(55) 
Arlene Everett was a veteran fifth grade teacher with eleven 
years of service to the Hampton School District. On March 19, 1981, 
the district superintendent caused a notice and recommendation to 
terminate her teaching contract pursuant to section 279.15, The Code, 
to be served upon Everett. The notice listed the reasons for the 
termination as unsatisfactory performance, failure to meet district 
standards, unsuitable teaching methods, inability to motivate students, 
and persistent failure to provide the type of teacher-directed responses, 
activities, and reinforcement techniques for students to make satis­
factory progress to acquire basic skills and develop a positive self-
concept. On May 4, 1981, after a private hearing, the board voted 
to terminate her contract. The termination was affirmed on appeal to 
an adjudicator and to the district court. 
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the board's decision, held 
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that it was not necessary that each allegation constitute just cause 
in and of itself, but that considered as a whole, all allegations to­
gether constituted just cause. The evidence submitted by the district 
detailed several incidents over a period of years that would substantiate 
problems with Everett's teaching. Although the record contained 
conflicting testimony regarding some of the problems, including sup­
port from some parents, the court considered the evidence in light of 
the demeanor of the witnesses who presented it. 
Bishop v. Eastern Allamakee Community School District (56) 
Margaret Bishop was a teacher with the Eastern Allamakee Community 
School District. On May 10, 1982, the school board voted to terminate 
her continuing contract of employment for the 1982-83 school year. 
Bishop appealed to an adjudicator, who upheld the termination action. 
Although the decision apparently was signed by the adjudicator and 
mailed on August 11, 1982, it was not received by Bishop's attorney 
until August 17, 1982. Without designating the date of filing, the 
parties agreed that Bishop notified the board secretary orally on 
August 18 and August 20 that she was rejecting the adjudicator's 
decision. This oral notification was within the ten days of filing 
deadline, although Bishop did not at that time or any other time 
notify the board in writing of her rejection. She filed an appeal 
with the district court on September 3, 1982. In response, the school 
district contested the court's jurisdiction in hearing her appeal, 
since she had not complied with the written notice requirement of 
section 279.17, The Code. District court rejected all arguments 
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advanced by Bishop and dismissed the petition on the timeliness 
grounds. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court action. It warned 
that a finding that oral notification substantially fulfills the 
requirements of the statute could inject a great deal of confusion 
in subsequent termination cases. One purpose of the written notice 
was to avoid the uncertainties and disputes that might arise over 
whether the party adversely affected by the adjudicator's decision 
provided sufficient notice of rejection to their opponent. Bishop's 
claim that her right to equal protection was violated by the timelines 
cannot be sustained. Under the rational basis test, a legislative 
classification is upheld if any conceivable state of facts reasonably 
justifies it. The guarantee of equal protection does not exact 
uniformity of procedure. 
As a teacher and public employee, a teacher seeking review 
of an adjudicator's decision upholding termination of her 
teacher contract could not claim she was similarly situated 
to private litigants seeking judicial review of their claims 
for equal protection purposes (56, p. 501). 
Libe V. Board of Education of Twin Cedars Community School District (57) 
Frank Libe was a teacher with the Twin Cedars Community School 
District. On May 7, 1982, he was seirved with notice by the superintendent 
of his intent to recommend to the board of education the immediate 
termination of Libe's contract. The reasons listed for the recommenda­
tion were; (1) Libe had engaged in a sexual relationship with a student, 
(2) in the process of giving this student rides home from school 
functions he had engaged in kissing and petting in his parked car. 
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(3) his communication with the student had been unprofessional and 
inappropriate, (4) the contents of this communication had been unprofes­
sional and inappropriate, and (5) the means of delivery of these com­
munications had been unprofessional and inappropriate. At the hearing 
before the board of education, the student testified that she had a 
relationship with Libe that involved discussion of personal problems, 
and that the relationship had gradually escalated in intensity, 
culminating in one act of sexual intercourse. Over objections by 
Libe, evidence was admitted that the student had taken a polygraph 
test with results indicating that she was not deceptive when she 
stated that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with Libe. The 
board accepted the superintendent's recommendation and terminated 
Libe's contract effective immediately. This decision was affirmed 
by an adjudicator and by district court. 
The Court of Appeals held that school boards are not as restricted 
in receiving evidence as are regular courts of law. The fact that 
evidence would be inadmissable in a jury trial did not bar its 
consideration in an administrative proceeding such as this. Applying 
these principles, the court concluded that the board was entitled to 
consider the polygraph results. While the Iowa Supreme Court has 
expressed reservations about the reliability of polygraph examinations, 
it has not completely forbidden the introduction of such evidence in 
legal proceedings and has in fact stated that polygraph results "are of 
some value." The primary issue in this case was one of credibility. 
The student's testimony supported the allegations against Libe, while 
he denied any wrongdoing or improper conduct. The board determined 
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that the student's testimony was credible and Libe's was not. The 
court would not second-guess the board's judgment in this area. The 
board's decision was affirmed. 
Johnson v. Board of Education of the Woden-Crystal Lake Community 
School District (58) 
Raymond Johnson had been a teacher in the Woden-Crystal Lake 
School District since the 1969-70 school year, with a two-year absence 
in the army from 1971-73. On March 15, 1982, the district superintendent 
gave written notice to Johnson that he would recommend the termination 
of Johnson's contract to the board. The reasons listed for the recom­
mendation included Johnson's continual nonsupportive attitude toward 
the school administration, his insubordination, and his lack of co­
operation with and ignoring of the administration's directives, 
assignment, and instructions. After a private hearing the board 
issued its decision and accepted the superintendent's recommendation 
by terminating Johnson's contract. Upon appeal, both an adjudicator 
and the district court affirmed the board's decision. 
The Court of Appeals, also affirming the board's decision, 
ruled that insubordination and lack of cooperation with the school 
administration have been held to constitute just cause to justify the 
termination of a teacher's contract. As established in Youel (47), 
the fact that a teacher may not have been totally responsible for all 
of the problems does not mean that his contract cannot be terminated. 
The board must have the final say as to how best to bring an in­
tolerable state of affairs to an end. 
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Waterloo Education Association v. Waterloo Community School District (59) 
Paula McDougall was an employee of the Waterloo Community School 
District. On March 11, 1983, the district served McDougall with a 
notice and recommendation to terminate her contract pursuant to section 
279.15, The Code, and listing "specified reasons for the recommendation. 
The school district and the Waterloo Education Association had in 
place a collective bargaining agreement which contained an article on 
binding arbitration. It also contained an article on discipline and 
dismissal in which employees questioning the good and proper cause of 
such actions could have the choice of appealing the discharge under the 
provision of Iowa Code section 279.13 or by filing a grievance. 
Once the choice was made, the employee was prohibited from subsequently 
changing from one procedure to the other. McDougall filed a grievance 
alleging that no good and proper cause for her termination existed. 
After various proceedings, the district refused to arbitrate. District 
court affirmed the school district's action. 
The Supreme Court held that, although Chapter 279 of the Code 
contains the statutory provisions for terminating teachers' contracts, 
a majority of the court had held in other instances that it did not 
constitute the exclusive means for terminating teachers' contracts. 
Arbitration may be substituted under Chapter 20, The Code. The 
district court was reversed and the school district ordered to process 
the grievance. 
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Wilson y. Des Moines Independent Community School District (60) 
Rose Wilson was a teacher employed by the Des Moines Independent 
Community School District. She was transferred from North High 
School to Tech High School in October of 1981, and received her first 
formal evaluation at Tech in February of 1982. She was given a 
composite rating of "needs improvement." An assistance team was re­
quested for her for the 1982-83 school year. In September of that year 
she was informed that she needed improvement in the areas of planning, 
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meeting individual student's needs, and improving classroom discipline. 
Throughout that work year, Wilson continued to have problems with 
district policies and work rules. In March of 1983, she failed to 
report to work and did not notify the registrar until 9:30 a.m. 
Because of her repeated violations of work rules, she was suspended 
for several days. An assistance team was again assigned to her for 
the 1983-84 school year, and she was given an improvement plan with 
specific objectives that included all of the previously addressed 
problems. As her problems continued throughout the year, she was 
suspended indefinitely on January 12, 1984, pending termination 
proceedings. After a hearing the board voted to terminate her con­
tract effective June 30, 1984 for the reasons stated. An adjudicator 
affirmed the board's decision. 
The Court of Appeals, in ruling for the board, held that the 
record showed that during the span of well over a year and a half, 
Wilson was evaluated and informed of her professional shortcomings. 
She was informed that her failure to comply with the district's 
standards may result in sanctions, discipline, or discharge. The 
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record revealed no evidence that demonstrated a good faith attempt 
by Wilson to improve her professional skills or in any way rise to 
the standards stressed to her in her evaluations. The decision of 
the district was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Just cause for termination of nonprobationary teacher is 
one which directly or indirectly significantly and adversely 
affects what must be ultimate goal of every school system, 
high quality education for district's students; it relates 
to job performance, including leadership and role model 
effectiveness, and must include concept that school district 
is not married to mediocrity but may dismiss personnel 
who are neither performing high quality work nor improving 
in performance; on the other hand, just cause cannot in­
clude reasons which are arbitrary, unfair or generated out 
of some petty vendetta (60, p. 681). 
Substitute Teachers 
Fitzgerald v. Saydel Consolidated School District (61) 
The Saydel Consolidated School District maintained a special 
education program. One of the district's special education teachers 
resigned during the 1979-80 school year. The district tried without 
success to find a certificated special education teacher to fill the 
vacancy. Robert Fitzgerald was certificated to teach kindergarten 
through eighth grade and had three years teaching experience in 
another school. He had applied for employment with the Saydel 
district and had been placed upon its temporary substitute list. 
In January 1980, Fitzgerald was employed on a day to day basis to 
teach the vacated position until a certificated teacher could be 
located. At the end of eighteen days a properly certificated teacher 
had not been located, and the district had another of its certificated 
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special education teachers take over the classroom where Fitzgerald 
was teaching, moving him to the less difficult special education room 
newly vacated by the change. To retain him in that position until 
the end of the year the district had to obtain special permission from 
the State Department of Public Instruction, which it did. 
On March 13, 1980, the superintendent wrote Fitzgerald a letter 
in which his status with the district was reviewed. In the letter 
he was reminded that his current position was interim and that it 
would end on June 6, 1980. No other positions were offered him, and 
he was invited to write a letter of his interest, if any, in future 
assignments with the Saydel district. On March 26, 1980, the superin­
tendent wrote a second letter to Fitzgerald advising him that the 
board had officially terminated his interim position at its regular 
meeting. Fitzgerald did not request a hearing on this matter. He 
contacted the district several times during the ensuing summer re­
questing consideration for various positions that were available, 
but was not hired. His name was again placed on the temporary 
substitute list. Fitzgerald brought suit against the district. 
The Supreme Court upheld the district's actions in its termination 
of Fitzgerald's position. It ruled that sections 279,13 to 279.19, 
The Code, do not expressly mention substitute teachers. Past decisions 
from other jurisdictions have generally held that temporary substitute 
teaching does not ripen into tenure. With regard to Fitzgerald's 
status, his period of teaching was not voluntary on the district's 
part. The district sought, and would have hired, a properly certificated 
teacher for this classroom had it been able to find one. Fitzgerald's 
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lack of certification also lent weight to the temporary nature of his 
job. 
Statutory tenure provisions, concerning contract provisions, 
notice of termination, and the provision of private hearings 
upon termination, do not apply to temporary substitute 
teachers (61, p. 101). 
Teacher Certification 
Erb V. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction (62) 
Richard Erb, a military veteran and holder of a master's degree 
in fine arts, received his teacher certificate in 1963. Since that time 
he had taught art in the Nishna Valley Community School. In addition 
to teaching, he had coached wrestling, assisted with football, and 
served as senior class sponsor. He was married and had two sons. 
In the spring of 1970, Erb became involved in an extra-marital rela­
tionship with Margaret Johnson, a home economics teacher in the Nishna 
Valley schools, who was planning on resigning her teaching position and 
opening a boutique in Red Oak. Johnson was married to Robert Johnson, 
a farmer in the district. Johnson became suspicious of his wife's 
conduct and by means of various acts of subterfuge eventually dis­
covered Erb and Margaret engaged in sexual intercourse. Erb and 
Margaret terminated their affair, and Erb offered to resign his position 
in the district, but the local school board decided unanimously not 
to accept his resignation. The board president testified Erb's 
teaching was highly rated by his principal and superintendent, he had 
been forgiven by his wife and the student body, and he had maintained 
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the respect of the community. Erb was retained for the ensuing year 
and continued to teach in the Nishna Valley School District. 
Johnson appeared before the Board of Educational Examiners to 
present his case against Erb, stating that he only wanted him out of 
Nishna Valley schools, and was not intent on having his certificate 
revoked. During the hearing the Board refused to allow Erb's attorney 
to cross-examine Johnson or two witnesses offered by him and also 
refused to allow testimony of thirty-five other witnesses in support 
of Erb's character and fitness to teach. The Board voted five to four 
to revoke Erb's teaching certificate and, without making any findings 
of fact or conclusions of law, ordered it revoked. District court 
held that Erb's conduct was sufficient basis for revocation of his 
certificate. 
The Supreme Court ordered Erb's certificate reinstated. It held 
that since students are taught by example as well as lecture, the 
teacher's out-of-class conduct may affect his classroom fitness, but 
such conduct is of limited relevance. The Court was unwilling to make 
the assumption that merely because Erb admitted adultery, such conduct 
automatically made him unfit to teach. The Board was not permitted 
unfettered power by the legislature to revoke the certificate of 
any teacher whose personal, private conduct incurred its disapproval 
regardless of its likely or actual effect upon his teaching. A 
teacher's certificate can be revoked only upon showing a reasonable 
likelihood that the teacher's retention in the profession will ad­
versely affect the school community. 
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Power of the Board of Educational Examiners to revoke 
teaching certificates is neither punitive nor intended to 
permit exercise of personal moral judgment by members of 
the Board (62, p. 340). 
Discriminatory Practices 
Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission v. Cedar Rapids Community School 
District (63) 
The Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission was established by Cedar 
Rapids City Ordinance, which established the Commission, enumerated 
its powers, defined and set out unfair practices in public accommoda­
tions and services, and provided the procedures for redress of ag-
grlevances. Two Cedar Rapids school teachers filed complaints with 
the Commission in 1972, alleging sex discrimination in employment 
by the Cedar Rapids Community School District. The alleged discrimina­
tion involved forced maternity leave for pregnant teachers. After 
Investigation, the Commission found probable cause for the complaints 
and provided for conciliation. When conciliation failed, a public 
hearing was held in which the Commission found the district had dis­
criminated in the areas of sex and employment against the two teachers. 
It directed compensation and reemployment for them. After the 
district failed to comply, the Commission filed a petition in district 
court asking that the school district be ordered to comply. District 
court dismissed the petition on the grounds that the Commission had im­
properly acted as a court, failed to provide judicial review of its 
ruling, and that its orders were not enforceable. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling. The 
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crux of the issue was whether "judicial power" existed. The power to 
ascertain facts clearly belonged to the Commission; however, when the 
ordinance was studied, it was logical to conclude the Commission could 
not enforce its decision except by suing in the district court. The 
Commission could not have any order enforced through its own actions 
alone. The failure of the ordinance to provide for judicial review 
of the Commission's findings and rulings constituted a failure to 
provide adequate safeguard to those who were affected by the administra­
tive action. 
Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Parr (64) 
Joan Parr and Judy McCarthy were teachers in the Cedar Rapids 
School System. Parr was asked to terminate her duties due to pregnancy 
in accord with a 1970 school board regulation not extending leave op­
portunities to nontenured teachers. McCarthy was also requested to 
temporarily discontinue her teaching duties for the reason of pregnancy. 
Parr's employment was terminated April 10, 1972, at which time she was 
two months short of completing the two-year probationary period. 
Consequently, she was not entitled to maternity leave with automatic 
right to reinstatement of employment. When McCarthy's employment was 
temporarily discontinued May 10, 1972, her two-year probationary period 
had been completed, thus entitling her to maternity leave with rein­
statement of employment upon return to work at the beginning of a new 
academic year. Both teachers advised their supervisors to the 
effect they desired to work past the fifth month of pregnancy, but 
neither such wish was honored. Both teachers had obtained permission 
100 
from their doctors to continue working. 
Pursuant to an agreement between the Human Rights Commission and 
the district, the district filed a petition for declaratory judgment, 
requesting an adjudication of the legality of the district's 1970 
maternity leave regulation. At the trial the 1972 amendment denying 
sick leave benefits to teachers on maternity leave was also attacked. 
The district court ruled both policies to be discriminating and 
ordered back pay and reinstatement to both teachers. 
t The Supreme Court affirmed the district court. It held the 
district illegally isolated pregnancy from other disabilities or 
physical conditions and made it subject to restrictive provisions. 
In the case of other illness or debilitating conditions, an individual 
was not required to cease employment at a fixed time and return to 
work following recovery at a set date regardless of the employee's 
wishes or medical advice. Any person affected by a disability other 
than pregnancy ceased employment and thereafter returned to work 
when he or she deemed it proper to do so. The policy penalized the 
teachers and members of their class for being women and suffering 
disabilities to which they alone were inherently susceptible, and this 
was discriminatory. 
Davenport Community School District v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission (65) 
The Davenport Community School District had a policy in effect 
permitting employees to accrue sick leave from year to year to be used 
during the tenure of each employee. The district, however, did not 
permit the use of such leave by female employees against absences 
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from work due to pregnancy or pregnancy-related disabilities. Six 
teachers brought proceedings against the district alleging discrimina­
tion in violation of Chapter 501A.6, The Code. The hearing officer 
found in favor of the teachers basing his decision largely on a rule 
promulgated by the Commission in 1972 which proscribed the employment 
practice of excluding disability caused by pregnancy from a temporary 
disability plan. He also noted the Parr (64) decision. The district 
court affirmed the Commission's ruling. 
The Supreme Court, in affirming the Commission cited the Iowa Civil 
Rights Act, Chapter 105A, amended by the Sixty-fifth General Assembly 
to prohibit sex discrimination in employment. The school district 
had notice of the content of the rule in question due to its publica­
tion, and there was no evidence in the record that the district took 
any measure to prevent or enjoin enforcement of the rule pending the 
decision of Parr (64). 
Mandatory Retirement 
Johnston v. Marion Independent School District (66) 
Ruth Johnston became a teacher in the Marion School District in 
1954. During the 1973-74 school year, she reached sixty-five years of 
age. The district had a mandatory retirement policy which called 
for retirement on the first day of July following an employee's 
sixty-fifth birthday. The school reserved the right to reemploy 
retired teachers on a year-to-year basis. The district attempted to 
discharge Johnston under section 279.24, which provided for discharge 
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by a majority vote of the board for any good cause. Johnston resisted 
the attempt, claiming there was no good cause to discharge her. 
The Supreme Court, ruling in Johnston's favor, held that age has 
nothing to do with fault. The legislature did not vest school boards 
with the power to designate or change what might constitute cause by 
mere process of adopting local school policies. This view was 
bolstered by the district itself, in reserving the right to rehire 
teachers sixty-five years and older on a year-to-year basis. 
' Neither teacher's age of sixty-five years nor school policy 
calling for retirement of a teacher at sixty-five years 
was sufficient to give school board "good cause" to dis­
charge teacher in absence of evidence of some specific 
personal fault (66, p. 216). 
DeShon v. Bettendorf Community School District (67) 
Following a board hearing, the Bettendorf Community School Board 
determined that their mandatory retirement policy which required the 
retirement of all employees on the first day of July following the 
employee's sixty-fifth birthday, constituted just cause to terminate 
the contract of Margaret DeShon, who had taught in the district for 
nineteen years. Upon appeal to an adjudicator by DeShon, the decision 
* of the board was upheld. She consequently rejected that decision 
and appealed to district court for review. District court also upheld 
the termination. 
The sole determination for the board was whether the attainment of 
their mandatory retirement age constituted just cause. The policy 
was clearly interrelated with the personnel needs of the district, 
providing a means of contract termination which allowed both the 
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district and the teacher to plan for their future needs while in­
corporating the safeguards of the review procedure. The district 
was supported in its policy by the Iowa Public Employee's Retirement 
System which stated that a member's normal retirement age should be 
sixty-five years. The Supreme Court affirmed the district's deci­
sion. 
To show a violation of equal protection in case in which 
no fundamental right or suspect classification is involved, 
party must show there is no reasonable basis for the 
classification (67, p. 330). 
Extracurricular. Contract 
Slockett V. Iowa Valley Community School District (68) 
Joanne Slockett was employed by the Iowa Valley Community School 
District as a physical education teacher and junior high basketball 
coach. Although initially, both assignments were written on the same 
contract, in subsequent years two contracts were issued, one for the 
teaching position and a separate contract for a varsity coaching 
position. In February of 1979, the school board voted not to offer 
Slockett the coaching position for the following school year. There 
was no attempt to terminate her other duties. The coaching contract 
was terminated without affording Slockett the procedural protections 
provided for termination of teacher contracts. The district court 
determined that the head coaching position was a mere extra-duty 
assignment and did not qualify as a tenured position; therefore, 
the district was not obligated to comply with statutory requirements 
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for terminating tenured positions. After the trial court entered 
its ruling, the General Assembly amended Iowa Code Chapters 279 and 260 
so as to require separate contracts for positions to coach inter-
scholastic activities. 
The Supreme Court, in looking at the legislative action, held 
that the legislature is presumed not to perform a useless act, hence 
the statutory amendment was an indication that the law was changed 
from the statutes that controlled this case. There was a clear 
separation of the contracts, and the wording of the instruments 
plainly provided that the coaching was a mere extra-duty assignment. 
There was nothing in the statutes prior to the amendment which 
prohibited such a contractual agreement. The actions of the district 
were upheld. 
Suspension Without Pay 
McFarland v. Board of Education of the Norwalk Community School 
District (69) 
James McFarland was a teacher and coach in the Norwalk Community 
School system. On September 10, 1977, he was coaching a freshman 
football game and one of his players was ejected from the game for 
fighting. McFarland struck the player on the shoulder pad and helmet 
and threatened to "throw him into the stands" if he fought again. 
On September 12, he was notified that the superintendent was going to 
recommend to the board that his contract be terminated according to 
the provisions of section 279.24, The Code, and that he was suspended 
without pay pending the board's decision. The board heard the 
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recommendation for termination on September 26, met later in executive 
session, and issued its findings of fact, concluding that McFarland 
had engaged in conduct ordinarily justifying termination for just 
cause, but that they had elected not to terminate his contract. Addi­
tionally, it found just cause for his suspension without pay from 
September 12 to October 1. McFarland sought review of the suspension 
decision by an adjudicator, who concluded that he did not have jurisdic­
tion to hear the appeal and dismissed it. The district court dis­
missed McFarland's appeal on the same ground. 
The Supreme Court reversed the district court. The Court held 
that even though parts of the termination statute seem to limit the 
board's options to either accepting or rejecting the superintendent's 
recommendation of termination, to conclude that no appeal could be 
taken because the board did not act to terminate was an unduly restrictive 
view. The purpose of suspension under the discharge section 279.27, 
The Code, was to provide a safeguard for the students, or possibly 
the teacher, in those cases in which problems might occur in future 
associations. Withholding of pay would, in effect, constitute punish­
ment in advance of hearing and would not further advance the purpose 
of suspension. McFarland was awarded back pay. 
Northeast Community Education Association v. Northeast Community School 
District (70) 
James O'Rourke was a teacher employed by the Northeast Community 
School District. On October 12, 1984, O'Rourke hit a student on the 
shoulder. This was the third time O'Rourke had struck a student in 
thirteen months. The district superintendent immediately discussed 
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the Incident with O'Rourke and decided to suspend O'Rourke for three 
days without pay. He later notified O'Rourke in writing of his deci­
sion. At no time did the superintendent seek to Invoke the termination 
or discharge proceedings of Iowa Code Chapter 279. On behalf of the 
teacher, the employee organization sought a declaratory judgment that 
the disciplinary suspension was beyond the powers of the superintendent 
and the school district and was also in violation of procedural due 
process rights. The district court entered a summary judgment on behalf 
of the association. 
The Supreme Court held that the school district had the power 
to suspend teachers for proper cause for disciplinary reasons provided 
that no discharge proceeding had been initiated against the teacher, 
and that disciplinary suspension could be imposed without pay for 
punishment. However, it affirmed the district court on the basis 
that the superintendent's suspension of the teacher was Illegal and 
beyond the superintendent's powers. The superintendent could only 
recommend such suspension to the board. O'Rourke's suspension was 
reversed. 
Benefits 
Barnett v. Durant Community School District (71) 
Muriel Barnett and twenty-four other teachers employed by the 
Durant School District during the 1971-72 and 1972-73 school years 
claimed a tuition refund of up to three hundred twenty dollars out-of-
pocket expenses Incurred by them, and provided for in their employment 
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contracts. Each of them took graduate courses during the 1971-72 
school year which met the qualifications and restrictions provided 
for in their contract. They also returned to their teaching duties 
for the following year. The district, upon advice from its attorney, 
claimed that such agreement to pay was beyond the authority of the 
board. The teachers filed petition for a declaratory judgment; the 
school district filed petition for a summary judgment alleging the 
refusal was correct because the agreement was unauthorized. The 
district court sustained the motion to dismiss. 
The Supreme Court held that there was no question of the authority 
of a school board to grant teacher salary increments based upon addi­
tional education. That right was implied in the statutes rather than 
expressly stated. The purpose of salary increments was obviously to 
encourage teachers to improve their skills to the benefit of the 
district. The agreement for tuition was motivated by the same ob­
jective, and there was no reason the district should not encourage such 
work by absorbing the tuition cost. The district court was reversed. 
Drinnin v. Heartland Area Education Agency 11 (72) 
John Drinnin was a teacher-preschool consultant employed by the 
Heartland Area Education Agency. As a public school employee, he 
was subject to Iowa Code 279.40 which granted a yearly leave of ab­
sence for medically related disability with full pay from ten to fifteen 
days depending on the number of years employed. The final sentence 
of this statute stated that any amounts due an employee under this 
section shall be reduced by benefits payable as temporary disability 
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and healing period benefits under the worker's compensation act. 
Drinnin was injured in an automobile accident in the course of his 
employment and missed sixty-three days of work as a result. At the 
time he had accumulated thirty-seven and one-half days of sick 
leave. During the first thirty-seven and one-half days of his absence 
he received one hundred percent of his salary from his employer and 
benefits which amounted to sixty percent of his salary from his em­
ployer's insurance carrier. The worker's compensation checks were 
signed over to the Agency. Following that period, Drinnin received 
no salary from the Agency, but continued to receive compensation 
benefits from the insurance carrier, which he kept for himself. Upon 
returning to work, he discovered that one full day of sick leave had 
been deducted for each of his first thirty-seven and one-half days of 
absence, thereby exhausting his available sick leave. He brought 
action, claiming that only four-tenths of a full day should have been 
deducted during the first thirty-seven and one-half days of absence, 
thereby not exhausting his available sick leave. The district court 
ruled that the Agency had correctly deducted his sick leave. 
The Supreme Court affirmed this decision. It held that worker's 
compensation benefits are, in substance, payments by an employer, 
either through the purchase of insurance, as was the case here, or 
by self-insurance. Because the payments should be viewed as coming 
from the employer, the Agency was entitled to deduct a full day for 
each day missed. 
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Administrators 
Flanders v. Waterloo Community School District (73) 
M. Dean Flanders served as principal of a public school under 
contract with the Waterloo Community School District. Under the 
statutes, ordinarily the last day a board or its agent could possibly 
inform the administrator in writing of notice to recommend termination 
of contract is March 31. Up to March 30, 1972, the board had not 
informed Flanders in writing of its intent. School was held on March 30, 
Flanders attended, but was not notified of contemplated termination. 
On that day the board caused a written notice to be mailed to Flanders' 
home by certified mail. The next day, March 31, was Good Friday. 
Flanders and his wife were not at home for the greater part of the 
day. A postman attempted to deliver the notice, but finding no one 
at home, left a notice for Flanders to pick up the mail at the post 
office. When Flanders arrived home, the post office had closed for 
the day and remained closed for the next two days due to Easter holidays. 
Flanders never picked up the notice. 
On April 10, the board mailed Flanders notice of termination of 
his contract by certified mail. He received this notice. He then 
brought an action for declaratory judgment that the attempted termina­
tion of his contract was void. The district court found against him 
and dismissed his petition. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the steps to be taken by the board 
were at statutorily mandated dates and times, and must therefore 
have been observed by the board. The court cannot supersede them 
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by times which it might deem "reasonable." Flanders did not receive 
the writing at least ten days prior to the mailing of notice of 
termination by the board, and the board's action was therefore 
ineffective. 
Briggs V. Board of Directors of the Hinton Community School District (74) 
Thomas Briggs was an elementary principal in the Hinton Community 
School District for fourteen years prior to his termination at the 
close of school year 1977-78. On March 29, 1978, the Hinton board of 
directors voted to consider termination of Briggs' continuing contract. 
All procedures mandated by section 279.24, The Code, were followed. 
The hearing officer issued his proposed decision that just cause for 
contract termination did not exist, and suggested that in the alterna­
tive Briggs be placed on probation for the next school year. The 
board then voted to review the opinion and a private hearing was 
held. Following the hearing, the board unanimously rejected the 
hearing officer's decision, and issued its own findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and decision, holding that there was just cause 
for the dismissal. The district court affirmed the board's actions. 
The Supreme Court also affirmed the board's actions. It ruled 
that in the context of teacher fault a "just cause" is one which 
directly or indirectly significantly and adversely affects what must 
be the ultimate goal of every school system; high quality education 
for the district's students. There was substantial evidence in the 
record before the board to justify the nineteen findings of fact 
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which noted deficiencies in the areas of teacher supervision, 
student discipline, and decision making. 
Evidence is "substantial" when a reasonable mind would 
accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion (74, p. 741). 
Cook V. Plainfield Community School District (75) 
In March of 1977, William Cook received notice the board had 
voted to consider termination of his employment, stating the following 
four general reasons; (1) incompetency, (2) insubordination, (3) un­
suitable administrative methods, and (4) lack of professional growth. 
Sixteen specific failures were cited to support the general reasons. 
Cook requested a hearing before final board action. After many hours 
of conflicting testimony from numerous witnesses, the hearing officer 
issued his proposed decision finding no just cause to terminate Cook's 
employment. The board moved to review the decision and held a private 
hearing where it found evidence of just cause and rejected the officer's 
recommendation. Cook appealed to district court which affirmed the 
district's action. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that the record supported the following 
allegations: (1) failure, inability, or refusal to refrain from overt 
opposition of the superintendent's administration and to communicate 
and cooperate with the superintendent regarding school problems and 
issues, (2) failure, inability, or refusal to maintain and complete 
on time the learning disabilities screening and placement program, 
and (3) failure, inability, or refusal to promptly develop and complete 
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staff evaluation as directed by the board. The district's actions were 
affirmed. 
Wedergren v. Board of Directors of the South Tama Community School 
District (76) 
Joel Wedergren was employed by the district in March 1977 as 
district superintendent. In 1978 the board and Wedergren entered into 
a contract of employment which began July 1, 1978 and was to continue 
for the three-year maximum allowed by law. The board voted on March 8, 
1978, to consider discharging Wedergren from his position. The board 
followed the hearing and review procedures contained in section 279.24, 
The Code. A hearing officer held an evidentiary hearing in May 1979. 
His proposed decision recommended that Wedergren not be discharged. 
The board voted to review the decision. It then heard the case de novo 
upon the record and made its own findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, voting to discharge the superintendent. On appeal, the district 
court affirmed the board's decision. 
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the board's decision. In so 
doing, it held that in the absence of evidence that a board has pre­
judged the facts of the case, the court would not find a denial of 
due process by the combination of investigative and adjudicative 
roles. The board was faced with a decision which it felt was 
necessary to the educational integrity of the district. It met 
that responsibility. The fact that some other person might not 
agree with that decision, or might have found otherwise, does not 
impair the validity of that decision. 
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Gere v. Council Bluffs Community School District (77) 
Lloyd Gere had been a teacher and principal in the Council Bluffs 
Community School District for more than twenty years. Because of de­
clining enrollment and budgetary cutbacks, the district decided to 
close some elementary schools beginning with the 1981-82 school year. 
In that process, Gere's assignment for that year was changed to the 
duties of (1) elementary principal of a small sixty-five student 
school, (2) coordinator of the district's outdoor education program, 
and (3) attendance officer for the district. Gere objected to the 
assignment as attendance officer but performed those duties under 
protest. He then filed a petition for declaratory judgment, asking 
the court to prohibit the district from requiring him to serve as 
attendance officer. The trial court ruled that Gere's contract did 
not permit the assignment because those duties would not be within 
the reasonable expectations of the parties and would also be un­
conscionable in view of the parties' unequal bargaining positions. 
The Supreme Court reversed the district court in favor of the 
school district's position. It ruled that Iowa Code section 279.21 
constituted a term of Gere's contract, and that it provided that "the 
principal shall perform such other duties as may be assigned by the 
superintendent." The mandate to perform other duties as assigned 
was not limited to instructional-type duties performed by principals. 
School districts, in providing effective educational programs, may 
reasonably be expected to use their administrators in various func­
tions. The Court held that the power to assign could not be unlimited. 
A principal could not have been required to act as building custodian 
114 
or bus driver, but short of such extremes, the decision to assign 
should be at the discretion of the school authorities. 
In the Matter of Waterloo Community School District and concerning 
William J. Gowens (78) 
Because of budget limitations and declining enrollments, the 
Waterloo Community School District found it necessary to eliminate 
the positions of three of its twenty-three elementary school principals. 
The position of Gowens, a nonprobationary administrator with twelve 
year's service to the district, was one of the three terminated. 
The board served notice to Gowens and provided him with four reasons 
for its action: (1) the district continued to have a declining student 
enrollment, (2) the district continued to have budget limitations, 
(3) the district had eliminated the position of three full-time 
elementary principals, and (4) the relative performance and evaluation 
of the administrators and the needs of the district had been con­
sidered. Gowens requested a hearing to review the board's action. 
At the hearing the board introduced evidence to establish the first 
three reasons, but chose not to offer proof in support of the fourth 
reason. The hearing officer found that the district had established 
the first three reasons and that these reasons amounted to just 
cause for terminating Gowens' position. On review the district court 
reversed the board, ruling that, although the district had shown 
sufficient cause to eliminate three positions, it had not shown just 
cause for selecting Gowens' position as one of them. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court. It held that 
in selecting positions for staff reductions a board need not justify 
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its decision under the formal procedure, or grounds, that would or­
dinarily be required to discharge an administrator for just cause, 
but the board could be called upon to articulate some objective basis 
for its selections. Such basis could be ability, seniority, experience, 
or anything else that denoted the decision was not arbitrary. The 
difficulty with the board's position in this instance was that it 
left unanswered the crucial question of whether its decision rested 
within the broad area of discretion or within the narrow area of what 
might be prohibited. The Court ordered Gowens reinstated. 
Unemployment Compensation 
Orr V. Lewis Central School District and Employers Mutual Casualty 
Company (79) 
John Orr filed a petition for arbitration in June 1978, seeking 
benefits for headaches which he alleged he suffered as the result of 
a work-connected incident in May 1975 when he was struck on the back 
of the neck by a falling plank. He claimed that, despite reasonable 
diligence, he was unable to determine the headaches were caused by 
the May 1975 incident until September 1977. The school district 
and the insurer moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the 
action was barred because it was untimely under section 85.26, The 
Code. A deputy industrial commissioner sustained the motion and 
dismissed the petition. Upon petition for judicial review, the 
district court affirmed. 
The Supreme Court held that the discovery rule delays the accrual 
of a cause of action until the injured person has in fact discovered 
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his injury or by exercise of reasonable diligence should have dis­
covered it. The time period for notice or claim did not begin to 
run until Orr, as a reasonable man, should have recognized the nature, 
seriousness, and probable compensable character of his inury or 
disease. A motion to dismiss should only be sustained if were 
certain that the party could not recover under any state of facts 
which could be proven in support of his claim. The district court 
was reversed and the issue remanded to the industrial commission. 
Courts do not favor statutes of limitations, and thus 
when two interpretations of limitations statutes are 
possible, the one giving the longer period to litigate 
seeking relief is to be preferred and applied (79, p. 257). 
Pes Moines Independent Community School District v. Department of Job 
Service and James H. Sorenson (80) 
James Sorenson had his name placed on substitute teacher lists 
at three schools in the Des Moines area, including the Des Moines 
Independent Community School District, in 1982. He accepted one as­
signment from the school district and additional assignments from the 
other two schools during the fourth quarter of 1982. He did not accept 
any teaching assignments from the district in either the first or 
second quarters of 1983; however, he did accept assignments in the other 
two schools during the first quarter of 1983, and from one of the other 
schools in the second quarter. At the conclusion of the 1982-83 school 
year, the district sent a letter to Sorenson indicating that the 
school district would have substitute teaching available to him for 
the following term. The school district had a policy whereby a 
substitute was retained on the list if the first letter was not 
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returned. A second letter was sent to Sorenson in August requesting 
that he confirm if he wished to have continued employment with the 
school district. Sorenson did not return the letter or notify the 
school district because he assumed that his failure to contact the 
district would indicate that he was no longer available to substitute 
teach. On June 1, 1983, Sorenson moved from Altoona to Cedar Rapids 
because of financial reasons. After the move he was employed for a 
short time as a substitute teacher with the Cedar Rapids School 
District. 
Sorenson filed an initial claim for unemployment insurance 
benefits effective October 16, 1983. A claims deputy determined that 
he was entitled to benefits. The school district appealed this decision 
on the grounds that claimant voluntarily quit. On that appeal the 
hearing officer concluded that Sorenson was entitled to benefits be­
cause; (1) his election not to report for further possible assignment 
with the district was not a voluntary quit, and (2) he was justified 
in not accepting suitable work because he no longer resided in the 
area where the job was offered. On judicial review, the district 
court affirmed the job service's determination. 
The Supreme Court reversed the decision and remanded the case 
for denial of benefits. It held that Sorenson was not involved in a 
conventional employer-employee relationship. Substitute teaching 
is by its nature inherently indefinite depending on the occurrence 
of unforeseen vacancies in the teaching faculty. The legislature has 
treated school district employees differently than other employees. 
Unemployment benefits are not paid to teachers during the period between 
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successive academic years or terms, and there is a special provision 
in employment agency rules which compares substitute teachers 
favorably with regular instructional employees in regard to the ex­
pectation of future employment. A substitute who has been notified 
that his status will remain the same as the preceding semester or 
school year, and has no reasons to believe otherwise maintains a 
continued employment relationship with the school. 
Worker's Compensation 
Cedar Rapids Community School and Bituminous Casualty Corporation v. 
Reginald Cady, deceased, Roberta Cady, widow, and Iowa Industrial 
Commission (81) 
Reginald Cady and Graydon Caslavka were employed as janitors by 
the Cedar Rapids Community School District. They were both recently 
assigned to Harding school. The two men had no contact outside of 
work and little contact at work. However, unknown to the employer 
and Cady, Caslavka was afflicted with paranoid schizophrenia accompanied 
by delusions of persecution. He believed that a "hit man" was after 
him to avenge his misconduct in real and imagined past sexual af­
fairs. On the day before the killing, he decided that Cady was the 
hit man. On the day of the killing, Cady almost collided with 
Caslavka's car while driving into the school parking lot. Caslavka 
then took a pistol from his car and shot Cady, fatally wounding him. 
Subsequent psychiatric examinations established that his conduct was 
wholly caused by an insane delusion. The Industrial Commission ruled 
that Cady's death arose out of his employment, on the basis of the 
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analogy between a latent defect in a machine which breaks down and 
causes injury and an unforeseen mental disorder which causes a co-
employee to run amuck and cause injury. The district court affirmed 
the commissioner's reasoning. 
The Supreme Court also affirmed the commission. It held" that in 
keeping with the humanitarian objective of the workers' compensation 
statute, the legislation was primarily for the benefit of the worker 
and his dependents. Its beneficient purpose was not to be defeated 
by reading something into it which was not there, or by a narrow and 
constrained construction. When work exposes the employee to the risks 
of the street, the injury is compensable; when work exposes an employee 
to the risk of attack by a deranged person, it is like a "street risk" 
and also compensable. 
Death of janitor arising out of an on-the-job assault by 
an allegedly deranged co-employee janitor at school arose 
"out of" employment within meaning of Worker's Compensation 
Law, and thus widow was entitled to death benefits (81, 
p. 298). 
Johnson v. Harlan Community School District, West Pes Moines School 
District and Employers Mutual Insurance Companies (82) 
Diana Johnson was an employee of the West Des Moines School 
District. On January 7, 1984, while working for that district, she 
was injured in a fall on the premises of the Harlan Community School 
District. She later brought an action against the Harlan District, 
alleging its negligence had caused her injuries. Following a jury 
trial, she recovered a judgment of eighty thousand two hundred fifty 
dollars in that action. Prior to the conclusion of the litigation, 
she had received worker's compensation benefits as a result of her 
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injuries^ paid to her by Employers Mutual Insurance Companies. These 
benefits included over nineteen thousand dollars for weekly healing 
period and disability benefits and in excess of fifty-five thousand 
dollars for medical and hospital benefits which her employer was 
required to furnish under section 85.27, The Code. 
The West Des Moines School District and the workers' compensation 
carrier filed notice of lien in employee's tort action for both 
weekly benefit payments and cost of medical and hospital services 
which were furnished, claiming the right to indemnity from Johnson's 
recovery from tort-feasor. Johnson agreed that the district and the 
carrier should be reimbursed to the extent of the weekly healing period 
and disability benefits she received but disputed their right of 
recovery for the sums paid as medical and hospital expense. 
The Supreme Court decided that the benefits were recoverable 
by the district and the carrier. The Court ruled that the purpose 
of the subrogation provision of the statute was to permit the employer 
to recoup monies it had been required to pay under the provision of 
Chapter 85, The Code, from a tortious third party whose conduct had 
produced the injury which necessitated the payments. No other reason 
was advanced which suggested a rational basis for treating the two 
categories of benefit payments differently for the purpose of the 
employer's right of subrogation. 
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Classified Employees Contract Termination 
Spilman v. Board of Directors of Davis County Community School District 
(83) 
D. Sue Spilman was a properly certificated librarian, though she 
had never previously been so employed. After a rather detailed 
conference between Spilman and the superintendent of the district, 
the parties entered into a written employment contract under which 
she agreed to serve as a library clerk for one hundred eighty working 
days during the 1974-75 school year. She was to be paid four thousand 
six hundred dollars, an amount less than the basic teacher scale. 
The usual teacher employment contract form was not used. At the end 
of the school year she was orally informed that her contract would 
not be renewed for the following year. There was no written notice, 
nor was a hearing granted. Spilman brought action, seeking a declaratory 
judgment that she was entitled to the protection of section 279.13, The 
Code, which stipulated the conditions under which the contracts of 
teachers must be terminated. The district court filed a decision dis­
missing Spilman's case and assigning cost to her. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court. It held that the 
primary task of the court was to construe Spilman's employment contract, 
in light of the continuing teacher contract statute. At no place in 
either the Code or Department Rule was there any provisions made for 
certification of "library clerks." Spilman herself testified that 
she was familiar with the terms of the contract and was aware she 
was being employed as a clerk before she signed the contract. There 
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was no question of the intent of both parties as to the meaning of 
their contract. 
Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community School District (84) 
Carolyn Vinson was employed as a school bus driver by the Linn-Mar 
Community School District. Her immediate supervisor was Jerry 
Williams, the district's director of transportation. Pursuant to the 
terms of a master employment contract, Vinson was paid in accordance 
with the designated route time for the route she drove. Such time 
was not the actual driving time of a particular occasion but the amount 
of time determined by Williams to represent a reasonable time within 
which the route ordinarily could be completed. In filling out her 
time card, Vinson showed her starting time as 2:45 p.m. and recorded 
her return time as the time shown on the office clock after her return 
to the bus barn. The time shown on the cards did not affect her 
compensation, however, because her compensation was based on the time 
allotted for the route. Other drivers recorded their time in the 
same way. 
After a dispute with Williams about breakdown pay on October 21, 
1980, she was informed by him that she was being overpaid because her 
route should not start until 2:50. All of the other drivers started 
at 2:45, and she had never been informed that she had a different 
starting time. Williams subsequently undertook a time study of Vinson's 
route, culminating in his decision to reduce her route time by five 
minutes, and refusing to allow her to include shut-down, clean-up 
time on her time card. He then instructed her to fill out her time 
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card every day by indicating that her departure time was 2:50 and 
her return time was 4:05, regardless of what the return time actually 
was. Vinson continued to record actual time, and was given a 
memorandum from Williams on the subject of "Falsifying Time Cards" 
and informed that if she persisted, she was liable for suspension and 
dismissal. Vinson continued her practice and was suspended for three 
days. During that time she responded in writing to Williams accusing 
him of ordering her to falsify her time card by his insistence on her 
recording her time in the manner he had chosen. When she returned 
to work, she continued filling out her time card in the manner she 
had previously, and Williams dismissed her. Subsequently he instructed 
drivers merely to show their route numbers on their time cards as a 
basis for receiving compensation at the predetermined rate. In 1981, 
Vinson applied for a bus driving position with a neighboring school 
district. When an official of that district called Williams to 
inquire why she had been discharged, Williams told him he terminated 
her for "recording incorrect time on time cards." Vinson brought 
suit. 
The case was submitted to the jury on special verdicts. Vinson 
was awarded compensatory damages and punitive damages on her defama­
tion claim, compensatory damages and punitive damages on her claim for in­
tentional infliction of emotional distress, and compensatory damages 
for breach of contract. The district appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The Court decided for Vinson in all but one area, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. It reasoned that an attack on the 
integrity and moral character of a party is libelous per se. Thus, 
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it is libel per se to make a published statement accusing a person of 
being a liar. The Court believed that a statement that an employee 
was fired for making incorrect entries on her time card could reasonably 
be taken as imputing dishonesty to the employee. Therefore, Williams 
statement could be understood as defamatory per se. The final step 
was to report the incident to a prospective employer as if it involved 
dishonesty, knowing the report would be so received and harm Vinson's 
chance of being employed, and knowing that she had not acted dishonestly. 
The fact that the entries would not change her compensation bears on 
the gravity of Williams' behavior, and the fact that the system was 
changed after she was fired lends support to her claim that she was 
being singled out. 
Union Activities 
Valley Educational Support Personnel Association v. Public Employment 
Relations Board (85) 
On May 19, 1985, the Board of Directors of the Valley Community 
School District promoted Dave Smock to the newly-created position of 
head custodian. Smock was promoted over John Gass, a sixteen-year 
employee, and Lou Anne Dennler, a five-year employee. Smock had been 
an employee of the district for ten months. All three employees 
had been active in the Valley Educational Support Personnel Association. 
Smock had been the chief organizer of the union and Gass and Dennler 
had been elected, respectively, president and vice-president of the 
association. After the selection of Smock, Dennler submitted her 
resignation from her janitorial position. The district refused her 
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subsequent request for reinstatement. The association filed a com­
plaint challenging the district's actions, alleging a violation of 
Iowa Code section 20.10. PERB dismissed the complaint. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that the district would have promoted 
Smock despite any animus toward the association, and that the 
evidence of his initiative was sufficient to sustain the district's 
burden of production. The Court also concluded that there was 
substantial evidence to support the decision not to reinstate Dennler, 
absent a finding of prohibited practice by the district's actions. 
Under dual motive test. Public Employment Relations Board 
properly considered evidence tending to show lack of animus 
on part of school district toward union after union estab­
lished prima facie case that promotion of junior employee 
over two senior employees was based on exercise of protected 
union activities ; although test requires employer to produce 
evidence of legitimate reason for action taken, it does not 
thereby render irrelevant evidence directly rebutting prima 
facie case (85, p. 496). 
Military Service 
Bewley v. Villisca Iowa Community School District (86) 
James Bewley was employed as a custodian with the Villisca Com­
munity School District. The parties entered into annual contracts 
of employment, each providing Bewley with a two-week vacation, to be 
determined with the consent of the superintendent. In 1976 and 1977, 
Bewley was informed by the superintendent that the district's unof­
ficial policy was that employees who were members of the National 
Guard were to take their vacations during the same period of time they 
were attending training camp. Apart from his training time, Bewley 
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received no vacation time during those two years. He brought action 
for damages against the district in district court, which found for 
Bewley. The district appealed. 
The Supreme Court ruled for Bewley. In so doing is cited Chapter 
29A.43, The Code, which provides in part that no person, firm, or 
corporation, shall discriminate against any officer or enlisted person 
of the National Guard or organized reserves of the Armed Forces of the 
United States because of his membership therein. Such period of 
absence shall be construed as an absence with leave, and shall in no 
way affect the employee's rights to vacation, sick leave, bonus or 
other employment benefits relating to the employee's particular employ­
ment. The Court refused to exclude school districts from the parameters 
of that statute. 
Significant Legislation Since 1970 
House File 427, enacted in 1970, created uniform dates for the 
issuance and return of teachers' contracts. The Act required that no 
teacher's contract be issued for renewal prior to March 1, and that a 
minimum of twenty-one days after issuance be allowed for the return of 
the contract. Another contractual issue was decided in 1975 when the 
legislature provided for a two-year contract for school principals 
who had been employed at least nine months by a school district. 
This Act also defined the duties of the school principal concerning 
the administration and operation of the attendance center to which the 
principal was assigned. 
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Procedures for continuation and termination of teachers' contracts 
and for discharge of teachers was outlined in Senate File 205, ap­
proved by the 1976 General Assembly. The Act specifically exempted 
superintendents, assistant superintendents, principals and assistant 
principals. Under its terms, the superintendent initiates termination 
proceedings which shall be for just cause. A private hearing may be 
held before the board at the request of the teacher. A nonprobationary 
teacher may appeal the decision of the board to an adjudicator who 
may be a person mutually agreeable to the two parties or may be 
selected from a list of five names submitted by the PERB. The 
adjudicator's decision is final unless appealed to the district court. 
In the same legislative session. House File 1582 provided 
procedures for the termination of the contract of or discharge of all 
administrators. Termination of a nonprobationary administrator must 
be pursuant to notice, a hearing before a hearing officer selected 
from a list of names submitted by the Professional Teaching Practices 
Commission, and the decision of the hearing officer may be overruled 
by the school board. The administrator may appeal to the district 
court based upon specific reasons enumerated in the Act. 
The Sixty-sixth General Assembly also redefined sick leave for 
state employees as a medically-related disability so that it includes 
pregnancy, and prohibits employers from discriminating in promotion, 
discharge, demotion, or suspension of employees because of valid 
absence for a medically-related disability. The law on mandatory 
retirement was changed in 1979. For employees in the Iowa Public 
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Employment Retirement System, two changes were made; (1) an employee 
of the state cannot be retired involuntarily because of age, and 
(2) an employee of a political subdivision may be retired on the basis 
of age at seventy or above. 
Significant changes in teaching contracts for extracurricular sports 
activities were enacted in 1984 through Senate File 2215. The Act 
requires school districts to issue separate extracurricular contracts 
to coaches of interscholastic athletic activities. If the holder 
of an extracurricular contract is a teacher, the teacher must possess 
a coaching endorsement for that sport. However, the Act also allows 
school boards to employ noncertificated persons to serve as assistant 
coaches of any sport and head coaches of any sport except varsity 
football, basketball, track, baseball, Softball, volleyball, gymnastics, 
hockey, or wrestling if the individuals hold a coaching authorization 
issued by the Board of Educational Examiners. If an extracurricular 
contract is held by a certificated teacher, the contract can be 
terminated or the teacher may be discharged using the present law for 
termination or discharge. If an extracurricular contract is held 
by an individual possessing a coaching authorization, that individual 
serves at the pleasure of the board. If an individual holding an 
extracurricular contract does not wish to accept the contract for 
that activity for the next school year, the individual may resign 
from that contract for that year. However, the board may require that 
a teacher employed by the district either continue coaching for the 
next year or accept an extracurricular contract to coach for the 
next year if the board has made a good faith effort to fill the position 
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and has been unable to do so. An appeal procedure for teachers 
required to accept extracurricular contracts is provided. The termina­
tion of an extracurricular contract of a certificated teacher does 
not affect a regular teaching contract of that teacher, but if an 
employee's regular teaching contract is terminated, the employee's 
extracurricular contract is also terminated. 
The following year the legislature once more addressed this issue 
and provided that an individual who possesses a teaching certificate 
with a coaching endorsement who is employed by the board of directors 
of a school district in a coaching capacity but is not issued a 
teaching contract serves at the pleasure of the board and is not 
subject to termination procedures. 
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CHAPTER VIII; STUDENTS 
Chapter 299, The Code of Iowa, provides in part that all children 
over the age of seven and under the age of sixteen who are physically 
and mentally able must attend some public school for at least one 
hundred twenty days per each school year. In lieu of such attendance, 
such child may attend a private school, provided that equivalent in-
instruction is provided by a certified teacher. 
Exceptions to this requirement include: (1) any child who is 
over the age of fourteen and regularly employed, (2) any child whose 
educational qualifications are equal to those of students who have 
completed the eighth grade, (3) any child who is excused by any court 
of record or judge, (4) children attending religious services or 
receiving religious instruction, and (5) children who are attending a 
private college preparatory school approved under section 275.25 
(87, p. 379). 
Students may be excluded from school for violations of the regula­
tions established by the board, for reasons of immorality, or when the 
presence of a student is determined to be detrimental to the best 
interests of the school. School administrators may suspend students 
for short periods of time provided that such suspension is duly reported 
to the board in writing. A school board may, by a majority vote, 
expel any student from school for the reasons listed above, but such 
suspension may not be for a longer period of time than the current 
school year (88, p. 335). 
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Eleven cases relating to student issues were decided by the Supreme 
Court since 1970. The causes for litigation involving schools and 
students have changed from the concerns of racial discrimination, 
corporal punishment and discipline related issues reported by Skarda, 
to those involving eligibility for athletics, cases involving tort 
liability wherein students sustained personal injury, and special 
education. 
Eligibility 
Hunger v. Iowa High School Athletic Association (89) 
The Iowa High School Athletic Association (IHSAA), an unin­
corporated association in charge of boys' interscholastic athletic 
events in Iowa, developed rules of conduct to determine eligibility 
of students to participate in athletic events for their member 
schools. One such rule contained a section that prohibited athletes 
from consuming alcoholic beverages and controlled drugs. An interpreta­
tion of that rule by the IHSAA placed a student ineligible if he was 
in a vehicle that was stopped by a law officer and one such substance 
was found inside the vehicle, even if the student was not consuming 
the substance, and even if the incident did not occur during the 
school year. 
On June 7, 1971, William Hunger and three other minors were riding 
in a car containing a case of beer. The car was stopped by a highway 
patrolman and the beer was discovered. Upon reporting the incident 
to his school officials, Hunger was declared ineligible to play football 
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during the coming fall for the first six weeks of the season. Bunger 
brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the IHSAA rule. 
The Court found the rule in question to be a rule of the IHSAA, 
an organization that had no authority to promulgate rules to students. 
Neither the State Board of Public Instruction nor a school district 
operating under that Board could redelegate its rule-making authority 
to the IHSAA. Therefore, the rule was invalid. The Court further 
stated that the rule on its face was too tenuous to uphold. An 
incident outside of school, outside of the school year, and outside of 
football season, involving no illegal use of beer could not be up­
held in this situation. 
Statute authorizing schools to participate in inter-
scholastic events sponsored by qualifying organizations 
and inferentially to belong to such organizations did 
not authorize school board to turn over its statutory 
rule-making authority to such organizations (89, p. 555). 
Student Injury/Death 
Sprung V. Rasmussen (90) 
Senior Daniel Sprung was injured in a physical education class, 
while attempting to perform a tumbling exercise under the supervision 
of instructor Rasmussen. The incident occurred on February 14, 1968 
and Sprung was incapacitated until May 11, 1968. On June 29, 1968, 
one hundred thirty-six days after the happening of the incident. 
Sprung's father formally notified the district through his attorney 
of his intent to file suit. In October he brought petition against 
the district. The district, in its response, claimed the notice had 
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not been given within the required ninety days and asked for a dis­
missal. 
The Court found the section of law relied upon by the district 
to be ambiguous. The issue was involved not with two separate 
statutory timelines, but two permissible interpretations of the same 
timeline, Reading the questioned sentence to favor the position taken 
by Sprung and his father, it concluded that legislative intent was to 
permit an injured party to defer the service of the sixty-day notice 
for a period of ninety days, thus giving the party a maximum period 
of one hundred fifty days before service of notice would be required. 
Where student injured in physical education class was 
incapacitated for period of 87 days, notice given to school 
district of student's claim for damages arising from 
injuries served 49 days after termination of claimed 
incapacity confirmed with statutory notice requirements 
(90, p. 431). 
Fosselman v. Waterloo Community School District (91) 
On September 20, 1968 Stephen Fosselman (a ninth grade student) 
was participating in a game of "bombardment" in his physical education 
class at Logan Junior High School in Waterloo. He was injured at 
the start of the game when, in the act of retrieving the ball, he 
was struck in the face by another student's knee. At the time of the 
injury instructor Frank Guild was either participating in the game or 
observing the activity from a platform at the side of the court. He 
did not observe the accident. Fosselman left the game in a dazed 
condition and was found later in the locker room. A later medical 
examination disclosed four fractures of the facial bones, a depressed 
sinus and bruises to the left eye and surrounding area. The fractures 
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were repaired and the doctor's report concluded ho permanent injury. 
Fosselman and his father filed suit claiming negligent supervision 
of the physical education class. 
There was uncontradicted evidence that the rules of the game had 
been explained by the instructor, that the students had frequently 
requested the game, and it had been played many times prior to the 
time that Fosselman was injured. The Supreme Court found that no 
evidence had been introduced that established that more than one 
instructor was needed to provide appropriate supervision of the class. 
Evidence was insufficient, in action for damages for in­
juries sustained during student's participation in game of 
"bombardment" in ninth grade physical education class, to 
require submission of negligent supervision issue to jury 
(91, p. 281). 
Wong V. Waterloo Community School District (92) 
On July 17, 1970, eleven year old Peter Wong was drowned while 
participating in a swimming class conducted under the auspices of the 
Waterloo School District. The class involved a summer program of six 
swimming lessons held at McKinstry Junior High School. The classes were 
supervised by employees of the district, including both classroom 
teachers and lifeguards. Peter was known to be afraid of water and 
was last seen in the shallow end of the pool. Sometime later his body 
was discovered in the deep end. Artificial respiration was attempted, 
both by those present and later, by the Waterloo Fire Department in-
halator squad. All efforts failed. Peter's father brought suit, 
alleging specific negligence. 
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The Court cited various factors as persuasive against the neg­
ligence allegation. Those factors included the inherent dangers of 
swimming, the possibility of bodily malfunction on the part of the 
victim, the possibility of the victim's own negligence, and the 
lack of control over other swimmers who might cause or contribute to 
the misadventure. The authorities were unanimous that drowning is not 
such an occurrence, which in the ordinary course of things happens 
only if there is negligence. 
In action for death of 11-year-old boy who drowned while 
participating in a swimming class conducted under auspices 
of defendant school district, the refusal to permit res ipsa 
loquitur to stay in the case was not reversible error, where 
the intestate was one of 17 young boys in swimming class, 
there were seven persons engaged to supervise their 
activities, the whereabouts and conduct of each were in­
quired into at trial, and it did not appear that any other 
witnesses or any additional evidence would have been pro­
duced under application of the res ipsa doctrine (92, p. 
867). 
Shearer v. Perry Community School District (93) 
On March 25, 1971, Kenneth Shearer, a fourteen year old student 
at Perry Community High School, was engaged in an exercise which in­
volved a weight attached to a bar with a cable on a weight machine. 
While he was so involved a portion of the machine became disengaged, 
striking him in the mouth and teeth. The blow resulted in the loss of 
two front teeth and necessitated considerable dental treatment. At 
the time of the injury, the physical education teacher was in the room 
with Shearer, and the injury was immediately reported to the principal 
of the school. On March 23, 1973, two years later. Shearer filed a 
petition against the district alleging negligence. The district filed 
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a motion for dismissal on the grounds that the timelines in section 
613A.5, The Code, had not been complied with. 
Unlike the situation in Sprung (90) discussed above, the Court 
ruled in this case that official notification was not delivered to 
the district in a timely fashion. Notification of the building 
principal by the instructor involved, and verbal notification to the 
superintendent on the following day by the mother of Shearer did not 
constitute formal notification of intent to file suit. 
Verbal notification to superintendent of school district 
of injuries sustained by student while using exercise machine 
in school would not constitute substantial compliance with 
statute specifically requiring written notice to govern­
mental subdivision of tort claim (93, p. 689). 
Kautman v. Mar-Mac Community School District (94) 
Sara Kautman was injured in a school bus accident which occurred 
when she and other members of the Mar-Mac seventh grade basketball 
team were returning home from a game. Upon bringing suit, a trial 
jury awarded her $25,000 whereupon she unsuccessfully moved for a new 
trial unless the district consented to additur in such amount as the 
trial court might allow. The Supreme Court ruled the jury award had 
effected substantial justice between the parties and refused to remand 
for either a new trial or additur. 
In determining whether jury's award was inadequate, question 
it not whether the evidence might have justified a higher 
award but whether under the record, giving the jury its 
right to accept or reject whatever portions of the conflicting 
evidence it chose, the verdict effects substantial justice 
between the parties (94, p. 147). 
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Greene v. Tri-County Community School District (95) 
This suit arose from an accident which occurred in a high school 
football game played on October 12, 1973. It was not brought initially 
until October 1975; pleadings were not completed until February 1977. 
On August 15, 1977, the district court clerk filed and delivered to 
all parties the "try-or-dismiss" notices pursuant to Iowa Rules of 
Civil Procedure 215.1. The rule set in motion in this case requires 
that such notice be delivered before August 15. The parties did not 
observe that the notice was late, and proceeded to act upon it. On 
December 29, 1977, all parties joined in an application to continue 
the suit to the 1978 court sessions. The application was granted but 
no further action was taken in 1978. In February 1979, the district 
moved to dismiss the action, essentially on the basis of the plaintiff's 
failure to prosecute. The trial court dismissed the action. 
Eleven months later, after adding new counsel, the plaintiff 
petitioned to vacate the dismissal, relying on the failure of the 
clerk to give the proper notice in 1977. In its consideration, the 
Supreme Court held that because the stakes are high and the results 
harsh, the formalities prescribed to implement rule 215.1 procedure 
might be strictly followed. If there was not substantial compliance, 
the rule was not invoked and there was no automatic dismissal to set 
aside. There was no automatic dismissal here; the notice was served 
one day late, hence the rule never came into effect. The case was 
reinstated. 
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Mullnix V. Saydel Consolidated School District and Joy McDowell (96) 
Student Kathleen Mulinix was injured when struck by a car driven 
by McDowell while exiting a school bus owned by the Saydel District 
and driven by one of its regular drivers. The student brought action 
against both McDowell and the District. McDowell settled in the amount 
of $6,000 with the student and the mother prior to the jury's verdict. 
The jury found McDowell to be 0% negligent, the student to be 60% 
negligent and the school district and driver to be 40% negligent. 
The attorney for the District and the driver filed a motion to offset 
the jury verdict by the settlement paid by McDowell. The motion was 
denied. 
When it reached the Supreme Court, that body cited itself in 
Glidden v. German, 360 N.W. 2nd, 716 establishing the proper method of 
offset. Pursuant to that scheme the fault against Mulinix was first 
deducted. From that net amount was then deducted the payment made by 
the settling party (McDowell). The Court held that it was not neces­
sary to show that the settling party was not actually liable, but it 
was sufficient if it appeared that the plaintiff could have sued 
the settling party. In this case, the plaintiff not only could have 
sued McDowell, but in fact, did. 
Oliver v. Sioux City Community School District (97) 
On February 17, 1983, an accident occurred during high school 
gymnastics practice involving the fall of a student from uneven parallel 
bars. Student Cindy Oliver suffered a fractured spine in the fall. 
She was taken by ambulance to the hospital where surgery was performed 
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that night. She remained bedridden for eight weeks, and will probably 
never walk normally again. After the accident, Oliver's father presented 
the ambulance bill to the district, seeking reimbursement. He was 
refused. Two questions reached the Supreme Court for its consideration; 
(1) Did the ambulance bill constitute a written notification under 
the provision of 613A.5, and (2) was the notice delivered within sixty 
days of the accident? 
The Court, noting that the statute does not require the writing 
to follow any particular form, concluded the bill for the ambulance 
service was a claim for damages. The bill might not have been tech­
nically perfect, but the substance was there. The question of time­
liness was remanded to district court for determination thereof. 
Student's allegation that notice of her injury had been 
sent to school district was.sufficient to allege compliance 
with statutory notice provisions (97, p. 665). 
Special Education 
Southeast Warren Community School District v. Department of Public 
Instruction (98) 
The Southeast Warren Community School District initiated regular 
expulsion procedures against Thomas Konrad, a special education student. 
Upon his mother's appeal, the Department of Public Instruction ruled 
that a special education student cannot be expelled under any circum­
stances, In a judicial review proceeding, the district court held 
to the contrary, sustaining the position of the school district. 
Two statutes are alleged to be in direct conflict: Section 
282.3(1), establishing a duty to provide special education programs 
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and services for all children requiring special education; and Section 
282.4, stating the district's expulsion authority. The Court ruled 
that the policy expressed in the special education chapter put a special 
gloss on any expulsion proceedings involving special education students. 
It did not preclude expulsion, but it required special procedures 
before expulsion may occur. Those procedures must include réévaluation 
of the child by the diagnostic-education team provided for in 670 
Iowa Administrative Code, and after a full hearing, a determination 
by the school board whether an alternative placement would better meet 
the needs of the student and the district. Expulsion should be re­
sorted to only when no reasonable alternative placement is available. 
Statutory duty to provide special education programs and 
services for all children requiring special education did 
not deprive school district of statutory authority to 
expel such children (98, p. 173). 
Buchholtz v. Iowa Department of Public Instruction (99) 
Michael Buchholtz and his family lived on a farm in the Rockwell 
Swaledale Community School District. The farm bordered the Meservy-
Thornton School District. Michael attended the first, second and 
third grades in the Rockwell district. He experienced learning 
difficulties and was placed in a remedial reading program in 1976, 
with the permission of his parents. He continued to have problems 
and was tested by the AEA and diagnosed as having a learning disability. 
He was subsequently placed in a resource room in March 1978 and remained 
there until the end of the school year. There was discussion with 
his parents about retaining him in third grade and allowing the 
resource room to help bring him up to grade level, but summer tutoring 
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was not encouraged. Michael's parents wished to have him tutored 
in the hope that he could progress to fourth grade and so arranged 
with a learning disability teacher in the Meservy-Thornton district. 
As a result of the tutoring, Michael made good progress and 
the parents sought to have the district lines altered to allow him 
to stay in the Meservy-Thornton schools, or in the alternative, to 
have the Rockwell District pay his tuition to that district. The 
State Department of Public Instruction denied their request. The 
Supreme Court reasoned that the Iowa standard does not require the 
"best" or "maximum" program in the sense of an unlimited commitment 
of resources and effort to meet the needs of each handicapped child. 
The standard established a goal of equality of education of handicapped 
and nonhandicapped children. The district must strive to meet the 
needs of special education students with the same level of effort 
which was devoted to meeting the needs of nonhandicapped children. A 
reasonable person could conclude that no material difference existed 
between the special education programs available in the two school 
districts. One district's program was not made inappropriate merely 
because another had a better program. 
There must be parity of educational opportunity between 
handicapped and nonhandicapped children and district must 
strive to meet needs of special education students with the 
same level,of effort which is devoted to meeting needs of 
nonhandicapped students; whether equality of education is 
actually realized depends on nature of handicap, availability 
of resources, and what effort is reasonable in context of 
individual case (99, p. 789). 
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Significant Legislation Since 1970 
Many of the cases involving students that have been litigated 
over the time considered by this study have been in the area of tort 
liability. The legislature has also been concerned with the rights 
of students. In 1974, House File 753 was enacted, prohibiting 
certified guidance counselors in schools from being required to dis­
close confidential communications entrusted to them by pupils or their 
parents or guardians. 
In 1984, Senate File 2168 was passed, permitting school districts 
to use additional allowable growth for dropout prevention programs. 
The school district is required to submit an application for approval 
of the dropout prevention program to the Department of Public Education. 
The program is funded on the basis of one-fourth or more from the 
district cost and up to three-fourths by an increase in allowable 
growth. 
House File 162, from the same legislative session provides that 
special education programs can be continued beyond the date on which 
an individual reaches twenty-one years of age until the Individual 
reaches the age of twenty-four with the approval of the Department if 
the individual had an accident or prolonged illness that delayed the 
completion of the individual's educational program. Current law also 
provides for continuation of a special education program beyond age 
twenty-one because of congenital factors. 
The 71st General Assembly enacted legislation in 1986 that es­
tablishes requirements for the search of students or protected student 
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areas. Under the provisions of the bill, school districts are required 
to adopt a "student search rule." Additionally, the law establishes 
standards by which searches may be conducted, and strictly prohibits 
searches which involve a strip search, a body cavity search, the use 
of a drug sniffing animal to search a student's body, and the search 
of a student by a school official not of the same sex as the student. 
School districts are allowed to conduct general, routine in­
spections of lockers, if twenty-four hour notice is given. If there 
is an individualized suspicion that a student has violated a law or 
school rule, the twenty-four hour notice is not required. 
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CHAPTER IX: SCHOOL DISTRICT REORGANIZATION 
Prior to July 1, 1975, the responsibility to study and approve 
county plans for school reorganization was given by the Legislature 
to county boards of education. In instances where school districts 
contained land that was located in more than one county, joint county 
boards of education were organized to approve such plans. The county 
boards were mandated to consult with school district officials and 
hold public hearings when necessary. Part of their task was to assign 
elementary school districts that did not provide a high school at­
tendance center to neighboring districts that did, in effect consoli­
dating the districts. 
The State Department of Public Instruction provided assistance to 
the county boards, and appeals relative to territories in two or more 
counties were brought to its attention for adjudication. All decisions 
at this level were final (1, p. 131). When the Area Education Agencies 
were created by the Legislature in 1975, the responsibility for the 
study and formulation of school reorganization plans became part of 
that organizational scheme, replacing the county boards of education. 
Statutory authority for school reorganization is found in Chapter 275, 
The Code of Iowa, wherein procedures are stipulated for such actions. 
Section 275.1 states in part; "It is the policy of the state to en­
courage economical and efficient school districts which will ensure 
an equal educational opportunity to all children of the state" (100, 
p. 283). 
Three cases were considered by the Supreme Court after 1970 
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that grew from the county board concept, and one from actions of an 
Area Education Agency in a reorganization proposal. The amount of 
litigation in this area has been significantly reduced from that dis­
cussed by Skarda, partly in light of the more popular concept of 
sharing of both students and educators. Legislation encouraging 
sharing is discussed at the end of this chapter. 
County Boards 
Eden Township Board of Directors v. Carroll County Board of Education 
and Templeton Independent School District v. Carroll County Board of 
Education (101) 
In 1958 a county plan for the reorganization of schools in Carroll 
County was adopted by the Carroll County Board of Education. In 
late 1965 approximately thirty independent school districts in the 
county were not maintaining high school grades. In the following years 
many of these districts were attached to districts maintaining twelve 
grades. A portion of Eden Township had been placed in one of these 
attachments in the Carroll Community School District. In August 1968 
the Carroll County Board made attachments of the remaining portion of 
Eden Township and Templeton Independent School District to the 
Manning Community School District which was maintaining twelve grades. 
Both Eden and Templeton districts and their boards of directors ap­
pealed the county board's actions. The district court overturned the 
attachments. Following this decision three members of the Carroll 
County Board as individuals, and one member of the Eden Township 
Board of Directors appealed to the Supreme Court. 
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The Court held that the Individual members of the boards had no 
standing to appeal since they did not constitute the board of directors 
of a school district or a county board of education. It further found 
that the county board had fallen into what might be termed appeasement 
when attempting to accomplish the reorganization with as little dif­
ficulty as possible. 
Reason for limiting the right to appeal to a court of 
record to parties allegedly interested through certain 
bodies whose territory is involved in proposed attachments 
and by no other, applies to appeals from district court to 
Supreme Court, and right to appeal to Supreme Court is 
restricted to those having standing as an aggrieved party 
(101, p. 195). 
Board of Education of Audubon County v. Joint Board of Education of 
Audubon, Cass, and Shelby Counties (102) 
A procedural question arose when the Joint County Board of Educa­
tion considered a proposal to reorganize the nonhigh school district 
of Kimballton with Elk Horn-Kimballton, a high school district 
previously reorganized. The matter had a history of litigation and 
both the Elk Horn-Kimballton District and the Audubon District desired 
to reorganize with Kimballton. During the course of the hearing, 
the county board heard several objections to the proposed reorganiza­
tion and passed motions to overrule them. No motion to accept the 
proposal was made. The county superintendent notified the public of 
the petition and set a date for the election to be held. The proposed 
reorganization was approved in both districts. The Audubon County 
Board filed an appeal from the Joint Board's action, claiming that 
the election was illegal because no motion was made to accept the 
petition. 
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The Supreme Court ruled that the evidence was clear that the Joint 
Board did not dismiss the petition and had no intention of doing so. 
By overruling a motion to dismiss the petition, the Board thought it 
was approving the same. 
School reorganization law is to be liberally construed, 
and precise and exact compliance is not essential, but 
substantial compliance is necessary and will suffice 
(102, p. 423). 
Templeton Independent School District v. Carroll County Board of 
Education and Eden Township School District v. Carroll County Board 
of Education and Manning Community School District v. Carroll County 
Board of Education (103) 
This case is a continuation of the litigation surrounding the 
Carroll County Board of Education's efforts to attach portions of 
the Eden and Templeton School Districts, neither having a high school, 
to the Manning Community School District. A previous attempt at at­
tachment was held to be null and void because it was effected without 
considering the desires of residents of the subject districts. In 
this instance, however, the record showed that adequate opportunity 
was afforded Templeton and Eden residents to make their wishes known 
to the county board regarding attachment preferences, and that the 
county board did fairly consider the desires expressed. The Supreme 
Court refused to weigh the wisdom of legislative action by the Carroll 
County Board of Education so long as it acted pursuant to statutory 
authority. 
A court has neither the right to ignore the statutory criteria 
for effectuating attachments and reorganization of school 
districts nor the power to provide a substitute for same, 
i.e. compulsory adherence to the wishes of the residents 
of the attached area (103, p. 1). 
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Area Education Agencies 
Myron Bloom v. Arrowhead Education Agency and Elmer Klahs v. Arrowhead 
Education Agency (104) 
In June of 1975, during the period of transition from county to 
area boards, the Arrowhead Board of Directors passed a resolution 
adopting the existing county plans for school reorganization as the 
tentative reorganization plan for the area under its jurisdiction, 
pending future reorganization studies. In January 1976, a proposal 
for reorganization of the Sioux Rapids and Rembrandt districts was 
filed with Arrowhead. A public hearing was held in July, after which 
the Arrowhead Board concluded a larger reorganization proposal should 
be explored and dismissed the proposal. 
In August an identical reorganization proposal was filed with the 
Agency. Another hearing was held in September at which time the 
Board decided to approve the new proposal for submission to the voters. 
The proposal was approved by the voters. Bloom and Klahs brought suit 
to overturn the election, alleging the Agency Board had not properly 
adopted a tentative plan for school reorganization. District court 
affirmed and overturned the election. 
The Supreme Court found that although the adoption was done in 
June, before Arrowhead would have had an opportunity to conduct studies 
and surveys, the Board may well have concluded it had insufficient 
basis for departing from the county plans. The Board was relying upon 
districting which presumably was in compliance with reorganization 
requirements of the former statutes. The election was allowed to stand. 
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School reorganization statutes are to be liberally construed 
and substantial compliance with them is sufficient (104, 
p. 594). 
Significant Legislation Since 1970 
Although the creation of the area education agencies affected 
many areas of public school operation, enacting legislation is 
pertinent to the reorganization of school districts in that such 
agencies replaced the county systems that had been authorized to over­
see and facilitate district reorganization. In 1974 the Sixty-fifth 
General Assembly established the fifteen area education agencies with 
boundary lines the same as the fifteen merged area schools. The 
purpose of the agencies is to provide to the local school districts 
in the area special education instructional and support services, 
media services, and additional optional services, which may previously 
have been provided by the county school systems and joint county 
system abolished by the Act. The Act mandates special education 
instructional services, establishes a plan for weighted enrollment 
for each type of handicap of from 1.8 to 4.4, and provides for state 
foundation aid to be paid on the basis of the adjusted enrollment. 
Increased attention to school district reorganization was evi­
denced by the 1978 General Assembly in the form of House File 2359. 
This Act relates to school district reorganization procedures. It 
deletes the option of the State Board of Public Instruction to allow 
additional time for school districts making a good faith effort to 
comply with approval standards before commencing reorganization of the 
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district. It provides that when two or more area education agencies 
are discussing the formation of a school district which includes 
territory in more than one area agency, the total votes of each board 
will be equal. The Act provides that for the first year of existence 
of a reorganized district, the board will consist of all the resident 
members of the boards of the constituent districts. 
This same legislation provides that the collective bargaining 
agreement of the district with the largest enrollment will continue 
in effect until a successor agreement for the reorganized district 
is negotiated. It also provides that if only one collective bargaining 
agreement is in effect, the employees of the reorganized district will 
be included in the bargaining unit of that agreement. 
Legislation enacted in 1982 specifically states that the State 
Board of Public Instruction can attach a school district not main­
taining twelve grades to one or more adjacent school districts. 
House File 477, passed in 1983 prohibits the filing of a school 
reorganization petition with an area education agency administrator 
if the petition describes similar or identical boundaries to a previous 
petition for six months after an area education agency board has 
disapproved a change in boundaries designated in the petition, and 
for six months after a reorganization election fails. It also prohibits 
an area education agency administrator from accepting a reorganization 
petition from a district that has approved the issuance of general 
obligation bonds at an election during the preceding six-month period. 
In 1985 the Iowa Legislature approved Senate File 398, which 
relates to school district reorganization procedures. One provision 
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of the bill increased from five to ten the number of days within 
which an AEA board is required to render a decision following the 
public hearing. 
House File 2462, approved in the 1986 legislative session, is 
the omnibus bill relating to incentives for school district efficiency, 
reorganization, and sharing. It provides that, for school districts 
with an enrollment of less than six hundred before reorganization, 
property tax rates will not increase with respect to the additional 
property tax and taxes for bonded indebtedness. It reduces the founda­
tion levy of a reorganized school district from $5.40 to $4.40 in 
the budget year following reorganization. The levy would then increase 
by twenty cents a year for five years, until it reached the $5.40 
amount. 
As part of the incentive to become more efficient through reorganiza­
tion and sharing, this legislation provides supplementary weighting 
for school districts which share administrators, excluding principals. 
School districts and area education agencies are limited in their 
expenditures for executive administration to five percent of the school 
corporation's operating budget, effective July 1, 1989. 
The 1987 session produced House File 499, another omnibus bill 
dealing with educational standards and school efficiencies. It made 
several changes to the law concerning whole grade sharing agreements. 
In addition to providing more specific definitions for different types 
of whole grade sharing, the Act established new timelines for signing 
a sharing agreement, and allows students to opt out of a sharing 
agreement under certain conditions. 
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House File 2226, enacted during the 1988 General Assembly session 
allows a school district reorganizing on or after July 1, 1988 to use 
as its budget enrollment the combined budget enrollments of the 
districts that were involved in the reorganization as if they had not 
reorganized. In some cases reorganized school districts had lost 
enrollment count because they no longer qualified for the budget 
guarantee. 
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CHAPTER X: ELECTIONS 
Although the number of instances of court intervention in decisions 
involving indebtedness of school districts has diminished substantially 
since 1970, such matters are often the subject of emotional contro­
versies at the local level. The property taxes that are generated by 
such undertakings are of immediate effect to the district's constituents, 
and the election process utilized to assume such indebtedness is sub­
ject to challenge on many fronts. To assist in this process, the Iowa 
Legislature has provided statutory guidance as to when a district may 
incur indebtedness, for what reasons, and to what extent. School 
districts are authorized to contract indebtedness and to issue general 
obligation bonds to defray the costs thereof. Bonds may be sold to 
assist in purchasing, building, furnishing, reconstructing, repairing, 
improving, or remodeling a schoolhouse, gymnasium, stadium, field 
house, school bus garage, teachers' or superintendent's home, and 
obtaining a site for or improving an already owned site for an athletic 
complex. Section 296, The Code, stipulates that the length of time 
for such bonded indebtedness shall not exceed twenty years, and the 
total indebtedness of a district shall not exceed five percent of the 
actual value of the taxable property within the school district, 
as determined by the most recent state and county tax lists (105, 
p. 369). 
However, before indebtedness can be undertaken by a district 
in an amount that exceeds one and one-quarter percent of the assessed 
value of the taxable property, certain procedures must be followed. 
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A petition must be signed by a number equal to twenty-five percent of 
those voting in the last school election and filed with the President 
of the Board, asking that an election be held. The petition must 
state the amount of the indebtedness being proposed and the purposes 
for which it will be used, if it is authorized. The board will meet 
and establish the date of the election unless it determines unanimously 
that the propositions in the petition are grossly unrealistic or 
contrary to the best interests of the district. In the case of bond 
elections, an extra-majority, or sixty percent of the votes cast must 
approve the measure or it fails. 
Three instances of elections disputes have been considered by the 
Supreme Court over the course of this study. Each of the three involved 
a bond election. 
Bond Issues 
Adams v. The Fort Madison Community School District (106) 
In a bond election in the Fort Madison Community School District, 
53.1% of those voting cast affirmative votes. According to statute, 
an extra-majority vote, or 60% of those voting, is required to pass a 
bond issue. Adams and several voters who had supported the issue 
brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the sixty percent 
requirement. They reasoned that under the current statute, the 
voting power of the "no" voters was disproportionate to their numbers 
as compared with that of the "yes" voters. This, in effect, would 
violate the principle of one person, one vote announced by the United 
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States Supreme Court In 1963. 
The Supreme Court, however, held that due to the long-term ef­
fects of a bond issue, the extra-majority vote is reasonable. Bond 
levies remain fixed charges to a school district in affluent times and 
in bad times. The sixty percent requirement constituted an effective 
tool for keeping fiscal affairs in hand by insuring that a true 
majority of those voting were willing to undertake such an obligation. 
Fiscal stability and continued solvency of local government 
provided sufficient justification under either traditional 
rational basis test or compelling interest test for de­
parting from simple majority test in statutes requiring at 
least a 60% affirmative vote in order for school district 
general obligation bond proposals to carry (106, p. 133). 
Paulson V. Forest City Community School District (107) 
On December 3, 1974, the Forest City Community School District 
held an election on the question of issuing bonds to build and equip 
a schoolhouse. Waldorf College, a two-year liberal arts institution, 
is located in the school district. At the election, one hundred forty-five 
Waldorf students signed declarations of eligibility to vote under 
Chapter 49.77 of the Code of Iowa. An election board member approved 
the declarations and the students voted in the election. The voting 
on the proposition to issue the bonds was such that if one hundred 
forty of the Waldorf students had voted affirmatively, and if they 
were not qualified voters, the proposition would have failed. Paulson 
and other taxpayers brought suit in equity against the district 
and the election officials. 
The Court found the underlying problem was that of determination 
of the students' voting residence. It reasoned that a person's 
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residence, for voting purposes only, is the place which he declares 
is his home with the intent to remain there permanently or for a 
definite or indefinite or indeterminable length of time. In this 
case, the students' declarations that Forest City was their residence, 
under those qualifications, tipped the scales in favor of their ability 
to vote. 
Unmarried college students who made voter's declaration of 
eligibility at polls and who declared college town to be 
their home were voting residents qualified to vote in school 
district election on question of issuing bonds to build and 
equip school house, even though students' family homes were 
outside the school district (107, p. 344). 
Brutsche v. Coon Rapids Community School District (108) 
Certain election irregularities were found regarding a bond issue 
election in the amount of $1,900,000 to finance a new school building. 
Among these irregularities were the following; (1) the canvas of the 
election was held on Monday following the election, rather than the 
statutorily required Friday, (2) the school board did not officially 
notify the commissioner of elections to call a special election, nor 
did it provide him with a list of possible election officials, (3) the 
requirements of section 53.22 providing for voting in nursing homes 
was not exactly complied with, and (4) there was some question as to 
whether the district intended to use some of the funds generated to 
construct an athletic field, even though such intention was not included 
in the proposal. 
The Court refused to overturn the election, ruling that the matter 
of the canvas was an irregularity, not a matter of substance, the 
authority of the commissioner of elections was so broad as to make 
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the furnishing of the list a technical requirement at most, the election 
officials performed their duties satisfactorily with regard to the 
nursing home voters, and there was no evidence the board intended to 
build an athletic field with revenues generated from the bond issue. 
Bond election will not be held invalid on account of dis­
regard of merely directory provisions of election laws 
where similar disregard would not render election of of­
ficials invalid (108, p. 338). 
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CHAPTER XI: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Collective bargaining by public employees was authorized in 1975 
by the General Assembly through enactment of the Iowa Public Employment 
Relations Act, Chapter 20, The Code of Iowa. This law, often referred 
to as PERA, states and defines the rights of public employers and 
employees. It has broad coverage, applying to virtually all public 
employees within the state, excepting supervisors, confidential em­
ployees, and a few other specified classifications (109, p. 1). 
PERA provides that employees may organize and bargain collectively 
with their employers through representatives of their own choosing. 
To insure this right, secret ballot elections are conducted by the 
Public Employment Relations Board, often referred to as PERB. Further 
to insure that the rights of employer and employees are protected and 
to prevent disruption of services to the public, PERA defines certain 
practices of employers, union, employees and other individuals as 
prohibited practices (109, p. 2). 
PERA provides a duty to bargain with the designated representatives 
of the employees. The subjects of mandatory bargaining are set down in 
a "laundry list" fashion which provides a more limited scope than the 
traditional "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ­
ment," used in the National Labor Relations Act (110, p. 397). Strikes 
are prohibited and strong sanctions are provided in the event of an 
illegal work stoppage. Election procedures are carefully stipulated 
in the PERA. Unlike the NLRA, which does not require the representative 
to be selected by any particular procedure, the Iowa law requires 
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PERB-conducted representation elections to be by secret ballot. A 
petition for bargaining representative determination is to be accompanied 
by a thirty percent show of interest, i.e., evidence that thirty percent 
of the employees in the appropriate unit support the petitioner (111, 
p. 49). Generally, eligible voters in a PERB election are those employees 
who were employed in the bargaining unit during the pay period preceding 
the direction of election and who remain employed in the bargaining 
unit on the date of the election. However, the parties may mutually 
agree on different criteria to determine voter eligibility. 
Of all the issues raised in labor relations in the public sector, 
one of the most significant has been questions about scope of bargaining. 
Such questions have arisen in several different forms : prohibited 
practice complaints alleging that a party has refused to negotiate 
over mandatory subjects of bargaining; petitions for declaratory 
rulings; or specialized procedures established specifically to address 
these issues. Often the questions have been the result of negotiations: 
one party presents a demand which the other side refuses to consider. 
In Iowa this has created some frustration in the bargaining process 
because of potential delay when all bargaining must be completed 
by the certified budget date of the employer, March 15 (112, p. 760). 
To cope with these problems, the Board has instituted the special 
expedited declaratory ruling procedure for resolving negotiability 
disputes during the bargaining process. 
There has been considerable case litigation regarding the mandatory 
subjects of bargaining set forth in section 20.9. The Iowa Supreme 
Court has generally placed a narrow construction on these bargaining 
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subjects. Federal agency and court opinions, arising out of NLRA 
cases, are not controlling on Iowa subjects of bargaining (109, 
p. 11). 
The Supreme Court and PERA have placed bargaining proposals in 
three categories: mandatory, permissive, and illegal. Proposals which 
fit within a mandatory subject as found in section 20.9, must be 
negotiated upon the request of either party. In addition, proposals 
fitting with the mandatory designation may be submitted to a fact­
finder or arbitrator, and their inclusion in the negotiated contract 
may be ordered. Permissive proposals are those on which bargaining 
is permitted but not required. Permissive proposals may be submitted 
to a neutral for resolution only upon mutual written consent of both 
parties. Illegal proposals are those on which negotiations are precluded 
by law. 
PERB has the general responsibility for the administration of 
resolution of bargaining disputes by neutrals. Such resolution is 
provided for through mediation, fact-finding, interest or contract 
issue arbitration, and grievance arbitration. Mediation services may 
be requested by either party in a dispute. The request must be 
dated and signed, filed with PERB, and served upon the other parties 
to the negotiations. Ten days are allocated for the mediation process. 
PERB has determined that the day of the first meeting is the date 
which starts the ten-day allowance. 
Fact-finding is a compulsory component of the impasse procedures 
unless the parties to the dispute mutually agree to dispense with it 
and proceed directly to arbitration. Normally, in the event mediation 
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efforts are unsuccessful, the statute requires the PERB to appoint a 
fact-finder (111, p. 51). In most cases, the PERB has allowed the 
parties to select a fact-finder from a list provided them. The fact­
finder conducts a hearing and issues findings and recommendations for 
the parties' consideration. After reading the fact-finder's report, 
the parties must either accept or reject within ten days. If the 
dispute is unresolved after ten days, the PERB makes the report public. 
In Iowa, fact-finding is particularly significant in that the report 
generated by the fact-finder becomes a third option for the arbitrator 
to consider in rendering his or her decision. 
Interest arbitration in Iowa is final offer arbitration on an 
issue by issue basis. If the fact-finder's recommendations are not 
accepted by either party, they may request arbitration. Following 
such a request, the parties are required to exchange their final and 
best offers of each issue at which they are at impasse. The most 
commonly utilized form of arbitration is for a single arbitrator to 
hear the dispute. The parties can opt for a tripartite arbitration 
panel if they choose. Arbitrators are usually picked from a list 
supplied by the PERB. 
The arbitrator is required by statute to consider certain criteria 
in making his or her award. Included in these criteria are a comparison 
of wages, hours, and conditions of employment of the involved public 
employees with other public employees doing comparable work, past 
contracts between the parties, the employer's power to levy taxes, 
and the ability of the employer to finance economic adjustments (111, 
p. 52). The award must be issued within fifteen days of the hearing. 
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unless the parties have otherwise agreed. Arbitrators are prohibited 
by statute from mediating the dispute, and the award is subject to 
judicial review under Chapter 17A, The Code. 
The main function of the PERB in grievance arbitration cases is 
to provide panels of arbitrators upon request. Such services are 
offered based on an hourly fee rate, shared by the parties and paid 
to the state. 
The Iowa Supreme Court or Court of Appeals has been asked to make 
determinations based upon Chapter 20, twenty-five times since the law 
was enacted. Additionally, one case is Included that preceded the 
PERA, involving a "working agreement" between a school district and 
its classified employees. 
Working Agreement 
Service Employees International, Local No. 55 v. Cedar Rapids Community 
School District (113) 
The members of the Service Employees International organization, 
the authorized and acting representative of the custodial and maintenance 
employees of the Cedar Rapids School District, filed suit asking for 
judicial construction of a certain clause of its working agreement 
with the district. The union alleged that the working agreement was 
arrived at through negotiations and was designed to regulate working 
conditions and compensation of its members. It further claimed that 
two months after its adoption, the district advised the Union that 
certain changes would be made in schedules of certain employees, 
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thereby establishing a rule that was not in the agreement. The district 
argued the agreement was illegal in that it could not enter into a 
collective bargaining agreement in an industrial context with labor 
unions. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the Board of Directors of the district 
made the final judgment in matters to be included in written policy. 
The district was not obligated to include the recommendations of 
representatives of the custodial organization. The working agreement 
was not an enforceable contract. 
Where school board retained authority to unilaterally accept, 
reject, or modify any and all demands made by custodial 
employees' union representatives without possibility of 
sanctions such as strikes or boycotts being taken by the 
union membership, and board in no way indicated its assent 
to be bound by terms of "working agreement" which it adopted 
as to terms and conditions of employment of custodial em­
ployees, working agreement*was not binding contract (113, 
p. 403). 
Elections 
Mount Pleasant Community School District v. Public Employment Relations 
Board and Mount Pleasant Para-Professionals, Aides, Secretaries Or­
ganization (114) 
In June 1981, several nonteaching employees of the Mount Pleasant 
Community School District who were members of the Para-Professional, 
Aides, Secretaries Organization petitioned PERB to conduct a representa­
tion election. On October 6, 1981, PERB conducted the election, 
which the organization lost by a vote of ten to twelve. On October 5, 
1981, approximately thirty hours before the election, the superintendent 
of schools wrote and posted a notice in each of the school buildings 
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where members of the organization were likely to see it. The notice 
posed and answered questions dealing with various aspects of contract 
negotiation from the standpoint of the district. The organization 
challenged the results of the election, claiming the notice mis­
represented facts and threatened employment if the union won the 
election. PERB ruled that no misrepresentation of fact was presented 
by the notice, but that some statements pertaining to job security 
could have affected the outcome of the election, and consequently set 
the election aside. 
The Supreme Court held that underlying all representation election 
cases was the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. An employer's view may be expressed 
freely so long as that expression does not contain a threat of reprisal 
or force or promise of benefit. The notice in this case could not 
be shown to contain such threats, and did not have a significant effect 
on the election. 
Test in representation election case is whether sufficient 
showing is made to permit conclusion that allegedly of­
fensive conduct and -surrounding circumstances cumulatively 
tended to interfere with the election; application of that 
test requires a finding of proscribed conduct, which prevented 
employees from freely registering their choice of a bargaining 
representative (114, p. 473), 
Bargaining Unit 
Iowa Association of School Boards and Iowa State Education Association v. 
Iowa Public Employment Relations Board (115) 
On March 20, 1984, the Iowa State Education Association filed a 
petition for declaratory ruling with the PERB. The petition set forth 
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a series of hypothetical facts involving a school district and substitute 
teachers who had served that district in one of several time frames 
within a school year. ISEA sought to have the PERB define the situa­
tions under which substitute teachers would be eligible for coverage 
under the FERA. The Iowa Association of School Boards filed a petition 
to intervene, which was granted. 
PERB issued its declaratory ruling, holding that substitute 
teachers are public employees and are not excluded from the Act if 
the substitute performs any service during each of more than four 
consecutive months during the school year. Both ISEA and lASB filed 
petitions for judicial review. 
The Supreme Court based its ruling on a determination of the 
meaning of Iowa Code section 20.4(5) which grants to public employees 
rights under the Act. The provision of section 20.4 relevant to this 
case excludes certain public employees from the provisions of the 
chapter, including temporary public employees employed for a period of 
four months or less. The Court ruled the legislature did not indicate 
whether the work of a temporary employee must be full or part time, 
but included a four-month requirement of service rather than a minimum 
number of days or hours for eligibility under Chapter 20, The Code. 
Any employment by substitute teacher within consecutive 
months is sufficient to be included in statutory four-month 
standard for inclusion as public employee under Public 
Employment Act (115, p. 571). 
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Anthon-Oto Community School District v. Public Employment Relations 
Board (116) 
A petition was filed with the PERB by the Anthon-Oto Education 
Association which sought to amend the existing bargaining unit of 
professional employees to include fourteen classified employees. The 
proposed consolidation was favored by the classified employees in an 
informal survey taken by the Education Association. The district op­
posed the concept of a combined professional/classified bargaining unit. 
The PERB found that the proposed unit met the criteria of section 20.13, 
The Code, even though it had previously made the opposite determination 
in Mid-Prairie Community School District 85 PERB 2395. 
The Supreme Court ruled that, relying largely on the small size 
of the Anthon-Oto School District, PERB's decision was consistent 
with geographical location and efficiency of administration of government 
tests. It held that the similarities between Anthon-Oto and Mid-Prairie 
were mitigated by the differences in size between the two districts. 
Mid-Prairie was large enough that the classified staff there could 
constitute its own bargaining unit efficiently. The staff at Anthon-Oto 
could not. 
Public Employment Relations Board's determination that ap­
propriate bargaining unit for school consisted of combined 
professional/nonprofessional bargaining unit was reached 
in a manner consistent with reasoned balancing of factors, 
displayed in prior, similar cases and, as such, discretion 
Board exercised was neither arbitrary nor capricious (116, 
p. 141). 
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Dubuque Community School District v. Public Employment Relations Board 
and Dubuque Education Association (117) 
In May 1985, the Dubuque Education Association petitioned the 
PERB to amend its collective bargaining unit to add substitute teachers 
qualifying for inclusion under the Public Employment Relations Act. 
The Dubuque School District resisted the amendment, contending the 
substitute teachers were ineligible for coverage under section 20.4(5) 
which excludes temporary public employees employed for a period of four 
months or less, and argued that including substitute teachers in a 
bargaining unit already composed of regular teachers and professional 
employees would be inappropriate. PERB ruled in harmony with its 
decision in Iowa Association of School Boards and Iowa State Education 
Association, No. 2703 PERB (Feb. 18, 1985), allowing the inclusion. 
The Court ruled that the question had been addressed in Iowa 
Association of School Boards v. PERB (113), and declined to revisit 
the decision. It stated that greater similarities than differences 
are evidenced between substitute teachers and regular teachers. 
Considering also a desire to avoid duplication of time and expense 
of negotiations, the Court held that these issues favored a single 
bargaining unit. 
Substitute teachers who perform service for school district 
in each of four consecutive months are entitled to benefits 
of collective bargaining under Public Employment Relations 
Act (117, p. 428). 
168 
Benefits 
Bettendorf Education Association v. Bettendorf Community School 
District (118) 
Several years after negotiations with the Bettendorf Education 
Association, the Bettendorf School District had adopted a rule which 
provided that accumulated personal illness leave up to the age of 
sixty-five could be drawn as a lump sum at the time of retirement or 
as a death benefit to members of the family, at prevailing substitute 
rates. At the request of the superintendent, an attorney general's 
opinion was obtained in February 1972, on the issue of the board's 
authority to pay the benefits provided in the rule. The attorney 
general expressed the opinion that the benefits were unauthorized. 
The Education Association and the District agreed on March 9, 1972 
that contracts for the ensuing year should not include such benefits 
for accrued sick leave and that available funds should be used to 
improve health insurance coverage instead. 
Four teachers who retired in the spring of 1972 and three who re 
tired in the spring of 1973 brought suit against the district for the 
recovery of the benefit. The district court affirmed the attorney 
general's opinion and an appeal to the Supreme Court followed. 
The Court held the payments at issue in this case were not dis­
ability pay, but a reward to teachers who did not use up sick leave. 
The district acknowledged that the purpose was to discourage teacher 
absenteeism, which the Court ruled to be an appropriate objective 
of school districts. With regard to the retirees of 1972, the Court 
ruled that the district was plainly contracted to deliver the benefit 
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and the agreement was binding. Since the Education Association and the 
District had mutually agreed to remove the provision from the 1973 
contracts, no such obligation rested with the district for those 
retirees. 
Lump-sum benefits payable upon retirement for accrued sick 
leave were a form of teacher compensation, so that school 
district had authority to contract to pay then under 
statutory provisions authorizing school district to 
contract with teachers regarding compensation (118, 
p. 550). 
Prohibited Practices 
Burlington Community School District v. Public Employment Relations Board 
and Burlington Education Association (119) 
The Burlington Community School District and the Burlington Educa­
tion Association had been negotiating for collective bargaining with 
regard to the pay scale of the teachers employed by that district. 
The district requested that the negotiation sessions be held in public, 
and the association requested closed sessions instead. The district 
then filed with the PERB for a declaratory ruling to determine whether 
a public employer could unilaterally determine whether such sessions 
were to be open or closed. On November 3, 1976, PERB issued its 
declaratory ruling, finding that if parties to the collective bargaining 
disagree, the negotiations sessions must be closed. A unilateral 
demand on the part of a public employer that such sessions be opened 
would amount to bad faith on the employer's part since bargaining in 
public would tend to inhibit, if not destroy, the bargaining process. 
The Supreme Court held that the public policy of the PERB is to 
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encourage harmony between public employees and government, and the 
privilege requested by the school board in this case would contribute 
to discord and a complete lack of harmony between the two parties. 
It ruled that a board's insistence on open sessions as a condition 
precedent to bargaining was a prohibited practice under section 
20.10(3), The Code, as such insistence would interfere with the rights 
of public employees to bargain collectively. 
If legislature intended an agency to be able to unilaterally 
decide whether public employment bargaining sessions could 
or must be open to the public, it could have included 
negotiating sessions as a meeting which could be closed 
by a vote of the agency's members (119, p. 517). 
Brown v. Public Employment Relations Board (120) 
Elaine Brown had been teaching in the Sioux City Public School 
system since 1974. During that time the Sioux City Education Association 
had been the collective bargaining organization representing Brown 
and other employees of the Sioux City Community School District. The 
collective bargaining agreement between the association and the district 
contained language determining the seniority of teachers employed by 
the district. As early as 1978, a dispute arose as to whether Brown 
or another teacher, Fedderson, had greater seniority under the master 
agreement. Fedderson began teaching in the district after Brown, but 
Brown had signed a continuing contract three months after Fedderson. 
Faced with declining student enrollment and the distinct possibility 
of staff reduction, the district and the association together 
reviewed the seniority language in the master agreement in an effort 
to prevent future controversies. In the spring of 1979, the association's 
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executive committee, of which Brown was a member, received a recom-
& mendation from the association's seniority committee that each teacher's 
seniority dated from the signing of a continuing contract. The associa­
tion subsequently adopted that recommendation, elevating Fedderson above 
Brown on the seniority list. She subsequently resigned from the as­
sociation. 
Thereafter the school in which Brown and Fedderson were teaching 
was closed. When Fedderson was given a position in another building 
' for which both he and Brown had applied, she asked the association to 
process a grievance for her against the district. The grievance was 
processed through prearbitration steps but not further because the 
association concluded that Fedderson was clearly senior to Brown in 
light of the adopted language. Brown filed complaints against both 
the district and the association, accusing the association of prohibited 
practice in its failure to represent her; first in agreeing to the 
language and second, in failing to process her grievance completely. 
Her complaint against the district was in agreeing to the language mid­
term, and in granting seniority to Fedderson. Both the district and 
the association raised the issue of timeliness of her complaint at all 
stages of the proceedings. PERB ruled that the evidence did not sup­
port Brown's complaints against the district, but that the association 
had committed a prohibited practice when it agreed to language that 
adversely affected only her, a change which the association knew would 
have that effect. The district court affirmed that Brown's complaint 
agsinst the association was not timely, and reversed the PERB on the 
issue of prohibited practice. 
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The Supreme Court agreed that Brown's complaint may not have been 
filed in accordance with the timelines established under section 20.11, 
The Code. It remanded to the PERB to first determine whether Brown 
filed her complaint within ninety days of the occurrence of the 
prohibited practice. If she had not,'PERB was asked to decide whether 
she had established a found factual and legal basis for being excepted 
from the requirement. 
Statutory 90-day limit for filing complaint with Public 
Employment Relations Board alleging prohibited practice 
is mandatory rather than directory (120, p. 89). 
Negotiability 
Charles City Community School District v. Public Employment Relations 
Board (121) 
The Charles City School District had been engaged in collective 
bargaining with the Charles City Education Association, when during 
the course of the negotiations, the parties disagreed as to whether two 
proposals submitted by the association constituted mandatory subjects 
of bargaining. The district refused to negotiate on the proposals 
involving medical insurance for dependents and the right of the employee 
organization to process grievance procedures during company time without 
the loss of pay. A prohibited practice complaint was filed by the 
district with the PERB. In a recommended decision and order the 
PERB ruled the proposals to be mandatory subjects according to 
section 20.9, The Code. Subsequently the district court reversed the 
PERB, finding both proposals permissive under the statute. 
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The Supreme Court found the insurance proposal to be mandatory 
by applying a two-step analysis; a determination that the proposal 
came within the meaning of "insurance," and a determination that the 
proposal was not illegal. The proposal to give the employee organization 
paid time to process grievances was found not to be mandatory by the 
Court. Section 20.18 provides the cost of arbitration of grievances 
to be shared equally by the parties. The proposal would effectively 
have required the employer to pay the entire cost of processing 
grievances up to the point of arbitration. This would have limited 
the authority expressly granted to the employer under section 20.7. 
Given legislative history of Public Employment Relations 
Act section listing mandatory subjects on which parties 
are required to bargain if requested and cogent policy 
arguments for distinguishing public and private sector 
bargaining, Iowa legislative intent was to adopt a restrictive 
approach to interpreting subjects listed in such section 
(121, p. 766). 
Charles City Education Association v. Public Employment Relations Board 
and Charles City Community School District (122) 
A dispute arose during the course of contract negotiations late 
in 1978 between the Charles City Education Association and the School 
District. The association submitted for mandatory negotiation a 
proposal regarding the nature of post graduate hours that would qualify 
an educator for advancement along a district salary schedule, also 
proposed by the association. The district argued that the proposal 
was not a mandatory subject insofar as the nature of qualifying credit 
hours was concerned. 
The district petitioned the PERB requesting a resolution of the 
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negotiability dispute. The PERB ruled that the nature of the hours 
necessary for advancement was a question of job qualification, a matter 
of management prerogative, and was therefore a permissive subject 
of bargaining; and that while the number of semester hours to be 
utilized in the salary schedule was a mandatory subject, the determina­
tion of which college courses should qualify as credit hours per column 
was a management prerogative. District court reversed the PERB, 
finding the proposals mandatory within the meaning of "wages" in 
section 20.9, The Code. 
The Supreme Court affirmed PERB's determination, ruling that the 
public employer has the exclusive right to determine job qualifications 
of an employee due to its duty and right to hire, promote, demote, 
transfer, assign and retain employees. The Court held that, if the 
word "exclusive" in section 20.7 was to have its ordinary meaning, 
the employer should not be compelled to bargain on a proposal that 
bore only on job qualifications of an employee. 
Under Public Employment Relations Act, it was province of 
city school district to decide what education and what 
specific subject areas of the education would qualify a 
teacher for a particular teaching assignment (122, p. 663). 
Marshalltown Education Association v. Public Employment Relations Board 
and Marshalltown Community School District (123) 
During contract negotiations the Marshalltown Education Association 
and the Marshalltown Community School District reached an impasse 
when the district made a contract proposal that the employer's ad­
ministrative employees retain and accumulate seniority to be used 
if they were reassigned by the employer to the bargaining unit. 
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The association refused to discuss the proposal, arguing that it 
was not a mandatory subject under section 20.9, The Code. After a 
fact-finding hearing ended in disagreement on this point, the associa­
tion filed a petition with the PERB for an expedited resolution of 
negotiability dispute. The PERB ruled the district's proposal was a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. The association brought an appeal 
to the district court which affirmed the PERB. 
The Supreme Court, reasoning that the PERA, section 20.4 
specifically excluded school administrators from those persons per­
mitted to exercise public employee rights, including the right to en­
gage in collective bargaining, found the proposal to be a permissive 
subject of bargaining. It held that the proposal was not limited to 
present teachers in the unit who might have later become administrators, 
nor was it limited to administrators who were in the bargaining unit 
as teachers in the past. Instead, the proposal related to administrators 
who were not at the time and may never have been members of the bargaining 
unit. Therefore, the Court held that the proposal illegally sought 
to impose mandatory bargaining for the benefit of persons who were 
excluded both from the Act and from the bargaining unit. 
For proposal, made by public school district in negotiating 
a collective bargaining agreement, to be within scope of 
mandatory bargaining under Public Employment Relations Act, 
proposal must come within the meaning of one of subjects 
listed as mandatory in Act, and there must be no legal 
prohibition against bargaining on the particular topic 
(123, p. 470). 
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Woodbine Community School District v. Public Employment Relations Board 
and Woodbine Education Association (124) 
A difference arose between the Woodbine Community School District 
and the Woodbine Education Association concerning whether a proposal 
establishing the number of hours teachers must earn to advance on the 
salary schedule, and the kind of hours acceptable for such movement 
constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining. The proposal further 
stated that teachers who did not comply with the hours requirement 
were to remain stationary on the salary schedule. The district argued 
that the proposals were mandatory under the Act, while the association 
took the position that they were permissive in that they constituted 
work rules and disciplinary action. Responding to the district's 
request for an expedited resolution, the PERB ruled the proposals to 
be permissive. 
The Supreme Court ruled the case to be controlled by prior deci­
sions of PERB and of itself. In Charles City Education Association 
(122) the court said the nature of credit hours to be earned in order 
to advance along an established salary scale was not a mandatory subject 
of negotiation. In another decision the PERB had distinguished between 
the number of hours and the kind of hours, holding the former to be a 
mandatory subject and the latter a permissive one. The Court rejected 
the argument that the proposal was disciplinary. It said it was rather 
intended to sharpen teaching skills, to maintain teaching standards, 
and to keep abreast of changing educational theories. The decision 
to freeze those who did not comply was not disciplinary. It was 
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simply a recognition of the fact those better qualified should be ad­
vanced along the salary scale. 
Fort Dodge Community School District v. Public Employment Relations 
Board and Fort Dodge Education Association (125) 
Faced with the problem of declining enrollment, the Fort Dodge 
Community School District adopted a plan providing cash incentives 
for early retirement for teachers sixty years of age or older. Adoption 
of the policy evoked a prohibited practice complaint before the PERB 
by the Fort Dodge Education Association. The employee organization 
asserted that the plan was a mandatory subject of bargaining and the 
district had violated the Act by unilaterally adopting it. The PERB 
concurred with this position and ordered the district to negotiate the 
plan with the association. The district court reversed the PERB. 
The Supreme Court reiterated its position that legislative intent 
was to narrowly define the list of mandatory subjects of bargaining. 
It held that if the legislature had intended to give "wages" the broad 
application the association claimed, it would have been unnecessary 
to include in the list of mandatory subjects as many wage-related 
items such as insurance, vacations, overtime compensation, and supple­
mental pay. Further, the terminology "supplemental pay" meant pay for 
rendering a service, directly related to time, skill, and nature of 
those services. It was not intended to be tied solely to a person's 
age, as was the cash incentive plan of the district. 
Statute providing list of mandatory subjects of bargaining 
between public employer and employee organization was in­
tended to carve out specific, narrowly defined, exceptions 
for mandatory negotiation (125, p. 181). 
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Saydel Education Association v. Public Employment Relations Board 
and Saydel Consolidated School District (126) 
During the course of collective bargaining between the district 
and the association for a collective bargaining agreement for the 
1981-82 school year, a dispute arose over the district's proposed 
means of effecting transfers and staff reductions. The district's 
proposal involved the consideration of seniority, experience, educa­
tion, relative skill and ability, and other criteria in making a 
decision about voluntary transfers and teacher retention in the 
face of staff reduction. The association contended that the district 
must make those decisions solely on the basis of seniority unless the 
resulting staff would no longer comply with state minimum standards. 
The PERB ruled that the criteria sought by the district fell within 
the meaning of the statutory phrases "transfer procedures" and "procedures 
for staff reduction" as found in section 20.9, The Code. District 
court affirmed the PERB's ruling. 
The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the PERB and the district 
court, ruling that the legislature did not intend to place the severe 
limitations on a public employer's ability to maintain staff quality 
which would follow the association's construction of section 20.9. 
School district's proposal that certain criteria, other than 
seniority, including skill, ability, and experience, be 
considered by school district in connection with transfer 
or staff reductions was mandatory subject of bargaining 
under the Public Employment Relations Act; proposed criteria 
are encompassed within mandatory subjects of "transfer 
procedures" and "procedures for staff reduction," notwith­
standing that criterion of "seniority" is separately listed 
in mandatory bargaining statute, unlike criteria of skill, 
ability, and experience, in view of fact that "seniority" 
has meaning apart from transfer or staff-reduction procedures 
(126, p. 486). 
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Professional Staff Association of Area Education Agency 12 v. Public 
Employment Relations Board and Western Hills Area Education Agency 12 
(127) 
During the course of negotiations for a collective bargaining 
agreement between the association and the agency, a dispute arose 
over the bargaining status of two proposals submitted by the association. 
The first was a proposal which required the agency to reimburse all 
employees upon termination of their employment, a rate equal to one-half 
of their unused sick leave, up to one hundred thirty-five days. The 
second was a severance pay proposal in which the agency would follow 
a formula in the proposal to provide a similar payment to all departing 
employees with at least five years of service to the agency. The 
agency concluded the proposals were not mandatory and filed a petition 
for expedited resolution with the PERB. The PERB determined that 
neither proposal was illegal, but that both were permissive subjects 
of bargaining. District court affirmed the PERB. 
The Supreme Court found that the compensatory nature of sick 
leave made it a mandatory subject, unlike the proposals involved here. 
The payment of unused sick leave was not directly related to services 
rendered, or to the time, skill, and nature of additional services, 
but rather a form of severance pay. The circumstance that would trigger 
payment was the termination of employment, not the performance of any 
primary or extra services. 
Public Employment Relations Act specifically lists issues 
which are mandatory bargaining topics, and such list is a 
definition, rather than a description, of mandatory bar­
gaining topics under the Act; an issue must fall within 
one of those listed by statute, I.C.A. 20.9, to be a 
mandatory bargaining topic (127, p. 516). 
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Apllngton Community School District and Iowa Association of School 
Boards v. Iowa Public Employment Relations Board and Aplington 
» Education Association (6) 
During negotiations between the Aplington Community School District 
and the Aplington Education Association, the association proposed that 
an article on evaluations be included in the contract. Language in 
this proposal established evaluation criteria to be utilized within 
the evaluation procedure. Additionally, the proposal constructed a 
grievance procedure to be used within the context of evaluation. A 
disagreement arose as to the bargaining status of these proposals 
and the association filed a petition with the PERB seeking an 
expedited resolution as to whether the two proposals were mandatory 
subjects of bargaining. The PERB held a hearing and issued its ruling 
that both proposals were mandatory subjects. District court reversed 
the PERB's decision. 
The Supreme Court, citing its decision in Saydel (124), stated 
the term "procedures" in the PERA had a broader meaning than it had 
been given in previous PERB decisions, and concluded that the term 
"procedures" necessarily included substantive criteria. The evaluation 
procedures criteria proposed by the association in this case had 
similarities to the impasse procedures criteria in that some comparisons 
of substantive factors were involved. No principled difference existed 
between the use of the terminology in the two cases. 
Northeast Community School District v. Public Employment Relations 
Board (128) 
During the course of negotiations between the Northeast Community 
School District and the Northeast Education Association, a dispute 
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arose very similar in nature to that of Aplington (6) and Saydel (126). 
Four proposals submitted by the association dealing with evaluation 
criteria and procedures for grieving erroneous or inappropriate evalua­
tions became the center of a dispute between the two parties who dis­
agreed as to their bargaining status. The PERB was requested to issue 
an expedited resolution of negotiability regarding the proposals, and 
did so, ruling that they were all mandatory. District court, however, 
reversed PERB finding that the terms "evaluation procedures" and 
"evaluation criteria" were mutually exclusive under section 279.14, 
The Code. 
The Supreme Court held that its ruling in Aplington (6) effectively 
disposed of three of the four proposals. It found the fourth proposal, 
involving remediation procedures, to be substantially the same as 
language ruled mandatory in the Aplington proposal. It stated that 
remediation is a part of the evaluation procedure, and evaluation would 
be incomplete without it. 
Remediation proposal, which required principal to identify 
problems and offer suggestions, was part of teacher evalua­
tion procedures and thus, except for portion requiring 
building principal to perform remediation, constituted 
mandatory subject of bargaining between teachers' associa­
tion and school district (128, p. 46). 
Impasse Arbitration 
West Des Moines Community School District v. West Des Moines Educational 
Support Personnel (129) 
The West Des Moines Educational Support Personnel, a union repre­
senting the nonprofessional employees of the district, and the West 
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Des Moines School District had entered into a collectively bargained 
contract. A provision of that contract stipulated that the employees 
would work a seven and one-half hour day with a half-hour duty free 
lunch free period and with two fifteen-minute coffee breaks. The 
union argued that the employees should be paid for the duty-free 
lunch period. The district declined. The union filed a grievance 
with the school board which was rejected, whereupon it sought an 
arbitrator's decision. The arbitrator ruled for the union. 
The Supreme Court, affirming the arbitrator, ruled that although 
the arbitrator interpreted the contract in a way the school district 
did not, such interpretation did not alter the intent, of the contract. 
Fact that arbitrator, acting pursuant to binding arbitration 
clause in contract between nonprofessional school employee 
union and school district concerning dispute as to pay for 
"duty-free" lunch period, interpreted contract in a way 
school district would not, and in a manner reviewing court 
might not, did not render arbitrator's interpretation an 
alteration of contract terms (129, p. 625). 
West Pes Moines Education Association v. Public Employment Relations 
Board and Iowa Association of School Boards (130) 
The essence of the dispute involved the meaning of the words 
"impasse item" as used in Iowa Code sections 20.22(3) and 20.22(11). 
In June 1976, the association filed a petition with the PERB asking 
for a declaratory ruling on such meaning, and PERB responded, holding 
that the phrase "impasse item" as used in the PERA meant subject 
category. PERB ruled that parties must submit their final offers on 
a subject category to the arbitrator. On appeal, the district court 
reversed PERB, ruling that the phrase referred to any word, clause, 
phrase, sentence, or paragraph upon which the parties to arbitration 
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were in disagreement. 
The Supreme Court based its reversal of district court on the nature 
of final offer arbitration as opposed to conventional arbitration. 
In final offer arbitration, as mandated by the PERA, the arbitrator 
must select the position of one of the parties and may not select 
a compromise position. In conventional arbitration, the arbitrator 
could tailor a remedy somewhere between the last offers of both 
parties. 
A problem commonly perceived concerning this latter approach was 
its "narcotic effect." This problem was believed to stem from the 
arbitrator's real or imagined tendency to split the difference between 
the parties' positions. Management argued that because the employee 
organization was primarily the demanding party in negotiations, with 
conventional arbitration as the end result, true collective bargaining 
would not occur if the employee representative felt ultimate victory 
lies in the hands of the arbitrator rather than at the bargaining 
table. In order to limit this effect, the legislature required a 
form of arbitration which circumscribed the arbitrator's discretionary 
power, final offer arbitration. The effect of this was to encourage 
mutual agreement before arbitration because a third party would select 
one of the offers as binding with no compromise between the positions. 
The court reasoned that because the purpose of the procedure was 
to enhance the reasonableness of the offers, and reduce the discretion 
of the arbitrator, anything which served to fractionalize a particular 
subject would likely erode the effectiveness of the procedure. Therefore, 
the final offers must be submitted on a subject category basis. 
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In interpreting any statute, court must determine the intent 
of the legislature and court's construction of statute must 
be sensibly and fairly made with a view of carrying out 
legislature's intent (130, p. 118). 
Maquoketa Valley Community School District v. Maquoketa Valley Education 
Association (131) 
In September 1975 the district and the association began negotia­
tions to reach their first collective bargaining agreement. By the 
end of 1975 the parties had reached agreement on all subjects except 
salary and supplemental pay. Mediation was unsuccessful. In January 
of 1976 the parties went to fact-finding. The association accepted 
but the district rejected the fact-finder's findings and recommendations. 
On February 24, the district filed a request with the PERB for binding 
arbitration. A tripartite panel of arbitrators was selected. The 
panel's first meeting was held March 18, at which presentations and 
arguments were heard from both parties supporting their final offers. 
During this hearing the parties agreed on supplemental pay and withdrew 
that issue from arbitration. Sometime in April, well beyond the fifteen 
days required by statute, the panel chairman sent the other arbitrators 
and PERB an "Award of Neutral Chairman." The association arbitrator 
sent a letter "voting" for the award. The district sought a declaratory 
judgment that the award was invalid because it incorrectly defined 
"impasse item" and the decision was not timely. The trial court over­
ruled the district. 
The Supreme Court, after noting that the district had not utilized 
the proper vehicle for challenging the award, ruled that the arbitrators 
had violated the final offer concept by selecting the association's 
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final offer on every aspect of the salary schedule but adding in the non-
degree lane proposed by the district. The panel should have selected 
either offer, or the fact-finder's decision in total. The Court also 
ruled that an arbitrator's decision rendered more than fifteen days 
after the panel's first meeting is unenforceable. 
Arbitration of a collective bargaining impasse under Public 
Employment Relations Act is "agency action" and reviewable 
only pursuant to Administrative Procedure Act (131, p. 510). 
Sergeant Bluff-Luton Education Association, Lorraine Stodden and Lois 
Moore v. Sergeant Bluff-Luton Community School District (132) 
Moore and Stodden were hired as teachers in the Sergeant Bluff-
Luton School District in 1975 and 1965, respectively. They were both 
placed on the existing salary schedule at steps lower than those 
commensurate with their years of experience. They were maintained at 
those steps after the collective bargaining agreement became effective. 
The association and the teachers sought to have their placement adjusted 
according to language in the contract which they interpreted as requiring 
credit on the salary schedule for all experience. The district refused 
to make any adjustments in this regard. The teachers filed a grievance 
alleging erroneous interpretation or application of the agreement by 
the district. As a final step in the grievance procedure, arbitration 
was invoked. 
The arbitrator found in favor of the teachers, ordering their 
advancement on the schedule and additional pay retroactive to April 
1977. The district refused to abide by the arbitrator's decision, and 
the association and the teachers brought an action in equity to 
enforce the arbitrator's award and to recover attorney's fees from 
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the district. The district court refused to enforce the arbitrator's 
decision. 
The Supreme Court stated several reasons to favor a broad scope 
of arbitrator authority and a corresponding restriction of judicial 
involvement in the process. It held arbitration to be a faster 
process, that it drew upon the expertise of persons in the field, 
and was less expensive. It felt that the Court should not "second 
guess" the arbitrator, and thereby nullify those advantages. Binding 
arbitration should be final, and not binding only if the Court agrees 
with the arbitrator's conclusion. The Court ruled that the arbitrator 
drew his award from the essence of the collective bargaining agreement 
and should be enforced. With regard to attorney's fees, the Court 
ruled that such fees could only be collected if evidence of bad faith 
was presented. Such was not the case in this instance. 
Once arbitrability of the issue is established, sole question 
to be determined by the court on review of arbitrator's 
award is whether the arbitrator's award drew its essence 
from the collective bargaining agreement; it is not the 
function of the court to determine whether arbitrator has 
resolved grievance correctly (132, p. 144). 
Ottumwa Education Association v. Ottumwa Community School District (133) 
An employee of the Ottumwa School District applied for the position 
of junior high counselor at another school in the district, but the 
position was filled from outside. He claimed that in so doing, the 
district violated that part of the collective bargaining agreement 
relating to transfer procedure and staff reduction. He filed a 
grievance and it was duly processed at the lower levels and ultimately 
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denied by the superintendent. This set the stage for compulsory 
and binding arbitration of the dispute under the agreement. The 
district was notified that the association intended to pursue arbitration 
on behalf of the teacher. It refused to proceed to arbitration or to 
meet with the association to select an arbitrator. 
The association filed a petition in district court to force the 
district to arbitration and the district answered that it should 
not be so compelled because the grievance alleged was not a violation 
of the contract, and the subject matter of the grievance fell within 
an area of determination reserved exclusively to the employer under 
section 20.7, The Code. The district's position was upheld by the 
trial court. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded for 
arbitration. It reasoned that the school district should not be 
permitted to defeat the association's right to binding arbitration by 
asserting that the contract provisions did not apply. These were the 
very matters within the scope of what had been agreed to be arbitrated. 
It did not agree that section 20.7 retained for the employer a right 
to act unilaterally on matters that have been made the subject of 
collective bargaining. 
Dubuque Community School District v. Dubuque Education Association, 
Margaret Tyler and Lenard Heath (134) 
Tyler and Heath were teachers in the Dubuque School District, 
represented for collective bargaining purposes by the association. 
Prior to February 20, 1978, they signed and returned the regular 
teaching contract for the 1978-79 school year. The contracts were 
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subsequently approved by the district. During the following summer 
both teachers were informed that the district had unilaterally amended 
their contracts, assigning them additional duties, for which they 
would be compensated. They had each performed similar extra duties 
in the past and had both resisted the reassignment of them. Both 
teachers subsequently filed grievances with respect to the assign­
ments, asserting they were in violation of specified portions of the 
agreement. The grievances proceeded through the first three levels 
of the process and were denied by the superintendent. Arbitration 
was requested under level four of the procedure. 
At the hearing the association took the position that such assign­
ments beyond the regular seven and one-half hour work day were 
voluntary and need not be accepted by teachers. The district took the 
position that it had the right to make mandatory extra-duty assignments 
under section 20.7, The Code, and that such right could not be 
abrogated by any provision of the agreement. The arbitrator issued 
a written decision sustaining the grievance of the teachers. Upon 
challenge in the district court, the arbitrator's ruling was vacated. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that the arbitrator had sustained 
the grievances on a procedural ground (how and when such extra-duty 
assignments should be made), and not within the matters submitted to 
arbitration. It held that if the arbitrator's reasoning were allowed 
to stand, the district could never make extra-duty work assignments 
for the school year after the preceding spring, unless the individual 
teachers involved consented. This was not the language of the master 
contract or the individual contracts. 
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Iowa City Community School District v. Iowa City Education Association 
(135) 
Richard D. Brisco, a social studies teacher with the Iowa City 
Community School System, was notified in March 1980 that his 1980-81 
salary would be frozen at the 1979-80 level because of "unsatisfactory 
service." The collective bargaining agreement between the district 
and the association contained a grievance procedure culminating in 
binding arbitration for alleged violations, misinterpretations, or mis­
applications of specific provisions of the contract. A salary schedule 
was among the specific contract provisions, along with language that 
entitled teachers to step increases with every completed year of 
service, subject to the right of the district to withhold such increases 
for unsatisfactory performance. 
The association pursued grievance procedures in Brisco's behalf 
through binding arbitration, where a favorable award was gained. 
The school district filed a petition in district court to have the 
award vacated. The court rejected the district's argument. Upon 
further appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court, and 
the Supreme Court granted review. 
The Supreme Court reinstated the arbitrator's award, reasoning 
that nothing in the contract provided a positive assurance that the 
dispute was not arbitrable. The district's right to withhold a salary 
increase depended on the teacher's "unsatisfactory" performance. The 
contract did not define the term. Unless the parties to an agreement 
limited their submission, the arbitrator became the final judge of 
the facts and law. Even if the arbitrator made a mistake in arriving 
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at his decision, it was not a basis for upsetting his award. The 
Court could not presume that an arbitrator had exceeded his authority 
merely because it might disagree with his reasoning. 
Arbitrator's decision regarding unsatisfactory performance 
standard in collective bargaining agreement between school 
district and teachers union "drew its essence" from the 
collective bargaining agreement, and thus arbitrator did 
not exceed his authority (135, p. 140). 
Iowa State Education Association v. Public Employment Relations Board 
(136) 
The Iowa State Education Association posed a hypothetical situa­
tion involving impasse resolution to the PERB. The question assumed 
the existence of both the association and a school district which had 
in place clearly developed and ascertainable personnel policies 
with respect to all areas of mandatory bargaining under Iowa Code 
section 20.9. During the course of the hypothetical bargaining 
process, both sides presented positions with regard to mandatory 
subjects of bargaining, but no agreement was reached, either in 
negotiations or in subsequent mediation. 
During the fact-finding hearing which followed, the district, 
maintaining that it had adequate policies to cover the issues under 
discussion and that the policies compared favorably to other districts, 
asked the fact-finder to either not make a recommendation about these 
topics or to recommend that the existing policies be incorporated into 
the contract. ISEA's question to PERB was whether a fact-finder could 
in fact, make a recommendation that there not be a contract provision 
on an unresolved mandatory topic, and whether an arbitrator could then 
adopt the position of the fact-finder, thereby denying the parties 
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a bargaining agreement on a mandatory subject. PERB agreed that 
should a fact-finder adopt such a position, it would limit the choices 
of the arbitrator, and that an arbitrator could adopt the same 
position, but felt that it would be inappropriate to forbid a fact­
finder the ability to make such a decision. ISEA petitioned the 
district court for judicial review. That court concluded that the 
PERB ruling was a proper interpretation of the provisions of the 
PERA. 
The Supreme Court reversed the arbitrator's ruling. It held that 
the ruling confused discretion to recommend some solution with discretion 
to recommend no solution. It cited PERB's own rules requiring that a 
recommendation be made by fact-finders with respect to all topics 
of mandatory bargaining on a subject category basis. With regard to 
arbitration, the Court ruled that it was the intent of the legislature 
that the PERA establish the means of assuring fruition of a bargaining 
agreement establishing the rights and obligations of both parties on 
all topics of mandatory bargaining. The Court said it was not permissible 
for an arbitrator's decision to leave a submitted topic of mandatory 
bargaining unsettled. 
It is only necessary in operation of final stage of impasse 
process, under statutes governing public employee collective 
bargaining disputes that all impasse issues are resolved 
in manner which clearly reveals what collective bargaining 
agreement is (136, p. 793). 
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CHAPTER XII; SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Need for the Study 
This study was undertaken to assist educators, board members, 
school district employees, and any other persons interested in 
gaining a more complete knowledge of school law. Its purpose is to 
provide general knowledge of the laws that govern school districts in 
Iowa as interpreted by the judiciary system at the top of Iowa's 
appellate court structure, the Iowa Court of Appeals and the Iowa 
Supreme Court. 
Statement of the Problem 
The laws under which schools in Iowa operate are established by 
the legislature. These laws may be expanded upon by various administra­
tive agencies within the authorized governmental structure. This is 
accomplished through the establishment of administrative rules. The 
statutes and these rules are ultimately interpreted through court 
decisions when disputes arise as to their application in a specified 
situation. It is important for school authorities to have a clear 
concept of not only the statutes, but they also must possess timely 
knowledge of the interpretation of them through the courts' decisions. 
Procedures and Techniques Used in the Study 
Decisions of the Iowa Court of Appeals and the Iowa Supreme Court 
as reported in the Second Series of the North Western Reporter since 
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1970 constituted the primary sources of information for this study. 
These decisions were analyzed for the following components: (1) facts, 
(2) issues, (3) decisions, and (4) reasons. They were then grouped 
chronologically by category and summarized. Where appropriate, a 
summary of legislation enacted recently affecting the category under 
discussion was included at the end of the chapter. Other sources of 
information utilized included the Code of Iowa, 1985, School Laws 
of Iowa, 1985, and Summaries of Legislation from 1970 through 1988. 
Ample citations to the Code of Iowa and case law were included to 
assist in further research in any of the areas discussed. 
Delimitations of the Study 
The cases reviewed were only those of the Supreme Court of Iowa 
and the Iowa Court of Appeals. No attempt was made to research unre­
ported cases from lower court jurisdictions, nor was a study attempted 
of the substantial record of Public Employment Relations Board decisions 
that were not challenged in court. 
The review of legal principles included in this study were limited 
to the state of Iowa. In order to apply them to any other specific 
state, a review of statutes and administrative rules of that state 
would be necessary. 
The decisions presented herein represent interpretations of 
statutes and rules that were in place at the time of the hearing. 
Due to the dynamic nature of school law, they may or may not remain 
viable over the course of time. Thus, persons interested in these 
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issues must be constantly alert to changes in legislation and to 
, consequent court decisions. 
Following are indications of current trends in the decision-making 
processes of the Iowa courts. Specific case summaries are contained in 
the previous chapters. A listing of individual cases by category is 
found in Appendix I. It is hoped that school authorities who find 
themselves involved in similar situations will benefit from these 
cases of record. 
School Districts 
School districts are the basic units of school government in the 
State of Iowa. They operate as corporations with limited powers 
under Chapter 274 of the Code of Iowa. 
School districts are authorized to provide a free education to 
students who are bona fide residents of the district by virtue of their 
parents' or legal guardians' place of residence within the district. 
Districts may also allow nonresident students to attend classes in 
other than their district of residence providing that a tuition fee 
is paid to the district of attendance. The amount of that fee is 
established by the legislature and the Department of Public Education. 
School districts may themselves tuition their students into other 
districts under certain circumstances. It is anticipated that an in­
crease in such activity will result from the recent emphasis on whole-
grade sharing between neighboring school districts. 
Unlike most corporations, school districts may not incur original in­
debtedness by issuing bonds until authorized to do so by the voters of the 
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school district. Such bonds are utilized to acquire property, construct 
buildings, and repair and maintain all district-owned facilities. 
For many years the Iowa public schools were immune to suit for tor­
tious acts because they were considered agencies of the state. Chapter 
613A of the Code of Iowa now assigns responsibility for torts to munici­
palities and their officers and employees, acting within the scope of 
their employment or duties. School districts are included within the 
meaning of the term "municipality." A tort is a civil wrong which results 
in the death or injury to a person or to property rights, and it includes 
actions based upon negligence, error or omission, nuisance, breach of 
duty, or denial or impairment of constitutional or statutory right. 
The areas of separation of church and state and compulsory attendance 
to an approved school have become matters of judicial review in recent 
years. At issue is the right of the state to establish educational stan­
dards for private religious schools and to require evidence of compliance 
with such standards from the directors of such schools and the parents of 
children who attend them. The legislature has established a single in­
stance when an exemption has been granted to state, standards and reporting 
requirements in the case of the Amish communities in Iowa, and the courts 
have steadfastly refused to expand this exemption to other religious 
groups absent the specific characteristics of the Amish society. 
In recent years there has been significant legislative interest in 
the educational programs and standards of the public schools of Iowa. 
This is reflective of a revived national interest in the accomplishments 
of public and private schools, and it is likely to continue to be a source 
of legislation and rules in the near future. Although the courts have 
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not had a great deal of opportunity to address standards and approval 
during the time period covered by this study, it is an area that will 
bear observation and study, both in terms of increasing standards and 
the attempts of school districts to meet them. 
Boards of Education 
Members of boards of directors of school districts are officials 
of the state. They are elected locally to represent a specific 
jurisdiction and are ultimately responsible to the state agencies 
which have authority over public education in Iowa. Boards of directors 
may be comprised of either five or seven members, depending upon the 
size of the district, and in some cases, the wishes of the voters of 
the school district. The terms of board members rotate and are so 
arranged that an entire board is not elected at the same time. Most 
board terms are three years in length. 
Boards are given broad discretion in making decisions to employ 
counsel and run the local district's affairs. The authority for 
their actions is found in Chapter 279 of the Code of Iowa. In the 
cases reviewed, the courts have been reluctant to second-guess the 
judgment of local boards, absent a violation of procedure or law. 
In most cases, meetings of school boards must be open to the 
public. Closed or executive session may be held under certain circum­
stances which are detailed in Chapter 21 of the Code. In the cases 
where the legality of a closed meeting has been challenged, the courts 
have looked beyond the act to the intent of the board in holding the 
meeting and the likelihood that a similar violation would occur in 
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the future, before reaching a conclusion. The courts have held that 
contracts approved in a closed meeting, even though such action is 
violative of the law, are neither void nor voidable. 
The role of a school board member is a dynamic one, being 
susceptible to the constantly changing role of schools in society. 
In light of recent legislation in these areas, it is likely that 
boards of directors of public schools will be faced with increased 
responsibilities in the area of health and safety, standards and 
program evaluation, and personnel evaluation. 
Buildings and Grounds 
School districts are authorized to acquire and hold property in 
the name of the state. They may build facilities and purchase land 
for all types of school use, including playgrounds, athletic fields, 
and transportation facilities. Such authorization is found in Chapter 
297 of the Code of Iowa. Districts are required to advertise for and 
accept bids for construction, demolition, erection, alteration, or 
repair of a school facility when the cost for such work exceeds 
twenty-five thousand dollars. The process of letting bids is a quasi-
judicial function of the school district and may be reviewed by writ 
of certiorari (request for certified record). 
Districts have some discretion in the manner in which they 
handle the bid-letting process so long as they adhere to statutory 
guidelines. A district may split bids for a project totaling twenty-
five thousand dollars or more, thereby obtaining several projects that 
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do not equal that amount individually but equal or exceed it collectively, 
so long as they treat each project as though it met the requirements 
for bid-letting. A district may not split the project to avoid the 
bid-letting process. 
Generally the courts have been reluctant to interfere with the 
local district's determination of who has submitted the lowest 
responsible bid, absent indications that the determination was 
fraudulent, arbitrary, in bad faith, or an abuse of discretion. They 
have consistently ruled that an unsuccessful bidder has no standing 
to appeal the district's decision, so long as the district has acted 
in good faith. 
Prior to recent legislative action, school districts were under 
some constraints regarding the sale of unused buildings and sites. 
The current status of legislation gives school boards the authority 
to dispose of property at their discretion, requiring only that a public 
hearing be held prior to such disposal if the property in question is 
valued at more than twenty-five thousand dollars. 
Personnel 
The largest number of court cases reviewed in this study are in 
the area of personnel. School boards employ a variety of certificated 
and classified individuals to accomplish the mission of the district, 
and they expend a greater portion of their budget in so doing than 
in any other area of expenditure. Of all the employees of a school 
district, school boards are most regulated by statute in their attempts 
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to employ, evaluate, discipline, terminate, or retain certificated 
» staff members. For the purpose of this study, the terminology 
"certificated staff" refers to teachers and administrators exclusively. 
The Code of Iowa is specific in its determination of the procedures 
to be followed when action is taken relevant to the contract of a 
certificated employee. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States is also brought to bear by application of the 
concepts of "due process" in personnel actions. Recent Federal Supreme 
Court interpretations have focused attention on the property right of 
an individual to his or her job, as a means of livelihood. Courts 
are reluctant to take this property interest away from an employee 
without assurances that all safeguards have been utilized and that the 
individual has been given ample opportunity to be notified of his or 
her situation, to be afforded a fair hearing, and to be given an 
opportunity to remediate. 
In Iowa, the first two years of employment by a certificated staff 
member are probationary in nature. The safeguards for employment 
for these individuals are not as extensive as those for nonprobationary 
employees. Nevertheless, such individuals have a right under the 
statute to be notified and to request a private hearing before the 
board. The decision of the board is final and binding at this point 
so long as there has been no violation of a constitutional right or 
of the public employee rights of the employee under Chapter 20 of the 
Code. 
Staff reduction has been fertile ground for litigation in recent 
years, due to statewide factors of declining enrollment and financial 
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constraints. The courts have generally upheld the district's right 
to make a determination that staff reduction is necessary, ruling 
that the lack of need for an individual's services alone is just cause 
for terminating a contract. At the same time, the courts have been 
insistent that all parties follow the procedural guidelines established 
by the legislature. Failure to do so by one party or the other has 
often resulted in an adverse decision for that party. 
The matter of contract termination for cause is equally reliant 
upon procedural considerations. The courts have not been tolerant 
of contract terminations that appear to be arbitrary or capricious 
in nature, or that were incorrectly instigated at the outset. A 
school board may not, of its own instigation, move to terminate the 
contract of a teacher. In so doing, it becomes the judge of its own 
decision-making process at the hearing level. The court has ruled 
that such situations preclude an individual's ability to be heard 
before an impartial tribunal, thereby violating his or her due process 
rights. 
In the instance of mental or physical disability of a certificated 
employee, districts are required to look farther in their evaluation 
of that employee's ability to perform his or her job than they might 
be required under another circumstance. The courts have not precluded 
the dismissal of an employee under those circumstances, but have 
indicated that boards should proceed on grounds other than inattention 
to duty and incompetence. 
Certificated employees may be discharged from their duties if they 
have failed to respond to remediation or have become uncooperative 
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with their fellow employees and administrators. The court has stated 
that school districts are not married to mediocrity but may dismiss 
personnel who are neither performing high quality work nor improving 
in performance. School boards are required to produce a preponderance 
of evidence to support their claims in certificated employee dismissal 
proceedings. 
The concept of a one-year-only teaching contract has been 
ruled illegal by the courts. A district may not contract with a 
teacher on a year-to-year basis to avoid the continuing contract law 
if the teacher has achieved nonprobationary status. Recent legisla­
tion recognizes only two types of teaching contracts, probationary 
and continuing. The legislature has also moved to separate athletic 
coaching contracts from teaching contracts in recent years, and it has 
written guidelines for the termination of such contracts. 
Moral and behavioral issues are relevant to the ability of a 
teacher to maintain his or her position within a school district to 
the extent that they affect the individual's credibility with the 
students, the parents, and the community. School boards have not 
been vested by the legislature with unlimited power to dismiss an 
individual whose personal or private conduct has incurred its disap­
proval regardless of its likely or actual effect upon his or her 
teaching. The courts have allowed the introduction of polygraph 
evidence in board hearings under certain conditions. 
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Students 
According to statute, all children over the age of seven and under 
the age of sixteen who are physically and mentally able must attend 
some public school, or in the alternative, a private school providing 
equivalent instruction, for at least one hundred twenty days per school 
year. The statute lists five reasons for exception from this attendance 
requirement. Students may be excluded from school for violations of 
board regulations, for immorality, or when the presence of a student 
is determined to be detrimental to the best interests of the school. 
Most of the court cases involving students reviewed by this 
study involve instances of alleged tort liability wherein a student 
received an injury while under the care of the school. As is the case 
in personnel-related litigation, observance of statutory procedure 
and timelines are central to many suits. In other areas the courts 
were asked to look at student supervision in terms of its adequacy 
for the activity in which the injured student had been engaged. Courts 
have been reluctant to place a burden of additional supervision for 
physical activities upon the school when the school has been able 
to demonstrate that it has exercised responsible actions in the past. 
In the area of special education placement, the court has ruled 
that such students may be excluded from school, but only when the 
district has determined that no reasonable alternative is available. 
The courts have also maintained the position that parity of educational 
opportunity between special education students and others must exist. 
A district must strive to meet the needs of special education students 
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with the same level of effort which it devotes to meeting the needs 
of nonhandicapped children. The Iowa standard does not require an 
unlimited commitment of resources and effort in meeting the needs of 
each handicapped child. 
School District Reorganization 
The reorganization of school districts has been an issue that has 
lain quiet in Iowa courtrooms over the period researched in this 
study. This has been in contrast to a great deal of activity cen­
tering upon district reorganization prior to 1971. The responsibility 
for overseeing such reorganizations has been given to the area education 
agencies created by the legislature in 1974. Each education agency 
is required to develop and keep on file reorganization plans for 
districts within its area, and to review them periodically. 
An alternative to district reorganization that has become more 
viable in recent years is the concept of whole-grade sharing between 
school districts. The legislature has encouraged this concept, and 
in certain cases, has provided financial incentives to smaller districts 
to move in this direction. 
Elections 
A school district depends upon direct referendum for two major 
aspects of its operation. School board members are elected for terms 
of office on a rotating schedule that requires at least one member 
be elected every year. The other major aspect is the solicitation 
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of voter approval to undertake indebtedness, and thereby increase 
the amount of property taxes levied to support the district. 
The latter category of election has been the most litigated one 
over the time period reviewed by this study, albeit even that activity 
has been relatively quiet. The Supreme Court has defended the require­
ment that bond issue elections be carried by a sixty percent, or extra-
majority vote, in spite of challenges that such a requirement defeats 
the one-person one-vote concept. The court has also upheld the right 
of college students who live in the district of their college attendance 
to declare it to be their residence for voting purposes, even though 
their parents live elsewhere. There is a certain contradictory nature 
to these decisions in that the rationale for the former decision involved 
a concern for the long-term effect of such indebtedness and the need 
for the district to be cautious in its undertaking, while the latter 
decision seems to empower students of local colleges to participate 
in approving long-term commitments which they likely would not help 
defray. 
Collective Bargaining 
The enactment of the Public Employment Relations Act in 1975 has 
had significant impact upon the operation of school districts in Iowa. 
The Act provides that public employees may organize and bargain 
collectively with their employers through representatives of their 
own choosing. The subjects upon which they may bargain are specified 
by the Act in a "laundry list" fashion which provides a more limited 
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scope than traditional National Labor Relations Act language encom­
passing wages, hours, and other tems and conditions of employment. 
Strikes are prohibited by FERA. 
The Act also authorized the establishment of the Public Employ­
ment Relations Board, empowered to administer the Act and provide 
neutrals to resolve bargaining disputes between the parties. Such 
resolution takes the form of mediation, fact-finding, interest or 
contract issue arbitration, and grievance arbitration. 
The Supreme Court or Court of Appeals has been asked to make 
determinations based upon Chapter 20, the PERA, twenty-five times 
since the law was enacted. Procedurally, these cases reach the courts 
on appeal after having been adjudicated by PERB or decided by an 
arbitrator, although direct appeal to the courts is possible in 
certain instances. 
A classification of dispute that has been addressed by the court 
many times is that involved with the determination of the negotiability 
of issues. Parties to negotiations have disagreed on the scope of 
bargaining indicated by the list in Chapter 20 and have asked the 
courts to interpret the same for them. The issues of evaluation 
procedures and transfer procedures are two examples of this type of 
dispute. In both instances, the court ruled that they constitute 
mandatory topics of bargaining under the law. 
The accusation that one party or the other has committed a 
prohibited practice is another dispute brought to the court. Included 
in this category are questions over the interpretation of language 
within a bargained agreement and the implementation thereof. 
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particularly in cases of staff reduction and designation of seniority. 
« The court will not allow preclusion of law through negotiated 
contract language, even though parties may have mutually agreed on 
the issues in question. The standard for review of an arbitrator's 
findings has been to determine that his or her decision was drawn 
from the essence of the contract, not whether another individual would 
have come to the same conclusion. Once the parties to an agreement 
have established procedures under which they will operate, the court 
has insisted they utilize these procedures. Contract language 
may not be arbitrarily abrogated by either party. 
Negotiated contracts are binding upon both parties so long as 
they do not breach the law. Nevertheless, the courts have held that 
school districts have the statutory right and obligation to provide 
the best possible educational opportunities for their students 
through personnel administration. A collectively bargained agreement 
does not void this responsibility nor can it allow the bargaining 
unit to share it. 
Recommendations 
Some recommendations for future consideration and study are ap­
propriate, even though the court system has been generally consistent 
in its decisions with regard to school issues. The constant thread 
throughout the litigation reviewed by this study has been the court's 
reliance upon procedural consistency in determining the legality of an 
action. Prudent school authorities must be knowledgeable about the 
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regulations and laws under which they carry on the business of the 
i district. To that end, it is recommended that a handbook or digest 
of all Iowa Court of Appeals and Supreme Court decisions that affect 
schools be made available to district administrators, area education 
agency administrators, attorneys who avail their services to school 
districts, and those who teach law at the Iowa college level. 
Due to the dynamic nature of the laws of the state, it is likely 
that interpretations will change. Therefore, it is recommended that 
this study be replicated every ten years at the minimum. 
It is apparent from the recent legislative interest in school 
efficiencies in a time of declining enrollment and financial constraint 
that schools will receive continuing attention in these areas. 
New legislative mandates and departmental rules can be expected to 
exert pressure upon districts to reorganize. Parallel to these 
efforts are evidences that stricter approval standards are being 
considered for implementation, and greater expectations in the area 
of personnel evaluation are being formulated. It is recommended that 
a careful analysis of the forthcoming statutes be made in the light 
of procedural requirements for their implementation. Such analysis 
should be provided to school authorities to assist them in their 
efforts to safeguard against unnecessary litigation and to insure 
success when it cannot be avoided. 
Other potential legal issues that will face school districts in 
the near future are those which surround the Environmental Protection 
Agency's regulations regarding encapsulation and removal of asbestos-
containing materials, the Iowa Right-To-Know Rules requiring 
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employers to develop and implement written hazard warning programs 
for the work place, and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act recently adopted by the federal government and administered by 
the United States Department of Education. Such issues present chal­
lenges to school authorities that must be met in a timely fashion. 
To assist in this effort, it is recommended that a handbook of legisla­
tion affecting school districts be developed and distributed to school 
authorities. Such a digest should present not only issues to be ad­
dressed, but procedural considerations and deadlines for compliance 
for each issue. 
As evidenced by the decisions reviewed in this study, school 
authorities need not fear the legal process, and they may choose to 
utilize it constructively to assist in the proper administration of 
the schools of Iowa. In order for that end to be reached with a minimum 
of frustration and needless expenditure of resources, knowledge of the 
law and its interpretation continues to be a significant tool. 
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CASE LISTINGS BY CATEGORY CHART 
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A listing of topics, case titles, issues, and page numbers is 
presented for the convenience of the reader. 
School Districts 
Clinton Community School District v. Anderson — retrieval of 
fines, p. 22 
Hoefer v. Sioux City Community School District — employee health 
insurance, p. 24 
Hubbard v. Des Moines Independent Community School District — 
wage garnishment, p. 23 
Johnson v. Charles City Community School Board of Education — 
religion, compulsory attendance, p. 31 
Kriener v. Turkey Valley Community School District — tort 
liability, p. 30 
Lakota Consolidated Independent School District v. Buffalo 
Center — tuition, p. 27 
Langel v. Board of Supervisors of Carroll County — property tax, 
p. 28 
Maquoketa Community School District v. George — tuition, p. 26 
Sioux City Community School District v. Board of Public In­
struction — employee health insurance, p. 25 
Boards of Education 
Anti-Administration Association v. North Fayette Community School 
District — official meetings, p. 41 
Bishop V. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction — board authority, 
p. 39 
Board of Directors of the Davenport Community School District v. 
The Quad City Times — public disclosure, p. 43 
Keeler v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction — official 
meetings, p. 42 
Buildings and Grounds 
Calamus Community School District v. Glenn Rusch and Jean Rusch — 
reversion and sale, p. 54 
Elview Construction Company, Inc. v. North Scott Community School 
District — bids, p. 51 
Menke v. Board of Education, Independent School District of West 
Burlington — bids, p. 48 
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Unification Church v. Clay Central School District — reversion 
and sale, p. 53 
West Harrison Community School v. Iowa State Board of Public 
Instruction — bids, p. 49 
Personnel 
Ar-We-Va Community School District v. Long — nonprobationary 
teachers, staff reduction, p. 67 
Barnett v. Durant Community School District — tuition reimburse­
ment, p. 106 
Bewley v. Villisca, Iowa Community School District — classified 
employee, military service, p. 125 
Bishop V. Eastern Allamakee Community School District — non-
probationary teacher, contract termination, p. 88 
Briggs V. Board of Directors of the Hinton Community School 
District — administrator contract termination, p. 110 
Board of Directors of the Sioux City Community School District v. 
Ames Mroz — nonprobationary teacher, contract termination, p. 84 
Board of Directors of the South Winneshiek Community School 
District v. Sexton — nonprobationary teacher, contract termination, 
p. 86 
Board of Education of Fort Madison Community School District v. 
Youel — nonprobationary teacher, contract termination, p. 78 
Bruton v. Ames Community School District — nonprobationary teacher, 
contract termination, p. 79 
Cedar Rapids Community School v. Cady — worker's compensation, 
p. 118 
Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Parr — discriminatory 
practices, p. 99 
Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission v. Cedar Rapids Community 
School District — discriminatory practices, p. 98 
Cook V. Plainfleld Community School District — administrator 
contract termination, p. Ill 
Davenport Community School District v. Iowa Civil Rights Com­
mission — discriminatory practices, p. 100 
DeShon v. Bettendorf Community School District — mandatory re­
tirement, p. 102 
Des Moines Independent Community School District v. Department 
of Job Service — unemployment compensation, p. 116 
Drinnin v. Heartland Area Education Agency 11 — sick leave bene­
fits, p. 107 
Erb V. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction — teacher certifica­
tion, p. 96 
Everett v. Board of Education of the Hampton Community School 
District — nonprobationary teacher, contract termination, p. 87 
Fay V. Board of Directors of the North-Linn Community School 
District — nonprobationary teacher, contract termination, p. 83 
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Ferree v. Board of Education of the Benton Community School 
District — probationary teacher, staff reduction, p. 59 
Fitzgerald v. Saydel Consolidated School District — substitute 
teacher, p. 94 
Flanders v. Waterloo Community School District — administrator 
contract termination, p. 109 
Gere v. Council Bluffs Community School District — administrator 
contract termination, p. 113 
Hagarty v. Dysart-Geneseo Community School District — nonproba-
tionary teacher, staff reduction, p. 65 
In the Matter of Waterloo Community School District and William J. 
Gowens — administrator contract termination, p. 114 
Johnson v. Board of Education of the Woden-Crystal Lake Com­
munity School District — nonprobationary teacher, contract termination, 
p. 91 
Johnson v. Harlan Community School District — worker's compensa­
tion, p. 119 
Johnston v. Marion Independent School District — mandatory re­
tirement, p. 101 
Kruse v. Board of Directors of Lamoni Community School District — 
probationary teacher, contract termination, p. 61 
Keith V. Community School District of Wilton — nonprobationary 
teacher, contract termination, p. 76 
Larsen v. Oakland Community School District — probationary teacher, 
contract termination, p. 64 
Libe V. Board of Education of Twin Cedars Community School 
District — nonprobationary teacher, contract termination, p. 89 
McFarland v. Board of Education of the Norwalk Community School 
District — suspension without pay, p. 104 
Moravek v. Davenport Community School District — probationary 
teacher, contract termination, p. 62 
Munger v. The Jesup Community School District — nonprobationary 
teacher, contract termination, p. 85 
Northeast Community Education Association v. Northeast Community 
School District — suspension without pay, p. 105 
Olds V. Board of Education of Nashua Community School District — 
nonprobationary teacher, staff reduction, p. 70 
Orr V. Lewis Central School District — unemployment compensa­
tion, p. 115 
Pocahontas Community School District v. Levene — nonprobationary 
teacher, staff reduction, p. 75 
Rankin v. Board of Education of the Marshalltown Community School 
District — nonprobationary teacher, staff reduction, p. 73 
Shenendoah Education Association v. Shenendoah Community School 
District — nonprobationary teacher, staff reduction, p. 74 
Slockett V. Iowa Valley Community School District — extracurricular 
contract, p. 103 
Smith V. Board of Education of the Mediapolis School District — 
nonprobationary teacher, staff reduction, p. 71 
Smith V. Fort Madison Community School District — nonprobationary 
teacher, contract termination, p. 82 
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Smith V. The Board of Education of the Fort Madison Community 
School District — nonprobationary teacher, contract termination, p. 80 
Spilman v. Board of Directors of Davis County Community School 
District — classified employee, çontract termination, p. 121 
Stafford v. Valley Community School District — probationary 
teacher, contract termination, p. 63 
Valley Educational Support Personnel Association v. Public Employ­
ment Relations Board — classified employee, union activities, p. 124 
Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community School District — classified em­
ployee, contract termination, p. 122 
Von Krog v. Board of Education of the Beaman-Conrad-Liscomb 
Community School District — nonprobationary teacher, staff reduction, 
p. 68 
Waterloo Education Association v. Waterloo Community School 
District — nonprobationary teacher, contract termination, p. 92 
Wedergren v. Board of Directors of the South Tama Community School 
District — administrator contract termination, p. 112 
Wilson V. Des Moines Independent Community School District — 
nonprobationary teacher, contract termination, p. 93 
Wollenzien v. Board of Education of the Manson Community School 
District — nonprobationary teacher, staff reduction, p. 69 
Students 
Buchholtz V. Iowa Department of Public Instruction — special 
education, p. 140 
Bunger v. Iowa High School Athletic Association — eligibility, 
p. 131 
Fosselman v. Waterloo Community School District — student injury, 
p. 133 
Greene v. Tri-County Community School District — student injury, 
p. 137 
Kautman v. Mar-Mac Community School District — student injury, 
p. 136 
Mulinix v. Saydel Consolidated School District — student injury, 
p. 138 
Oliver v. Sioux City Community School District — student injury, 
p. 138 
Shearer v. Perry Community School District — student injury, 
p. 135 
Southeast Warren Community School District v. Department of Public 
Instruction — special education, p. 139 
Sprung V. Rasmussen — student injury, p. 132 
Wong V. Waterloo Community School District — student death, 
p. 134 
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School District Reorganization 
Board of Education of Audubon County v. Joint Board of Education 
of Audubon, Cass, and Shelby Counties — county boards, p. 146 
Bloom V. Arrowhead Education Agency — reorganization proposal, 
p. 148 
Eden Township Board of Directors v. Carroll County Board of 
Education — county boards, p. 145 
Templeton Independent School District v. Carroll County Board of 
Education — county boards, p. 147 
Elections 
Adams v. Fort Madison Community School District — bond election, 
p. 154 
Brutsche v. Coon Rapids Community School District — election chal­
lenge, p. 156 
Paulson V. Forest City Community School District — residence for 
voting purposes, p. 155 
Collective Bargaining 
Anthon-Oto Community School District v. Public Employment Relations 
Board — bargaining unit, p. 166 
Aplington Community School District and Iowa Association of School 
Boards v. Iowa Public Employment Relations Board — negotiability, 
p. 180 
Bettendorf Education Association v. Bettendorf Community School 
District — benefits, p. 168 
Brown v. Public Employment Relations Board — prohibited practice, 
p. 170 
Burlington Community School District v. Public Employment Rela­
tions Board — prohibited practice, p. 169 
Charles City Community School District v. Public Employment Rela­
tions Board — negotiability, p. 172 
Charles City Education Association v. Public Employment Relations 
Board — negotiability, p. 173 
Dubuque Community School District v. Dubuque Education Association, 
Tyler and Heath — impasse arbitration, p. 187 
Dubuque Community School District v. Public Employment Relations 
Board — bargaining unit, p. 167 
Fort Dodge Community School District v. Public Employment Relations 
Board — negotiability, p. 177 
Iowa Association of School Boards and Iowa State Education Associa­
tion V. Iowa Public Employment Relations Board — bargaining unit, 
p. 164 
Iowa City Community School District v. Iowa City Education Associa­
tion — impasse arbitration, p. 189 
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Iowa State Education Association v. Public Employment Relations 
Board —impasse arbitration, p. 190 
Maquoketa Valley Community School District v. Maquoketa Valley 
Education Association — impasse arbitration, p. 184 
Marshalltown Education Association v. Public Employment Relations 
Board — negotiability, p. 174 
Mount Pleasant Community School District v. Public Employment 
Relations Board — election, p. 163 
Northeast Community School District v. Public Employment Relations 
Board — negotiability, p. 180 
Ottumwa Education Association v. Ottumwa Community School 
District — impasse arbitration, p. 186 
Professional Staff Association of Area Education Agency 12 v. 
Public Employment Relations Board — negotiability, p. 179 
Saydel Education Association v. Public Employment Relations 
Board — negotiability, p. 178 
Sergeant Bluff-Luton Education Association, Stodden and Moore v. 
Sergeant Bluff-Luton Community School District — impasse arbitration, 
p. 185 
Service Employees International, Local No. 55 v. Cedar Rapids 
Community School District — working agreement, p. 162 
West Des Moines Community School District v. West Des Moines 
Educational Support Personnel — impasse arbitration, p. 181 
West Des Moines Education Association v. Public Employment Rela­
tions Board — impasse arbitration, p. 182 
Woodbine Community School District v. Public Employment Relations 
Board — negotiability, p. 176 
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APPENDIX III: 
COURT CASES 1971-1988 CHART 
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APPENDIX IV; 
CASE FREQUENCY CHART 
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APPENDIX V: 
CASE DISTRIBUTION CHART -- PERSONNEL 
Court Cases: 1971 — 1988 
Case Distribution 
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Classified 7 
Admin. 6 
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Teacher 42 
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APPENDIX VI: 
CASE DISTRIBUTION CHART -- COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Court Cases: 1971 — 1988 
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Bargaining Unit 3 
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